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ABSTRACT
Politics and Petroleum Development in Argentina, 1916-1930
(May 1973)
James E. Buchanan, B. A., SUC at Potsdam, New York
M. A.
,
University of Massachusetts
Directed by: Dr. Robert A. Potash
During the Radical Period (1916-1930), Argentina's
first experiment with middle class democracy failed to
provide channels for meaningful political participation on
the part of the nation's lower and middle classes. Symp-
tomatic of this larger failure was the inability of
Argentina's political leaders and parties to provide the
country with a much needed oil law prior to 1930.
Subsequent to the 1907 discovery of a commercially
exploitable oil deposit in Comodoro Rivadavia (Territory
of Chubut) , the nation's leaders faced a problem born of
the fact that the 1886 Mining Code's provisions made no
allowance for the peculiarities of the petroleum industry.
New legislation was needed to decide whether ownership of
the deposits would remain with the provinces or be trans-
ferred to the national government, to dictate precisely
who would exploit the oil (the state, private interests,
or some combination of the two) , and, in the case of pri-
vate exploitation, to prescribe the exact conditions for
concessions.
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Between 1907 and 1930, two general positions developed
on this issue. That of the oil nationalists was based on
the assumptions (1) that Argentina possessed vast oil re-
serves which were the key to industrialization, economic
independence and national defense, and (2) that the "world
oil trusts" were intent upon controlling Argentina's oil
for their own purposes, even if it meant disrupting the
nation* s internal peace to do so. The nationalists, there-
fore, supported the extension of federal control over oil
deposits, state exploitation through Yacimientos Petro-
liferos Fiscales (YPF)
, and closely-controlled, small-scale
private operations and/or mixed companies involving state
and private capital. By 1927, the most ardent nationalists
were demanding an integrated and exclusive state monopoly
over domestic oil development.
The opposing view, held by domestic conservatives and
prospective foreign and national oil investors, was based on
the assumption that Argentina might have important petro-
leum resources, and that it was necessary to allow large
private firms to work under liberal conditions in order to
reveal whether the alleged oil wealth was myth or reality.
That no compromise was reached between these two
positions can, in large part, be attributed to the Radical
Party which held national political control from 1916 to
1930, and particularly to the Yrigoyenist wing. The
Vlll
Yrigoyenists consistently pursued an oil policy designed
to elicit electoral support, rather than one aimed at
producing the necessary national legislation. The most
blatant manifestation of this tendency occurred in 1927-
1928 during and after the only major oil debate before
1930. Instead of seeking a compromise solution which
would have conciliated all parties and still protected the
nation's interests, the Yrigoyenists stood unalterably for
an exaggerated nationalist policy. They and the Indepen-
dent Socialists pushed through the Chamber of Deputies a
bill calling for federalization of oil deposits and a
complete state oil monopoly. While the proposal had no
chance of gaining Senate approval, the Yrigoyenists and
the Independent Socialists used their nationalist stance
effectively in the 1928 national elections.
Under this legal cloud, the oil industry developed
slowly. The private sector adopted a "wait and see"
attitude while at times devoting considerable energy and
resources to speculation in exploration rights. The state
enterprise, YPF, made some remarkable advances under the
guidance of the energetic and talented nationalist, General
Enrique Mcsconi (1922-1930) , but it too was hindered by
the absence of a clearly defined national oil policy. As a
consequence, not even the combined efforts of the public
and private sectors were sufficient to keep pace with the
nation's expanding demand for oil and oil products.
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Passage of the Saenz Pena electoral reform law in
1912 ana Hipolito Yrigoyen's election as President four
years later were events hailed by Argentines and foreigners
alike as giant strides toward harmonizing theory and prac-
tice in the nation's political system. Fourteen years
later, however, Yrigoyen was the victim of a military coup,
an act whose repercussions for Argentina's political evolu-
tion were to prove far more influential than those of the
Saenz Pena law. Broken and defeated, the mysterious
caudillo bore. with him to Martin Garcia Island the extrava-
gant hopes entertained by many of his coreligionists in
1916. Argentina's experiment with Western-style middle
class democracy failed to provide a political environment
conducive to solving or even confronting effectively the
nation's social and economic problems.
The urgent need for understanding why the experiment
failed becomes apparent after glancing at Argentina's post-
1930 political record. In forty-three years, only two
elected presidents have managed to complete a full six-year
term, while six Chief Executives (three civilians and
three
military) have been ushered out of office by military
coups.
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Amidst this chaotic political setting, Argentina has been
unable to mobilize her human and natural resources to bat-
tle chronic social and economic problems. Although the
origins of the country's political difficulties do not lie
exclusively in the Radical Period (1916-1930)
, it is log-
ical to expect that a firm understanding of those years
will facilitate our understanding of Argentina's contempo-
rary maladies.
Despite the need for research, the Radical years have
remained somewhat in the shadows while historians have pre
ferred to shed light on 19th century and post-19 43 Argen-
tina. As a result, our knowledge of the 1916-19 30 era
rests heavily on the work of "official" historians and
polemicists. A trend toward filling this information gap
can be discerned in some recent monographs which deal with
several aspects of the Radical Period, including Robert A.
Potash's The Army and Politics in Argentina , 1928-1945
(Stanford: Stanford Univ. Press, 1969), Samuel L. Baily's
Labor
,
Nationalism , and Politics in Argentina (New Bruns-
wick: Rutgers Univ. Press, 1967), Peter Smith's Politics
and Beef in Argentina (New York: Columbia Univ. Press,
1969) , and Peter Snow's Argentine Radicalism (Iowa City:
Iowa Univ. Press, 1965). While none of thses studies
treats exclusively with the Radical Period, Potash, Smith,
Baily, and Snow have all contributed to an understanding o
Xll
those years by providing new information and fresh in-
terpretations based on scholarly investigations. It is
only from many more studies of this type that a meaningful
synthesis of the Radical Period will emerge.
Among the topics deserving detailed study, petroleum
must be accorded high priority. Since 1907 when oil was
discovered in Comodoro Rivadavia, it has been an explosive
ingredient in the Argentine political formula. From the
viewpoint of the national politicians, the problem has
been one of agreeing on a philosophy for oil development
and then mapping out the specific conditions under which
exploration and exploitation must be conducted. In 1916,
Argentina had no organic petroleum law. Exploration and
exploitation were subject to the provisions of the 1886
Mining Code which simply lumped oil together in a category
with other important mineral resources. Since the amount
of capital and time and the degree of technology demanded
by the petroleum industry clearly distinguished it from
other mining operations, the need for special legislation
was evident.
The central focus of this study is an analysis of the
proposal;' offered by political parties and interest groups
to fill the legislative void, and the related political
controversies. Two key issues dominated the debate which
culminated in a prolonged Congressional battle in 1927:
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1) Ownership - Should the provinces maintain control over
their petroleum deposits as the Mining Code dictated, or
should all oil reserves be placed under exclusive federal
jurisdiction?; 2) Exploitation - Who should undertake ex-
ploitation, the state, private companies, or some combina-
tion of the two?
The political parties whose petroleum policies are to
be examined include: 1) the Radical Party (Union Civica
Radical) which split after 1924 into the personalis tas who
supported Yrigoyen and the antipersonalistas led by
Yrigoyen's successor, Marcelo T. de Alvear; 2) the Con-
servative group which was not a party but a loose coalition
of provincial organizations with no permanent national
structure; 3) the Socialist Party which splintered into the
Independent and Orthodox wings in 1927. Argentina's
political map during the Radical Period was dotted with
provincial and regional parties whose names do not appear
here. The Congressional debates, however, reveal that
representatives of these marginal parties generally aligned
themselves with one of the five major political groups on
the petroleum issue. It is, therefore, not necessary to
deal with each of the smaller organizations individually.
Several interest groups became involved in the policy
debate, particularly after 1926 when the matter was one of
widespread public concern. Among the major participants
xiv
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were: 1) Yacimientos Petroliferos Fiscales (YPF)
, the
state oil firm; 2) private oil investors whose opinions
were sometimes expressed through a special section of the
Union Industrial Argentina; 3) the Comite Universitario
Radical, formed by Radical sympathizers in the academic
community; and 4) the Alianza Continental, a continent-
wide group formed to combat imperialism in Latin America.
The Alianza spearheaded the attack on foreign oil invest-
ment in Argentina. With respect to these organizations,
the issues of interest to the present study are not only
their individual proposals, but also their respective
propaganda techniques, and their effectiveness as pressure
groups insofar as it can be determined.
As might be expected, the petroleum debate consis-
tently involved the themes of economic nationalism, British
and United States imperialism, and the protection of
national sovereignty. A strong ideological undercurrent
was unavoidable when many Argentines considered domestic
petroleum as the key to industrialization and economic
independence, and the ideological content of the debate
intensified in direct proportion to the increasing
politicization of the issue during the 1920 , s. It reached
a point where some groups chose to ignore completely prac-
tical considerations as they made intransigent opposition
to foreign oil interests the touchstone of national loyalty.
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How and why the discussion became sidetracked in this
manner will be one of the major themes analyzed with the
Great Petroleum Debate in 1927.
Information on the growth of the petroleum industry,
in both the private and public sectors, has been provided
insofar as it is necessary to keep the political debate in
perspective. Since the records of the private companies
operative between 1916 and 19 30 are not available, sta-
tistical material has been drawn almost exclusively from
official sources. There is no reason to believe, however,
that the government figures are unreliable.
Except for Chapter I, this study is organized chron-
ologically around the three Radical presidential adminis-
trations that span the period 1916-1930. The first chapter
examines the petroleum situation in the years from the
Comodoro Rivadavia oil discovery in 1907 until Yrigoyen
assumed the presidency in 1916. Considerable space has
been devoted to this background era because the existing
literature on the subject is inadequate and/or misleading.
Yrigoyen' s first terra is treated in Chapters II and III
with 1919 as the dividing line. This division, while
admittedly arbitrary, coincides with the presentation to
Congress of Yrigoyen' s first major petroleum bills in
September 1919 and separates the 1916-1919 period of rela-
tive inactivity on the petroleum issue from the latter part
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of Yrigoyen's presidency when increased activity culminated
in the creation of YPF in 1922. The Alvear administration
is likewise the subject of two chapters. Chapter IV deals
with the 1922-1926 period, highlighting the work of General
Enrique Mosconi as YPF's Director General, while Chapter V
covers the remaining two years, focusing on the Great
Petroleum Debate. Chapter VI treats Yrigoyen's abbreviated
second term (1928-19 30) , and the conclusions appear in a
final chapter, Chapter VII.
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CHAPTER I
AN INDECISIVE BEGINNING
The discovery of extensive petroleum reserves near
Comodoro Rivadavia (National Territory of Chubut) was one
of those fortuitous events in a nation's history which
provoke visions of unexpected wealth and power, and, at the
same time, challenge the abilities of national leaders to
develop policies which will maximize the benefits of the
new found resources. 1 Argentina's oil windfall came on
December 13, 1907 at the hands of a government team dril-
ling for potable water near the isolated Patagonian pueblo.
Although this was not the first petroleum discovery in the
country's history, December 13th is commemorated by Argen-
tines as National Petroleum Day. For if the Comodoro
Rivadavia strike was not the first, it was the discovery
that initiated the development of petroleum as an economic
resource and as a political issue.
By 1930, the petroleum industry still had not ful-
filled the dreams awakened in 1907. It did not eliminate
*See map, Frontispiece.
1
2the need for importing fuels by that date, nor did it
become the basis of a burgeoning industrial complex. Pe-
troleum did grow in a political sense, however, into some-
thing few if any Argentines anticipated in 1907. The
question of who would exploit this vital resource and under
what conditions became a political storm center of consid-
erable magnitude, a subject for heated debate in Congress,
in lecture halls, and on street corners. So highly politi-
cized and so emotionally charged did the issue become that
economic and financial aspects at times became strangely
irrelevant.
Argentina's experience with domestic petroleum exploi-
tation prior to 1907 had not been particularly rewarding.
Between 1865 and the end of the century, several firms
which were organized to exploit petroleum deposits in the
provinces of Mendoza, Salta and Jujuy met with failure.
Insufficient supplies of capital and machinery combined with
the lack of scientific knowledge and technological expertise
to defeat these early experiments.
2
Viewed from a wider perspective, the petroleum indus-
try from 1865 to 1907 was the victim of the economic
policies pursued by the ruling elits. Insofar as any
2For background on 19th century petroleum exploitation,
see Republica Argentina, Ministerio de Comercio y Industria,
Las fuentes del petroleo argentino (Buenos Aires: Direccion
Nacional de Mineria, 19 57) , 6; and Sadi H. Mozo, El petroleo
3
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attachment to doctrinaire concepts can be discerned,
laissez-faire and multilateral trade dominated the thinking
of Argentina's leaders. This group of notables, nurtured
on French culture and British capital, rested their politi-
cal supremacy on an agricultural export economy. Argentine
wheat, meat, and wool were exchanged in transatlantic mar-
kets for the output of Europe's factories. Economic prior-
ities were ordered according to the demands of this trade
and not according to any plan for developing the economic
potential of the nation as a whole, and especially that of
the interior provinces. Deposits of petroleum and other
minerals often lay in remote areas, and their exploitation
would have required sizable investments at considerable
risk. While fortunes still could be made in land, cattle,
railroads, and other fields which buttressed the existing
economic framework, mineral exploitation was not an attrac-
tive field for domestic and/or foreign capital. In the
short run, it was easier, and probably cheaper, to continue
depending upon imported fuels and minerals.
Given the prevailing economic philosophy, no Argentine
government before 1907 had perceived petroleum as an issue.
Petroleum was a mineral like all others, and, as such, its
exploration and exploitation were subject to the dictates
argentino en el siglo XIX (Bahia Blanca: Martinez,
Rodriguez y Cia. , 1950rT~9-123
.
4of the 1886 Mining Code. The circumstances surrounding the
Comodoro Rivadavia discovery, however, altered that situa-
tion and forced the government of President Jose Figueroa
Alcorta to face the question of what Argentina should do
with her oil resources. Not only had government workmen
been responsible for the find, but under Article 7 of the
Mining Code, the national government was the legal owner of
the deposits by virtue of the fact that they were located
on land under its jurisdiction. 3 The fate of the Comodoro
Rivadavia deposits obviously lay in the hands of Figueroa
Alcorta' s administration, and, undoubtedly, the policy
decided upon would weigh heavily as a precedent in the
event of future discoveries.
While deliberating their course of action, the Presi-
dent and his advisors had to consider the significance of a
plentiful domestic petroleum supply for the present and
future development of the nation. They must have realized
that the "Petroleum Age" was fast dawning, and that through
3Under the Mining Code of 1886, Argentine mineral re-
sources were the property of the national or provincial
governments according to where they were located (Art. 7)
•
Private interests were granted the right to search for and
exploit mineral deposits under the regulations of the Code
(Art. 8) , and the State was prohibited from exploiting or
otherwise disposing of mines except as the Code dictated
(Art. 9). Eduardo A. Pigretti, comentador, Codigo de
mineria y_ legislacio'n de hidrocarburos (Buenos Aires:
Cooperadora de Derecho y Ciencias Sociales, 1964) , 22-31.
For the regulations referring to exploration and exploita-
tion rights see Ibid ., 45-115, 140-315. A detailed
5its application to the internal combustion engine, petro-
leum would become a vital fuel source. If this was
accepted as axiomatic in coal-producing countries like the
United States and England, how much more significant was it
*
for Argentina which had no domestic fuel supply and annual-
ly paid a considerable sum abroad for imported coal? 4 Eco-
nomically, however, a national petroleum supply meant more
than possibly escaping the annual outlay for foreign fuels.
It was one of the essential elements for Argentine indus-
trial development and, therefore, for the attainment of
economic independence, something which nearly a century of
political independence had not produced. In terms of
national defense, the value of a secure domestic fuel
analysis of these provisions as they applied to petroleum
may be found in Carlos E. Velarde's Las minas de petroleo
en la legislacion argentina (Buenos Aires : Imprenta y
Casa Editora "Coni" , 1922) , 33-178.
4Between 1907 and 1909 Argentina paid an average of
16,968,932 $oro a year for an average of 2,424,133 tons of
coal. This represented an average of 5.9% of the total
value of Argentina's imports. When crude petroleum and pe-
troleum products are added to coal, the figures go up to
23,012,493 $oro and 8.0% pe,r annum. Republica Argentina,
Direccio'n General de Estadistica (hereinafter cited D. G.
de Estadistica) , Anuario de la direccion general de
estadistica
,
correspondiente al alio 19 07 (Buenos Aires:
Compania Sudamericana de Biiletes da Banco, 1908), I,
pp. XIII, 288; also Anuario , 1908 , I, pp. XVII, 338;
Anuario , 1909 , I, pp. XIX, 356-357; and Jorge Newberry and
Justino C. Thierry, El petroleo (Buenos Aires: Vaccaro,
1910) , chart facing p. 1.
6supply was obvious.
Given these potential advantages, there were serious
problems which had to be confronted. As yet, little was
known about Argentina's petroleum wealth. One accidental
discovery proved nothing as to the extent of the deposits
or their quality. Even if vast high-grade deposits could
be assumed, experience had demonstrated that the nation
lacked the willing capital, heavy machinery, and trained
personnel necessary for petroleum exploitation. Finally,
there was a legal problem to be faced. The Mining Code was
approved in 1886 when neither the economic significance of
petroleum nor the problems of its exploitation were under-
stood. While the physical properties of oil deposits and
the time, money, and risk involved in their development
clearly distinguished the petroleum industry from other ex-
tractive enterprises, the standards for granting explora-
tion and exploitation rights were the same for petroleum as
for other minerals. In addition, it appeared that the
government's latitude for decision making was curtailed by
Article 9 of the Code which prohibited the State from ex-
ploiting or otherwise disposing of mines except as the pro-
visions of the Code dictated. 5 In other words, they had to
be granted to private interests for development.
5Pigretti, Co'digo de mineria , 28.
The policies adopted by the Figueroa Alcorta govern-
ment in response to the oil discovery were not definitive
in the sense of laying down a path from which there would
be no future deviation. Nevertheless, that administration
established a lasting precedent when it promptly displayed
its preference for at least some measure of state partici-
pation in and control over the petroleum industry. On
December 14, 1907, the Executive Power issued a decree
signed by Figueroa Alcorta and his Minister of Agriculture,
Pedro Ezcurra, which prohibited the granting of mineral
rights in a 200 , 000-hectare reserve centering on the town o
Gomodoro Rivadavia. 6 This area was set aside for further
exploration by the National Bureau of Mines. There having
been no provision in the Mining Code for the creation of
such a reserve, the decree was based on the 1903 land law
(Law 4,167). Article 15 of that statute permitted the Ex-
ecutive Power to exclude private interests from territories
being explored by government agencies.^
In his address opening the 1908 Congressional sessions
6Republica Argentina, Ministerio de Agricultura,
Yacimientos
/
Petroliferos Fiscales (hereinafter cited YPF)
,
Recopilacion de leyes , decretos y_ resoluciones sobre
materia potrolera (Buenos Aires: L. J. Rosso, 1938)
,
I, 5.
7 Ibid., 6.
8the President explained the reasons for the decree,
This discovery, which can transform the
economic fortunes of the region, demanded
a halt to the granting of private explo-
ration rights in the area around the well
in order to study the deposit's extension,
importance, yield and application, and
consequently, the form of exploitation
most advantageous to the public interest. 8
It is obvious from his remarks that the President was
thinking only in terms of the Patagonian region and not of
the nation as a whole, and that the decree was intended to
serve as a holding action rather than a permanent policy.
Private interests were to be denied access to the area
around the discovery on a temporary basis while the govern-
ment compiled the information necessary for formulating its
policy. From a more positive point of view, the fact that
the decree strayed from the accepted laissez-faire outlook
and created for the government an active role in the eco-
nomic sphere was a measure of the importance attached to
the petroleum industry by the Figueroa Alcorta administra-
tion. Here was a clear indication to private capital that
the government was willing to intervene and protect what it
considered to be the public interest.
Though Figueroa Alcorta' s term expired without any
SRepublica Argentina, Congreso Nacional, Camara de
Senadores, Diario de sesiones (hereinafter cited Senador^s,
Diario) (Buenos Aires: Imprenta del Congreso de la Nacion,
1908) , 1908, I, 36.
9*
decision on the best approach to oil exploitation in
Coraodoro Rivadavia, another step was taken in the form of
Law 7,059. As promulgated on Septeinber 6, 1910, this
measure opened to private interests 97.5% of the 200,000-
hectare reserve in Comodoro Rivadavia and left the govern-
ment with a 5,000-hectare reserve that was to be divided
into lots of 625 hectares each. The right to exploit pe-
troleum on these lots was to be assigned through public
auction, and the Executive Power was authorized to withhold
one or more of them for direct state exploitation. The sum
of 500,000 $m/n was allocated to the Ministry of Agricul-
9ture to cover the expenses of the law. While the Congres-
sional debate had revolved around the relative merits of
private and state exploitation, the law left the issue un-
resolved.^ It was the Executive's choice as to whether
the State would reserve the entire zone for its own work or
leave all or part of it open to private capital.
If national petroleum policy was slow to develop dur-
ing these years, 1907-1910, activity in the Comodoro
Rivadavia proceeded at the same pace. Work in the area was
9yPF, Recopilacion , I, 7.
10For the debates see Senadores, Diario , 1909, 569-582;
and Republica Argentina, Congreso Nacional, Camara de
Diputados, Diario de sesiones (hereinafter cited Diputactos,
Diario) (Buenos Aires: Imprenta del Congreso de la Nacion,
1910) , 1910, II, 244-247.
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the responsibility of the Bureau of Mines until the first
specialized petroleum agency assumed its duties in April
1911. A total crude oil production of 8,119 m3 (cubic
metres) testifies to the fact that operations were more
exploratory than exploitative in nature. 11 Even then
serious difficulties arose because of the scarcity of dril-
ling machinery and technical personnel, the lack of public
confidence and support, and, above all, the insufficiency of
funds. From December 1907 until April 1911, the government
invested 290,651 $m/n in petroleum development. 12 This was
hardly a sum designed to produce startling results. Rather
it was a reflection of the uncertain and perhaps indifferent
attitude which characterized the Figueroa Alcorta adminis-
tration, an attitude that allowed it to step down without
having formulated a definitive petroleum policy.
On October 12, 1910, incoming President Roque Saenz
Pena inherited a national petroleum policy still in embryo.
It was known that Argentina possessed oil deposits, and it
^Enrique Hermitte, El estado d,e la cuestio'n petro'leo
(Buenos Aires, 1921) , 18; and Boletin de Informaciones Pe-
troliferas (hereinafter cited BIP) , No. 9 (April 1925)
,"
755:
12Republica Argentina, Ministerio de Agricultura,
Direccion General de Explotacio'n de Petroleo de Comodoro
Rivadavia (hereinafter cited D. G. de, Explotacion) , Memoria
de la direccion general de explotacion de petroleo de
ComocToro Rivadavia , cof>espondiente al aflos 1912/1913
(Buenos Aires: Compania Sudamericana de Billetes de Banco,
1914) , 66-67.
11
was assumed that they were extensive. Yet it was not
clear whose task it would be to develop this vital re-
source. The national government had given notice it would
not step aside and deal private capital a free hand, but it
had not spelled out clearly what its objectives were or
what role it would play.
/ m»
Saenz Pena began with a burst of energy as manifested
in an Executive Decree issued only two months after he took
office. Through this December 24, 1910 decree, the Presi-
dent and his Minister of Agriculture, Eleodoro Lobos, exer-
cised the option left open to the Executive Power in Law
7,059 and set aside the entire 5,000-hectare tract in
Comodoro Rivadavia for state exploitation.-^ it is proba-
ble that the impetus for this measure came from Enrique
Hermitte, the French-trained engineer who headed the Bu-
reau of Mines, for the considerations set forth in the
decree are nearly an exact reproduction of the arguments he
presented on this matter in his department's Memoria for
1910. 14
The considerations constituted a reasoned brief for
13yPF„ Recopilacion , I, 9-13.
14 Republica Argentina, Ministerio de Agrici^ltura,
Direccio'n General de Minas, Geologla e Hidrologia ^herein-
after cited D. G. de Minas) , Memoria de la division de
minas
,
geologia e hidrologia , coyespondiente ai ano|910
(Buenos Aires: Oficma Meteorologica Argentina, 1912)#
31-35.
state exploitation of the reserve. While conceding that
this was a novel practice, alien to the traditions of
Argentine mining legislation and economic policy, the
decree noted that the Executive Power was encouraged by
reports from the Bureau of Mines on the quantity and quality
of the Comodoro Rivadavia deposits. Petroleum production
was of vital importance to a coal-importing nation since it
held out the promise of relieving Argentina from economic
and industrial subordination to fuel exporters. State ac-
tivity would prevent monopolies while at the same time at-
tracting private capital by proving the Argentine petroleum
industry was a profitable venture. An ample area outside
the reserve lay open to private firms which, in any case,
would not be likely to invest in the reserve itself since
their rights would be guaranteed for only five years under
the provisions of Law 7,059.
Thus far, the considerations seemed to indicate a
long-term commitment to state exploitation as a matter of
government policy. Such was not the case. The prefatory
remarks also pointed out that when the five-year limit
expired the State would be free, if it were advisable, to
invite private investment into the reserve. Meanwhile,
government activity would reveal the worth of the zone and
enable the State to obtain for exploitation rights a sum in
accord with their true value. In short, though the
13
Executive branch felt there was reason to pursue the
state's activity in Comodoro Rivadavia over the next five
years, it would be on an experimental basis only. There
was clearly an unwillingness to say without reservation
that direct state exploitation was the proper course of
action.
In contrast to the lengthy introduction, the operative
part of the decree was brief and precise. It provided for
the creation of an honorary Petroleum Commission (Direccion
General de Explotacio'n del Petroleo de Comodoro Rivadavia)
under the Minister of Agriculture and charged it with re-
sponsibility for the industrial and commercial exploitation
of the federal reserve.^
Before ill health forced his retirement from the pres-
idency in October 1913, Saenz Pena and his Minister of Agri-
culture, now Adolfo Mujica, issued another decree of major
significance for petroleum development.^ Dated May 9,
1913, it was a response to a situation that had evolved
under the terms of Law 7,0 59. That legislation had reduced
the original 200 , 000-hectare reserve to 5,000 hectares,
thereby placing extensive stretches of potential petroleum
l 5For the ordinance spelling out ^he powers and duties
of the Commission see YPF, Recopilacion , I, 13-15. Honorary
is used in the sense of unsalaried.
l 6 Ibid. , 20-21.
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land within the reach of private interests. Rights to ex-
plore the land were avidly sought after, but no actual
exploration was taking place, nor was any petroleum being
produced. The rights were being acquired for speculative
purposes, either by individuals who intended to sell them
at a lucrative profit, or by large companies attempting to
monopolize petroleum territories for subsequent sale or
exploitation. 17
In responding to this situation, the May 9th decree
stated that it was the Executive Power's duty to insure the
legitimate exploitation of public wealth, and, to that end,
it was ordering an in-depth exploration of the reserve
described in the decree and recommending passage of legisla-
tion to regulate petroleum development. The decree defined
a reserve of some 167,000 hectares in Comodoro Rivadavia
within which mineral rights would not be granted until it
1
8
had been fully explored by the Ministry of Agriculture.
As with previous petroleum measures, this decree did not
17One of the best official accounts of this phenomenon
can be found in D. G. de Explotacid'n, Memoria, 1912/1913 ,
70-72.
18The reserve created by this Decree was later de-
creased in size because it was based on the land law of
1903, Law 4,167. Since that law referred exclusively to
public lands and the 167,000 hectares included private
properties, a Decree issued on October 8, 1914 exempted the
latter from the provisions of the 1913 measure. YPF,
Recopilacion , I, 30-31.
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constitute a definitive policy statement, it was designed
to meet a particular set of circumstances, and more to
deter speculation than to promote exploration, if state
exploration and exploitation had been hampered in the past
by the lack of funds, where was the money to come from for
the exploration of an area 30 to 35 times the size of the
federal reserve?
The Saenz Pena administration did take steps to obtain
operating funds for the Petroleum Commission, submitting
bills to Congress in 1911 and 1913. On both occasions, the
Minister of Agriculture had received long reports from the
Petroleum Commission detailing the need for financial
support. In 1911, the Commission sought 2,000,000 $m/n
while in 1913 the target was a more ambitious 15,000,000
$m/n. 19 In an effort to satisfy the requests, the Executive
Power simply placed the Commission's case before Congress in
the form of legislative proposals. 20 Unfortunately for the
Commission's labors, neither bill was approved by Congress.
l^For copies of the reports justifying the requests for
funds, see D. G. de Explotacion, Nota fundando su pedido de
2.000 .000 $m/n pa,ra proseguir los trabajos (Buenos Aires:
Oficina Meteorologica Argentina, 1911) ; and Petroleo de
Comodoro Rivadavia ; Memorandum de la direccion generaT~rela -
tivo a~Ta explotacion futura de los yacimientos de petroleo
de Comodoro Rivadavia con programa de trabajos y_ presupues to
de gastos, del acta del 8 de abril de 1913 (Buenos Aires:
Imprenta "De Su Conf ianza"7~1913)
.
20Diputados, Diario
,
1911, II, 820-821; and 1913, II,
604-605.
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Sixty-two years old and the victim of a fatal disease,
Saenz Pena was forced to delegate his powers to his Vice
President in October 1913. For three years, the Saenz Pena
administration had lent a measure of support to the state
industry by translating the Petroleum Commission's requests
into decrees and legislative proposals. But it cannot be
said that he and his advisors were committed as a matter of
long-range policy to direct state exploitation. Such ac-
tivity was viewed as an experiment to help decide upon the
best method of handling the nation's vital fuel source.
Sa'enz Pena ' s Vice President and successor was
Victorino de la Plaza, a native of Salta and a cultured and
experienced public servant in the oligarchic tradition.
Holding to the tenets of laissez-faire economics more
rigidly than Figueroa Alcorta or Saenz Pena, De la Plaza
favored handing over the federal reserve to private in-
vestors. On July 16, 1914, he and his Minister of Agricul-
ture, Horacio Caldero'n, sent Congress a bill authorizing the
Executive Power to sign contracts with private firms em-
powering them to administer and exploit the area heretofore
21
reserved exclusively for the State.
21senadores, Diario , 1914, 145-147. There can be no
doubt that responsibility for the bill lay with De la Plaza
and Calderon, because the Petroleum Commission had recom-
mended continued state exploitation in^he Comodoro
Rivadavia reserve. D. G. de Explotacion, Memoria , 1912/1913 ,
77-80. De la Plaza's Anglophile sympathies were no secret,
17
The message accompanying the bill was phrased in the
language of 19th century economics. It pointed out the
State's lack of capital, technicians, and experience with
the petroleum industry, and, in general, called into ques-
tion "the State's aptitude for commercial activity of the
type, extension, and autonomy necessary for performing
efficiently in the marketplace." 22 It was De la Plaza's
opinion that exploitation should be entrusted to private
initiative with the government playing its traditional role
as an observer safeguarding the public interest.
When World War I cut off the influx of foreign capital
upon which the Executive's 1914 bill depended, De la Plaza
and Calderon reversed their position and, in June 1916,
initiated legislation intended to strengthen state exploi-
tation. 2 ^ This bill sought to provide a firm legal basis
for the government sector of the industry and to authorize
an investment of 16,000,000 $m/n in the expansion of its
activities. The administration now chose to support direct
state exploitation because, as the accompanying message
and it is possible English oil interests encouraged him in
his plan for opening the reserve to private investment.
There is no evidence, however, of undue pressure having been
applied or of collusion between De la Plaza and English
investors.
22Senadores, Diario , 1914, 145.
23Diputados, Diario , 1916, I, 376-378.
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stated,
the present circumstances demand the setting
aside of doctrinary beliefs and theoretical
preconceptions which, despite their undeni-
able worth, do not provide the basis for
satisfying the nation's pressing economic
and industrial needs. 24
De la Plaza was, in all probability, referring to the fuel
shortage caused by the war. Coal imports, which were more
than 90% English in origin before the war, had declined
from 3,421,526 tons in 1914 to 1,884,781 tons by 1916. 25
De la Plaza's concern over the fuel crisis was evi-
denced in a second bill submitted to Congress in June 1916. 26
Refusing to give up the possibility of attracting private
investment, he proposed a complete reform of the process for
granting petroleum exploration and exploitation rights. It
was an apparent attempt to clarify the rights and duties of
private capital and thereby create a stable atmosphere con-
ducive to investment. Both of the Executive's 1916 bills
died in Congress, however, without ever being debated. At
this late juncture, the Chamber's Special Committee on
Petroleum Legislation preferred to await the initiatives
of the incoming Radical administration before sending any
24 Ibid. , 377.
25D. G. de Estadistica, Anuario, 1914 , 347; Anuario,
1916 , 342.
26Diputados, Diario, 1916, I, 378-383.
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bill to the Chamber floor. 27
Despite these failures, the De la Plaza administration
did supply some practical support for expanding the system
of state exploitation. Through a Ministerial Accord of
October 30, 1914, it authorized the Petroleum Commission to
sell crude petroleum and its by-products in the public mar-
ket and to invest the profits in future exploitation. 28 It
was tantamount to declaring that the government enterprise
was now established, and that commercialization of its
product was to begin. The authorization to reinvest profits
was of utmost importance, since it provided the Commission
with an independent source of revenue. 29 In fact, profits
would become the only source of funds after 1916 when
Congress terminated the practice of making annual budget
allocations for petroleum development. It is understandable
why General Enrique Mosconi, head of the state industry dur-
ing the 1920' s and a legendary figure in the history of
2 ?Ibid
. ,
1916-17, V, 4932, 4952.
28YPF, Recopilacion
,
I, 31-32.
29Since both production and sales were still low, this
authorization did not mean the immediate injection of large
amounts of capital into state exploitation. At the same
time, however, income from the sales of crude petroleum
between 1914 and 1916 totaled 6,027,400 $m/n, while during
those same years the Petroleum Commission received only
3,500,000 $m/n in government financing. YPF , Desarrollo de
la industria petrolifera fiscal , 1907 -1932 (Buenos Aires:"
Jacobo Peuser, 1932), 78, 389.
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Argentine petroleum, once described this Accord as the true
beginning of state exploitation. 30
As we have seen, none of the Executive's legislative
proposals from 1910 to 1916 won Congressional sanction. It
was not a case of Congress displaying any favoritism. Dur-
ing these years, apart from the yearly budget appropria-
tions,^ the only bill related to petroleum which received
approval was a 1915 enactment extending for an additional
five years the time limit imposed on the federal reserve by
Law 7, 059. 32 Such meager results were obviously not due to
a paucity of proposals. Many public figures realized that
the 1886 Mining Code was ill-equipped to handle the problems
presented by the petroleum industry. President De la Plaza
himself had referred to the dilemma when submitting his
30Enrique Mosconi, El petroleo argentino , 1922-1930 ,
y la ruptura de los trusts petroliferos ingles y_
norteamericano eT"T° de agosto de 1929 (Buenos Aires:
Ferrari Hnos., T936T, 32.
31YPF, Desarrollo de la industria , 78. In 1912, the
allotment was 1,000,000 $m7n, in 1913 it was 1,500,000,
1,500,000 in 1914, 1,000,000 in 1915, and 1,000,000 in
1916. These sums combined with the 500,000 $m/n appropri-
ated through Law 7,059 and a total of 2,155,240.90 $m/n
appropriated through Ministerial Accords in 1915 for the
purchase of two petroleum tankers, add up to 8,655.240.90
$m/n invested by the national government in petroleum ex-
ploitation through 1916.
32Law, 9,664, See YPF, Recopilacion , I, 48.
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1916 bill on the regulation of petroleum concessions:
Our Mining Code did not take petroleum into
account when it was sanctioned, and, there-
fore, the Code's provisions on exploration
and exploitation of substances in the first
category, among which are included mineral
oils, are not applicable to the latter with-
out grave danger for the general economy. 33
The various proposals which entered Congress reveal
two common characteristics: first, the tendency of all but
one of the bills to grant the State some degree of direct
participation in petroleum exploitation; and second, a
limited geographical scope. In terms of the first charac-
teristic, the bills can be arranged along a continuum
according to the degree of state activity advocated. At one
extreme was the De la Plaza proposal for terminating state
exploitation and handing over the Comodoro Rivadavia re-
serve to private enterprise. It was the only bill during
this period which proposed an outright halt to state indus-
trial activity. 34
33Diputados, Diario, 1916, I, 378.
34 De la Plaza later referred to this bill as one
designed to create "mixed companies". (Diputados, Diario ,
1916, I, 376-377.) However, his message introducing the
bill clearly indicates that the role he envisioned for the
State was not that of a partner to private capital but that
of a watchdog. The bill itself is of no help in clarifying
this point since it did not describe the contracts to be
signed with prospective investors.
22
State involvement in its most limited form, mixed com-
panies, was proposed in bills authored by Deputies Adrian c.
Escobar (1913) 35 and Alfredo Demarchi (1914)
.
36 Their con-
cept of a mixed company was that of a partnership between
state and private capital. Their specific formulas varied,
but generally the State was to contribute the land of the
federal reserve along with existing installations and all
geological and scientific studies of the region at its
disposal. The private investors were to supply the capital
and technical expertise while a directorate composed of
representatives of both groups controlled operations. In
each case, the State was granted the right to appoint a
majority of the directors.
In 1914, Deputies Nicolas Repetto 37 and Tomas de Veyga38
introduced bills calling for more substantial state partici-
pation in the petroleum industry. These legislators advoca-
ted concurrent but separate exploitation by the State and
35Diputados, Diario, 1913, II, 1034-1038. Escobar was
a member of the Conservative Party representing Buenos
Aires Province.
36Ibid
. ,
1914, I, 777-780. Demarchi was a member of
the Radical Party representing the Federal Capital.
37 Ib
r
d
. ,
1914, III, 681-688. Repetto was a Socialist
representing the Federal Capital.
38Ibid
. ,
1914, IV, 41-48. De Veyga was a member of
the Radical Party representing the Federal Capital.
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private companies. The former would operate within the
5,000-hectare reserve, and the latter could take advantage
of lands oucside that zone. 39 Finally, at the other extreme
of the continuum, in 1916 Deputy Carlos F. Melo introduced
a bill which provided for a complete state monopoly over all
oil exploitation in Argentina. 40
The fact that the government industry was already oper-
ative in Comodoro Rivadavia probably influenced the prefer-
ence shown for state activity. The deciding factor, how-
ever, was the concern, shown in nearly all the bills, over
the need to protect Argentina's oil resources from monopoli-
zation by the world oil trusts. 41 Essentially, the argument
jyRepetto's proposal referred specifically to the land
outside the 5,000-hectare reserve but within the boundaries
described by the May 9, 1913 Executive Decree. De Veyga's
bill itself referred only to the federal reserve, but his
introductory remarks show that he intended the remaining
lands for private exploitation. De Veyga's bill actually
called for domestic private capital to cooperate with the
State within the reserve. In the event such funds were not
forthcoming, the State was to proceed alone. Had the bill
been passed, it is probable that domestic capital would not
have rushed into this venture, and the State would have con-
tinued as before in Comodoro Rivadavia. Therefore, this
proposal has been included here and not with those calling
for mixed companies.
40Diputados, Diario, 1916, II, 1032-1033. Melo was a
Member of the Radical Party representing the Federal
Capital.
41Deputy Melo showed no particular concern for this
problem when introducing his bill. He was less interested
in petroleum than in financial reform. His comments upon
submitting his bill indicate that the revenue from a state
petroleum monopoly was to be one of the keys in his planned
24
as set forth in these proposals began with the assumption
that Argentina possessed vast petroleum deposits which, if
properly safeguarded, would become the basis for industrial
ization and eventually economic emancipation. If, however,
the trusts were allowed a free hand, they would extract the
fuel at their own convenience, set prices as their greed
dictated, and remit the profits to foreign stockholders.
Though the case was seldom recited in such a cut-and-dried
manner, examples of this kind of thinking are clear and
frequent. Deputy De Veyga voiced the common apprehension
regarding the trusts when he claimed to have designed his
bill to ensure that
the large capital investments that have to
be made and the immense profits which must
be earned would strengthen the country,
placing it on the road toward economic in-
dependence, and could not be an incentive
to the greed of the trusts,....
It may seem strange that the trusts were so feared in a
country which had had no practical experience with Standard
or Royal Dutch Shell or Anglo-Persian, but Argentines knew
the names and the reputations which went with them, and they
were taking no chances. Risks could not be afforded with the
fuel supply which might reorient the economic future of the
reogranization.
42Diputaods, Diario , 1914, IV, 43.
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nation. Thus, the legislative history of the 1910-1916
period shows a clear tendency toward some sort of state
participation in exploitation along with a willingness to
permit private investment so long as trusts were excluded.
Earlier it was noted that the bills under discussion
were limited in their geographical scope. Only the Melo
bill in 1916 approached the petroleum issue as a national
one. Among the other bills, Repetto's alone referred to any
area beyond the 5 , 000-hectare federal reserve, and Repetto
stayed within the borders set by the May 9, 1913 Executive
Decree. A glance at the timing of the bills helps to ex-
plain not only their limited scope but their raison d'etre.
The five-year limit imposed on the reserve by Law 7,059 was
due to expire in 1915. Four of the bills entered Congress
the preceding year (Demarchi, De Veyga, Repetto, and De la
Plaza) , and a fifth appeared in 1913 (Escobar) . It is
probable, therefore, that the measures were motivated at
least in part by the desire to clarify the future of the
reserve before the time limit lapsed. If this was true, it
also helps explain why Congress did not act on the bills,
for Law 9,664, passed in 1915, removed the source of dis-
content by guaranteeing the reserve's existence for another
five years. Whatever the reason, it seems that the Execu-
tive's penchant for acting in a practical, pragmatic manner
was shared by Congress. Despite the fear of the trusts, the
26
petroleum problem was not being treated as a national one
deserving high priority and a comprehensive solution.
Rather the trend was toward patchwork proposals designed to
resolve immediate circumstances.
While Congress dragged its feet on petroleum legisla-
tion, there were signs by 1916 of growing interest in the
public-at-large. For a time after the 1907 discovery,
state exploitation was conducted in an atmosphere of general
public ignorance of the petroleum industry and doubt as to
the value of the Comodoro Rivadavia deposits. Even the few
who supported state exploitation posed a problem because of
their impatience for tangible success. As a result, the
Petroleum Commission felt obliged to extract petroleum in-
stead of applying its meager funds to vitally needed ex-
ploration in the hope that production would convince the
doubters and satisfy the impatient. ^3 Enrique Hermitte, who
was connected with state exploitation throughout this
period, dates a change in public attitude from the early
months of 1915. He explained the shift by the fact that the
European war promised to be a long one, and the price of
coal had begun to rise. Now the great demand for national
43For comments on this topic see D. G. de Explotacicta,
Memoria
,
1912/1913 , 69-70; also Informe de la direccion
general a S.E. el senor ministro de agricultura de la
nacibn , Teb"rero~d~e 1916 (Buenos Aires: Imprenta^e Gmo.
Kraft, 1916) , 10; Hermitte, Estado de la cuestion petroleo ,
5-6.
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fuel arose, bringing in its wake mounting criticism of the
Petroleum Commission when that body was unable to meet the
sudden demands placed upon it. 44
Hermitte's views as to the reasons for, and the timing
of, the change in public opinion are confirmed by petitions
to Congress, university studies, and the writings of
publicists. Once late during its 1914 sessions and three
times during its 1916 ordinary meetings, the Chamber of
Deputies received formal petitions requesting petroleum
legislation. 45 In the academic world, petroleum exploita-
tion, particularly that in Coraodoro Rivadavia, was the
topic of a seminar directed by Dr. Ricardo Davel in the
Faculty of Economic Sciences of the University of Buenos
Aires in 1916. 4
6
Among the publicists, two names stand out,
Ricardo Oneto and Enrique Hermitte. Oneto was a journalist
* 4Hermitte, Estado de la cuestion petroleo , 20.
45Diputados, Diario, 1914, III, 899, from "La
Asociacion latinoamericana" ; Ibid . , 1916, I, 605, from more
than 80 residents of Comodoro Rivadavia; Ibid . , 1916, II,
1342, from the "Comite Radical de la circunscripcidn 13a de
la Capital Federal"; Ibid . , 1916, III, 2476, from 1000
citizens of La Plata, B.A. Prov.
46Two of the theses which resulted from this seminar
and which will be referred to later are Carlos Arguero's
Petroleo s argentinos (Buenos Aires: f N.p., 1916), and
Jose Mendez's El petroleo en la republica argentina
(Buenos Aires:" N.p., 191677
28
who became known as the "Centinela" of Argentine petroleum
for the campaign he began in 1915 and pursued over 25 years
to defend the nation* s interests in its oil resources. 47
Hermitte, as we have seen, was chief of the National Bureau
of Mines throughout this period as well as a member of the
Petroleum Commission from its inception in 1910. 48
As of 1916, the petroleum issue had not yet been
politicized to the point where organized groups took up the
banner on one side or the other. Nonetheless, among the
scattered sources cited above, there is evidence of the
same consensus in behalf of state participation in petroleum
development already noted in Congressional bills. Of the
four petitions to the Chamber, the one submitted in 1914
supported the state industry in Comodoro Rivadavia, and the
remaining three were specific requests that Deputy De
Veyga's bill be sanctioned. 49 Out of Dr. Davel's 1916
47For the best summary of Oneto's views up to 1916, see
his El centinela , una campana de veinticinco arfos en defensa
del petr61eo argentino y_ de yacimientos petroliteros
fTscales , 1915-1941 (Buenos Aires: Editorial "El Ateneo"
,
1941) , 64-145.
48A good summary of Hermitte' s position may be found in
his Estado de la cuestion petr^leo , 5-33.
49The fact that three of the four petitions supported
the same bill suggests some sort of organized movement, but
I have no evidence beyond this one fact. The petitions
could have been a result of the propaganda campaign carried
on by Ricardo Oneto who favored the De Veyga proposal.
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seminar came two theses which recommended the mixed-company
formula to protect the nation's interests and avoid prej-
udicial action by the trusts. 50
Oneto was the most prolific propagandist favoring state
exploitation. In newspaper articles and pamphlets he urged
upon his readers the economic significance of having a
domestic petroleum supply, both for the savings it repre-
sented as a substitute for imported coal and as the basis
for industrial development. Oneto maintained that the
foreign trusts were the immediate threat to be countered,
and that the best solution was state exploitation in the
federal reserve in accordance with the De Veyga proposal. 5 ^
Hermitte, likewise, promoted state exploitation within the
reserve zone and private activity without. Before the First
National Congress on Engineering in 1916, he argued that
state exploitation would yield financial profits as well as
a direct role in solving questions related to the utiliza-
tion of oil produced, the creation of reserves, and the
52
avoidance of monopolies.
50Arguero, Petroleos argentinos , 63-66b; Mendez, El
petroleo , 113-123.
510neto, Centinela , 64-145. Oneto' s connection with the
De Veyga bill was a close one. De Veyga cited Oneto as the
source of the ideas it contained. Ibid . , 56.
52Hermitte, Estado de la cuestion petroleo , 15-26.
While the Argentine Congress and public opinion thus
began to show an awareness of the problems and possibilities
presented by petroleum development, the state industry was
trudging along at an agonizingly slow pace. Statistics
show a substantial increase in crude oil production, from
3,293 m3 in 1910 to 129,890 m3 in 1916. 53 Still, the latter
figure represented only about 5% of the amount estimated as
necessary to dispense with imported coal. 54 Obviously,
this often cited goal was far from fulfillment.
Meager though the results seem to be, they are not in-
explicable. The problems facing the Petroleum Commission
when it took over in April 1911 were sufficient to try the
expertise of a well-financed and experienced firm, let
alone that of an honorary commission with 500,000 $m/n at
its disposal. Every phase of the industry had to be organ-
ized, outfitted, and manned; exploration, extraction, stor-
age, transportation, distribution, and even the provision of
drinking water. To further complicate the task, the
Commission had to work under less than ideal conditions; an
uncertain Executive policy, little or no Congressional
support, and a cloud of public doubt and mistrust. Above
53BIP, No. 9 (April 1925) , 755.
54 D. G. de Explotacion, Informe, febrero de 1916, 9.
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all, however, was the lack of money. Time and again the
Commission's pleas for funds fell on deaf ears in the
Congress. As the Commission's President explained in 1916,
if the State wants results from the work in Comodoro
Rivadavia,
it should endow the exploitation work
with the resources necessary to develop
it in accord with the needs of the
country and the value of the deposit....
We do not hesitate in stating that if
any of our requests had been fully
satisfied, production would be two or
three times greater than it now is. 55
Scant allotments forced the Commission to delay acquisi-
tions and prevented commercially significant production
until 191^. 56
Even the European war which created an interest in and
a need for national fuels raised difficulties for the state
agency. The arrival of machinery on order from Europe was
delayed, and prices on materials from that part of the
world generally rose. More importantly, the war forced up
freight rates and seriously impeded the purchase of
55ibid.
,
8-9.
56 Ibid.
, 11-12 i also Memoria
,
1 912/1913, 55-56.
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petroleum tankers. 57
Despite the unimpressive record of the state industry,
the picture should not be regarded as completely negative.
That the firm survived this initial period with the diffi-
culties it faced was an accomplishment in itself. By
February 1916, there were 21 actively producing wells in
the reserve zone and a dozen more being drilled. Storage
facilities had been installed in the fields and in Buenos
Aires. Two tankers, one rented and the other on loan from
the Naval Ministry, supplied transport while two ships were
on order from United States firms. State-produced petroleum
was being used by the Naval Ministry and other government
agencies, by the Municipality of Buenos Aires, and by
several private concerns. 58 In short, the Petroleum
Commission had - proven that exploitation in Comodoro
Rivadavia was a feasible and potentially profitable under-
taking given proper guidance and capital investment.
Whatever the record of state operations, it did not
suffer in comparison to that of the private sector. After
the 1907 discovery, there was no private petroleum produc-
tion until 1916 when two companies in the Comodoro Rivadavia
57D. G. de Explotacio'n, Informe , febrero de 1916 ,
12-13.
58Ibid
. ,
3-5; and YPF, Desarrollo de la industria ,
383-388.
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region managed a total output of 7,771 m3 . 59 Some
observers then and later attributed this fact to speculation
by private interests, and there is some truth to this prop-
osition. 60 However, there are other factors which were in-
fluential in determining the attitude of prospective inves-
tors, factors which suggest why speculation may have been a
more attractive venture than industrial activity itself.
The traditional reticence of domestic capital toward
mining activity has been mentioned. One commentator has
pointed to the lack of public confidence in the importance
of the deposits and perhaps in the quality of the petroleum
as the key consideration. 61 It would seem, however, that
the uncertain legal climate was the essential deterrent to
private investment. Capital in the amounts demanded by the
petroleum industry requires a stable atmosphere wherein the
investor's rights and duties are clearly understood, and the
chances of profit outweigh the risks involved. Such condi-
tions were absent in Argentina at that time. Existing
legislation was unsuitable, and there was no certainty about
59BIP, Dec. 1936, 19-20.
60por a strong statement of this thesis, see Marcos
Kaplan's Economia y_ pol^tica del petro'leo argentino , 1939 -
1956 (Buenos Aires: Praxis, 1957), 17-18.
^Carlos Velarde, "El fomento de la explotacio'n del
yacimiento petrolifero de Comodoro Rivadavia," La
Ingenieria , No. 388 (July 1914), 226.
the direction reform would take. State exploitation was
proceeding without an exact statement of its aims. Private
investors did not know, for instance, whether state produc-
tion was intended principally for supplying the State's
needs, or whether the State would enter the market in active
competition with private producers. Pleas for legislation
to correct this situation and encourage private investment
emanated from several informed sources, including the Pe-
troleum Commission, but they met with no response. 62 Under
these circumstances, private capital could hardly have con-
sidered the Argentine petroleum industry a worthwhile risk.
When Hipolito Yrigoyen entered the Casa Rosada at the
head of the triumphant Radical procession in 1916, his ad-
ministration encountered a petroleum question similar in
many respects to that which faced the Figueroa Alcorta ad-
ministration in December 19 07. Comodoro Rivadavia was still
the only site where petroleum had been brought to the sur-
face by drilling. Nine years of experimentation and patch-
work policy-making had left unsolved the essential question
as to who was to exploit the deposits and under what condi-
tions. Clearly, the new government v/as free to implement
whatever formula it desired. Only the budding national
62D. G. de Explotacion, Memoria , 1912/1913 , 4; also
Informe, febrero de 1916 , 15; Velarde, "El fomento de la
explotacion," 226-22 8; Hermitte, Estado de la cuestion
petroleo
,
16-17, 23-31; Mendez, El petroleo , 112-130.
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consensus on state participation imposed limits on the
Radical's freedom of choice. Even here, there was consid-
erable latitude, since there was no agreement on exactly
how the State should intervene. A complete state withdrawal,
leaving the industry to private capital under existing
legislation, was the sole avenue apparently closed on
October 12, 1916. If the Radicals intended new directions
for Argentine economic development, petroleum policy was one
area for relatively unrestricted action.
CHAPTER II
YRIGOYEN It A GOVERNMENT WITHOUT A POLICY
Argentina's 1916 presidential election was unique in
the nation's post-1880 political experience. Thirty-six
years of conservative incumbency in both the national and
provincial governments had turned the election of a Presi-
dent into a perfunctory affair which served to legitimize
the elite's monopoly over choosing Chief Executives. In
1916, matters were different for two related reasons.
First, it was the first presidential election conducted
under the 1912 electoral reform law (Law 8871) ; and
secondly, because the provisions of that enactment largely
fulfilled the long-standing demand of the Union Civica
Radical (UCR) for guarantees against electoral fraud, that
party nominated candidates for President and Vice President
and, for the first time, went to the polls in their behalf.
On April 2, 1916, the Radicals successfully contested the
oligarchy's stranglehold over the presidency, and on
October 12, they triumphantly escorted their caudillo, the
inscrutable Hipolito Yrigoyen, into the Casa Rosada.
Few if any Argentines knew what to expect from the new
administration. Past declarations from the party were of no
36
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help, since the only objectives ever referred to were
,
suffrage reform and some vague utterances about fulfilling
the 1853 Constitution. The party's electoral platform in
1916 typified the lack of clarity with which the UCR
spelled out its intentions. Despite demands from within
the party, and from the opposition press, for concrete
proposals, 1 the national nominating convention approved a
simple reaffirmation of party principles and declared the
Radical's intent to govern "according to the high purposes
of the Constitution justly implemented in its spirit and
letter,..." 2
Petroleum policy was characterized by the same lack of
definition which made the Radical Party's program a subject
of speculation. On this issue, three years of UCR control
would prove that the enigma of October 1916 stemmed from the
absence of a coherent, long-range policy on the part of the
new administration. Though confronted with both the need
and the opportunity to formulate new legislation and revi-
talize the existing state enterprise, Yrigoyen did not
clarify his government's policy until September 1919 when
^For comment from the opposition press, see La Prensa ,
March 29, 1916, p. 7; La Vanguardia , February 4, 1916, p. 1,
March 28, 1916, p. 4, March 29, 1916, p. 4. For dissent
within t^he party, see Isaias R. Amado, "Contribucion para la
redaccion de
y
un programa de partido," Revista Argentina de
Ciencias Politicas , XII (1916), 91-110.
2La Prensa, March 22, 1916, p. 12.
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he presented two bills to Congress. Meanwhile, three
precious years slipped by without progress in either of
these critical areas.
Prior to 1916, the Radical record on petroleum was an
inconsistent one. Three UCR Deputies submitted petroleum
bills before Yrigoyen's election, and each put forth a dif-
ferent framework for exploitation. Alfredo Demarchi
supported mixed companies in his 1914 bill. Toma's de Veyga
focused on eliminating foreign capital in 1914, and Carlos
F. Melo, in 1916 opted for federalization of all oil .
deposits and a state monopoly over their exploitation. 3
While there was an obvious lack of agreement here,
these bills indicated that at least some Radicals were con-
cerned about the need for petroleum legislation. This fact
was emphasized, by a draft proposal for a party program pre-
sented to the 1916 Radical nominating convention as a minor-
ity report from the Platform Committee. Section VI of the
draft called for numerous legislative changes, including
reform of the Mining Code and, particularly, special legis-
lation on petroleum exploitation. 4
The road was open for Yrigoyen to introduce whatever
policies he favored concerning either legislation or the
state oil company. The Chamber's special committee assigned
3See Chapter I, 22-23.
^Amado, "Contribucion, " 104.
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to study petroleum legislation postponed making a recommen-
dation during the 1916 sessions, preferring to await the
president-elect's initiatives. The members of the Petroleum
Commission likewise sought to facilitate the new govern-
ment's activity by tendering their resignations shortly
after Yrigoyen's inauguration. 5 The fact that the Radicals
controlled neither house of Congress until they gained a
majority in the Chamber in 1918 was a problem to be reckoned
with, but it in no way prevented Yrigoyen from making his
plans public. If the administration was going to run into
Congressional opposition, that could be faced after placing
concrete proposals in the legislators' hands.
Given the opportunity to adopt new policies, it was im-
perative that Yrigoyen and his advisors do so immediately,
because a growing fuel scarcity arising out of WW I was
taking its toll in Argentina. During the early years of the
war, a severe decline in coal imports from England was
partially compensated for by increased imports of coal,
crude oil and petroleum by-products from the United States.
When the U.S. also became embroiled in the European con-
flict and, like England, sharply reduced fuel exports, the
fuel supply problem reached crisis proportions. ^ The
5La Prensa, October 20, 1916, p. 11.
^Argentina imported over four million tons of coal in
1913, and in 1917 only 707,700 tons. (Ernesto Tornquist &
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price of coal shot up at an alarming rate, and eventually it
became unavailable at almost any price. By winter's end in
1917, coal commanded 90 $m/n a ton, or five times as much as
before the war. 7
Nearly every phase of national life was affected by
the fuel shortage. Home owners, industries and public
service enterprises, railroads and farmers and cattlemen
whose produce traveled to market by rail, and the Naval
squadron were among the sectors hardest hit. 8 The Buenos
Aires press constantly referred to the "fuel crisis",
and President Yrigoyen, in his message opening the 1917
Congressional sessions, assured the nation that the fuel
supply was a primary government concern, and that every-
thing possible was being done to find domestic sources
of coal and wood.^
Cia. , Business Conditions in the Argentine
,
Report 143
(December 30, 1918) , 23
.
) Similar declines were recorded
with respect to other fuels, as coke imports descended from
21,317,500 kilos in 1913 to 3,903,900 kilos in 1917.
( Ibid . ) Finally, crude oil imports slid from 120,700 m in
1916 to 10,800 m3 in 1918. La Prensa , October 15, 1969,
p. 7 (Centennial supplement)
.
7La Epoca
,
August 8, 1917, p. 1.
^United States, Department of State, Records Relating
to the Internal Affairs of Argentina, 1910 -1929 (hereinafter
cited RRIAA) , National Archives Microcopy 514, Dearing to
Johnson, October 5, 1918, 835.50/10, enclosure.
9Hipolito Yrigoyen, Pueblo y_ gobierno , 2nd ed. (Buenos
Aires: Editorial Raigal, 1956) ,*"lV, 114.
Comodoro Rivadavia's allegedly vast petroleum wealth
would have been the best alternative to imported coal, but
production was simply insufficient to cover a significant
share of the national fuel needs. So heavy did the demand
for domestic petroleum become, that the Petroleum Commissior
in October 1917, informed its private customers that they
would have to find new suppliers because the state enter-
prise felt compelled to concentrate on provisioning govern-
ment agencies and public service firms. 10 Despite La Razon'
biting comment that this resembled "a doctor who advises
his patients to employ the services of a quack," 11 the un-
avoidable fact was that the domestic petroleum industry was
unequal to the task of replacing foreign fuels.
While some consumers sougiit relief through the use of
vegetable fuels like corn and wheat bran, 12 the most fre-
quently suggested alternatives were domestic coal and wood.
Unfortunately, there were disadvantages with both which
limited their effectiveness in providing a solution to
the fuel crisis. In the case of coal, the problem was one
of locating deposits that could be exploited economically.
Efforts by the Naval and Public Works Ministries to unearth
1QLa Razon , October 18, 1917, p. 3.
11Ibid.
1 5RRIAA
,
Dearing to Johnson, October 5, 1918,
835.50/10, enclosure, 3.
coal in the National Territory of Neuquen and along the
Atlantic coast near Puerto Deseado and San Julian all ended
in failure. 13
As for wood, the drawback was one of accessibility.
Most of the nation's forests were located far from the fuel
consuming centers, and the railroads lacked a sufficient
number of cars to transport the wood. 14 Clearly, the only
hope for successful import substitution lay with expanding
petroleum production. Even if this proved impossible during
the war, the urgency of the task would not disappear with
peace. As long as Argentina remained dependent upon
foreign fuels, she would be inviting another fuel crisis.
The Yrigoyen administration, early in its career, gave
indications that it planned to institute remedial measures
in the petroleum field. Honorio Pueyrredon, a distinguished
lawyer, law professor, and long-time Yrigoyen supporter, was
the President's choice for Minister of Agriculture and
therefore responsible for petroleum matters. In an inter-
view with La Prensa the day after Yrigoyen' s inauguration,
Pueyrredon stated that he considered petroleum exploitation
a question of vital importance and disclosed that he had
i
-)La Epoca , October 24, 1917, p. 1.
14La Prensa, November 24, 1917, p. 8; August 2, 1917,
p. 6.
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just completed a two-month study of the matter. On the
basis of his investigations, Pueyrredo'n had formulated a
legislative proposal, but he refused to reveal its content
until he discussed it with the President. 15
Yrigoyen reinforced the impression that petroleum
policy was a top priority issue for his government, in
December 1916, when Congress began meeting in Extraordinary
Sessions, he submitted a bill authorizing the administration
to issue up to 100,000,000 $m/n worth of government bonds to
cover: 1) the creation of a national agricultural bank,
2) the creation of a national merchant marine, 3) petroleum
exploitation in Comodoro Rivadavia. 16 Although no message
accompanied the bill to explain the administration's ob-
jectives or even the specific amounts destined for each of
the three areas, Pueyrredo'n later informed the Chamber that
the government would continue exploiting the federal reserve
15La Prensa, October 13, 1916 f/ p. 12. After assuming
charge of his new duties, Pueyrredon pursued his study, can-
vassing the opinions of informed parties connected with both
the private and public sectors of the petroleum industry.
Among others, he spoke with the Naval Minister, Vice Admiral
Saenz V^liente, the secretary of the Petroleum Commission,
Dr. Ramon Videla, Socialist Deputy Nicola's Repetto, and two
legal representatives of private firms, Dr. Manuel Agusto
Montes de Oca of Mexical Oil and Dr. Santiago O'Farrell of
Standard Oil. (La Epoca
,
January 23, 1917, p. 1; La Prensa ,
October 20, 1916, p. 11; Nicolas Repetto, Mi paso porTa
politica, de Roca a Yrigoyen (Buenos Aires: Santiago Rueda
Editor, 1956), 270-271; Arturo Frodizi, Petroleo y politica ,
Vol. XI of Pueblo y_ gobierno , 91.)
16Diputados, Diario, 1916, IV, 2791.
on its own, and that the requested funds would be used
primarily for extending exploration. 17 The Radical Minister
further promised the legislators that the Executive Branch
would present to Congress a comprehensive bill on petroleum
exploration and exploitation during that body's 1917
meetings. 18
Yrigoyen repeated Pueyrredon's promise of forthcoming
legislation in his message opening Congress on May 11, 1917,
and, at the same time, made revealing comments on the sub-
ject of petroleum. Dwelling upon the relationship between
oil and Argentine industrial growth, he sketched out the
role he envisioned for the nation's petroleum resources:
[The Executive Power] believes that
[Argentine oil] must be utilized for
the development of national industries,
but rejects the notion of accelerating
production for the purpose of exporta-
tion. This wealth is more useful to the
country as fuel than transformed into
foreign exchange. 19
Without clarifying who would be responsible for exploration
and exploitation, Yrigoyen thus made it clear that the
petroleum itself was destined for use within the nation
and not for export. On the subject of legislation governing
17 Ibid
. ,
1916-1917, V, 4962-4963. The Chamber career
of this bill is described later in this chapter.
18 Ibid., 4960.
19pueblo y_ gobierno , IV, 114
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exploitation, the President went on to state that he would
soon be seeking Congressional approval for a measure
destined to promote industry in all
regions of the country where evidence
of oil deposits has been discovered,
and guaranteeing, at the same time,
the exploitation and preservation of
this great wealth. 20
Despite this initial burst of verbal enthusiasm, the
Radical administration failed to support its words with
deeds. The bill Pueyrredo'n had prepared in October 1916 was
rejected by Yrigoyen, because it proposed exploitation by
mixed companies, a concept unacceptable to the President. 2 ^
While refusing his Minister's counsel, however, Yrigoyen
did not offer any general petroleum proposal of his own
until the last days of the 1919 Congressional period.
Neither, as we shall see, were any effective steps taken to
increase production in Comodoro Rivadavia.
With the exception of the money bill submitted to
Congress in December 1916, the only overt evidence of execu-
tive concern for petroleum matters prior to September 1919
consisted of a presidential tour of the Comodoro Rivadavia
installations on May 18 and 19, 1918. La Epoca , the
20 Ibid. , 115.
21Frondizi, Petroleo y_ politica , 91. I know of no
published version of the Pueyrredon bill. Frondizi's is
the only reference I have found to the bill's content, and
Frondizi cites no source.
46
semi-official UCR paper, reported that since his inaugura-
tion, President Yrigoyen had been anxious to undertake a
personal fact-finding excursion as a preliminary step to
drafting a program for expanding exploitation. 22
Published reports on the trip glowed with optimism
about the future of Argentine petroleum. According to La
Epoca, Yrigoyen was convinced that the petroleum wealth of
the South was destined to transform the nation's industry,
provide work for thousands of men, and supply the govern-
ment with incalculable resources,
if the government takes the necessary
steps and provides the resources which
are indispensable to taking advantage
of the veritable fortune that nature
lavishly offers to the efforts of the
nation. 2 3
As a result of the President's visit, La Epoca assured its
readers, the necessary measures would be taken to produce
a "radical transformation" in state exploitation. 24
No such transformation materialized, and it is doubt-
ful that Yrigoyen 's trip was designed to produce one. More
likely, the venture was intended to dramatize the adminis-
tration's concern for petroleum development and to impress
upon the public that new policies were under study. By so
22La Epoca
,
May 16, 1918, p. 1.
2 3 ibid
. ,
May 21, 1918, p. 1.
24 Ibid.
,
May 22, 1918, p. 1.
doing, the government probably hoped to take some of the
sting out of the criticism leveled at it for failing to
formulate a constructive petroleum policy.
The most persistent critic of the Radical administra-
tion was the influential Buenos Aires morning paper, La
Prensa
. Even before Yrigoyen took up residence in the Casa
Rosada, La Prensa had been an ardent advocate of domestic
petroleum development as the key to national industrial
growth and eventual economic independence." Insofar as
the framework for exploitation was concerned, the paper was
on record as an opponent of a state monopoly and as a parti
san of state exploitation within the federal reserve com-
bined with private work in all other areas. 26
During the first year of Yrigoyen' s presidency, La
Prensa constantly badgered the government to act on the
question of petroleum exploitation, to clarify
its thinking on this matter and eliminate
once and for all the indecisiveness and
vacillating standards which until now
have dominated this issue.... 27
The most interesting aspect of La Prensa'
s
campaign was the
position taken on private capital. While calling for
legislation sufficiently liberal to attract private
25La Prensa , June 5, 1916, p. 5; June 16, 1916, p. 6.
26 Ibid.
,
September 21, 1916, p. 6; June 16, 1916, p. 6
2 7ibid. , November 27, 1916, p. 9.
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investment, La Prensa emphasized that the capital should be
Argentine and not foreign. Though believing that Argentina
should try to lure foreign capital and technology to simu-
late industrial development, La Prensa cautioned against
such a policy with respect to petroleum because of "the
nature of the business" with its unique "financial
organization." 28 In short, La Prensa was anxious to avoid
the consequences of intervention by the foreign oil
trusts. 29
As one year of government inaction stretched into two
and then nearly three, La Prensa continued to protest,
hoping that petroleum exploitation
would cease being a matter of routine,
and be included in the forefront of
those activities whose development must
be supported by the State. 30
No amount of printer's ink, however, was able to shake the
administration out of its lethargy.
28Ibid
.
, November 27, 1916, p. 9.
290neto, the publicist and supporter of Deputy De
Veyga's petroleum bill, maintained a position identical to
that of La Prensa . In a 1918 pamphlet he explained; "It is
not, then, the intervention of foreign capital that we are
fighting, but its invervention in this particular case, be-
cause the oil business is monopolized on the world stage by
a powerful syndicate which would endanger the future of that
public wealth." (Oneto, "Estudio comparativo, " printed in
El centinela, 160.)
30La Prensa, May 18, 1919, p. 9.
The episode which best typifies the government's pe-
troleum policy, or lack thereof, prior to September 1919,
was its handling of the administrative phase of the state
enterprise. The Petroleum Commission's decision to resign
in October 1916 was greeted by silence from the Minister of
Agriculture. Only when the members reiterated their inten-
tions did Pueyrredo'n request that they continue serving un-
til the government had time to make a full inventory of the
petroleum situation. President Yrigoyen thought it advis-
able to maintain temporarily the existing administrative
machinery while, at the same time, declaring a moratorium
on new expenditures by the petroleum agency. 1 When the
president of the Commission, Alberto Schneidewind, and one
of the technical chiefs from Comodoro Rivadavia protested
that such a policy would produce a damaging paralysis in the
state industry, Yrigoyen relented and authorized new
a o
spending. J *
Even with this authorization, the members of the Pe-
troleum Commission could not have been overjoyed at the
prospect of continued service. Its interim status weakened
the Commission's authority and discouraged long-range
planning. And to make matters worse, the Commission was
31Ibid
.
, November 21, 1916, p. 6.
3
2
Ibid. , November 21, 1916, p. 6; November 27, 1916,
p. 9.
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under heavy fire for failing to increase state oil produc-
tion. In March 1916, La Prensa charged that the state
enterprise had for nine years been in the hands of incompe-
tent administrators whose good reputations covered up the
errors they committed and the harm they did to national
interests. 33
On February 2, 1917, the Petroleum Commission met at
the behest of one member who felt the Commission should in-
sist upon its resignation because of remarks recently made
in the Chamber of Deputies. 34 The Commissioner was probably
provoked by a speech delivered on January 31 by one of the
leading Radical Deputies, Horacio B. Oyhanarte, who
presented a critical analysis of the development of state
exploitation since 1907. Oyhanarte ascribed responsibility
for the lack of greater progress
to the inefficiency with which the work had
been executed, to the lack of scientific
methods, and to the fact that the commission
in charge of these matters appears neither
to have gotten beyond the trial and error
process [of the early years of state
exploitation] nor to have been much concerned
with its assigned task. 35
33Ibid
.
, March 21, 1916, p. 6.
34Republica Argentina, Congreso Nacional, Camara de
Diputados, Yacimientos petroliferos fiscales ; Antecedent
sobre su explotacion (Buenos Aires: Imprenta de la Camar
dT"DlpuTados, 1924) , I, 784-785.
35Diputados, Diario, 1916-1917, V, 4697. Oyhanarte
represented the Province of Buenos Aires.
Three weeks prior to Oyhanarte's comments, the
Commission had also been under attack on the floor of the
Chamber. During the deliberations on the budget for 1917,
the Chamber had voted to strike out the 4 8,000 $m/n alloca-
ted to pay the members of the Commission. 36 The discussion
preceding this vote elicited considerable criticism of the
Commission's conduct, particularly from the Socialists. 37
Enrique Dickmann (Socialist - Capt. Fed.), whose motion led
to the budget cut, insisted that the Minister of Agriculture
had a host of well-paid functionaires capable of handling
petroleum exploitation without the Commission which he
termed "Coraodoro Rivadavia's fifth wheel." 38
Under these circumstances, the Petroleum Commissioners
undoubtedly would have welcomed a legitimate excuse to
make their resignations irrevocable. On September 10,
1917, President Schneidewind retired for personal reasons
and was succeeded by Enrique Herraitte. Hermitte and the
remaining members, Gustavo Sundblad Rosetti, Juan Abella
and Adolfo Villate, continued at their posts another two
months until labor problems in Comodoro Rivadavia prompted
36The Petroleum Commission was originally an honorary
body, but it began receiving compensation for its services
in 1914.
37Diputados, Diario , 1916, IV, 3270; 1916-1917, V,
4084-4087.
38Ibid., 1916, IV, 3270.
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the acceptance of their year-old resignations.
In September 1917 there were about 1,400 laborers in
the state oil fields, 96.7% of then foreign born. 39 Forced
to work from 10 to 14 hours daily under the notoriously bad
climatic conditions of the Patagonian coast, living in sub-
standard housing, and feeling the pinch of the rising cost
of living during the war years, the petroleum workers
followed the lead of thousands of their Argentine contem-
poraries and went on strike. 40
On September 27, 1917, the workers presented a list of
demands to the administrators in Comodoro Rivadavia which
included an eight-hour day for all workers, a 25% salary in-
crease for those receiving less than 4 $m/n a day and a 15%
pay hike for the rest, and time-and-a-half for overtime and
41Sundays. x Two days later, in the face of management
silence, the work stoppage began. The employees of the two
39The bulk of the foreign workers, 49.8% of the total
work force, was of Spanish, Portuguese or Russian origin.
The remainder was drawn from eighteen other non-Argentine
nationalities. The administrative staff was markedly more
Argentine in origin with 78 of 161 positions filled by
natives. La Prensa , October 4, 1917, p. 8.
40For information on labor conditions, see La Vanguardia
,
November 1, 1917, p. 1; La Prensa , November 1, 1917, p. 8;
Asencio Abeijon, H Las palmeras huelgas petroleras , " printed
in Medio siglo de petroleo argentino (Comodoro Rivadavia:
Editorial "El Rivadavia", 1957) , 41-4 3
.
41La Epoca
,
September 29, 1917, p. 2,
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private companies then operative in the region immediately
joined the state workers, and petroleum production through-
out the area was effectively halted.
Despite official fears to the contrary, the strike was
not marred by serious outbreaks of 'violence. At the request
of the Petroleum Commission and the management of the private
firms, naval personnel supplemented the efforts of the small
local law-keeping force to patrol the oil fields and main-
tain order. 42
The strike lasted through October and into mid-November
before the workers' persistence paid off in the form of a
favorable settlement. Meetings in Buenos Aires between
a committee of strikers and the Minister of Agriculture
produced agreement by November 10 on an eight-hour day for
all personnel-, a pay raise of 20% for those earning less
than 4 $m/n a day and a 15% hike for all others, and 30%
extra for overtime. In addition, the government promised to
42La Prensa
, October 4, 1917, p. 8. At various times
throughout the strike, sailors from three vessels aided the
police. There were definite indications that the strikers
were not pleased with the conduct of the military personnel.
On one occasion, the government felt obliged to conceal the
destination of one Naval ship headed for Comodoro Rivadavia
for fear that if the strikers found out it would provoke an
uprising. (La Epoca , October 24, 1917, p. 1.) Early in
November, a committee of strikers in Buenos Aires to discuss
a strike settlement with government officials protested to
the Naval Minister about the conduct of the military police,
and, particularly, about the practice of positioning machine
guns around the petroleum fields. (La Prensa , November 3,
1917, p. 5, November 5, 1917, p. 8; La Razon, November 2,
set up a consumer's cooperative in the oil fields, enforce
the law governing work accidents in Comodoro Rivadavia, and
improve the workers' living quarters. 43
It was the manner in which the strike was settled
rather than the provisions of the agreement which led to the
Executive Decrees of November 14, 1917, accepting the resig-
nations of the Petroleum Commissioners. 44 When the strike
dragged into late October with no solution in sight,
Minister of Agriculture Pueyrredon undercut the Commission
by entrusting the matter to a three-man committee composed
of the commanders of two Naval vessels then in Comodoro
Rivadavia and the administrative chief of the state oil
fields, Leopoldo Sol. 45 It was under the guidance of this
group, and through direct negotiations between the committee
of strikers and the Minister of Agriculture, that the
strike was finally settled.
1917, p. 1; La Epoca , November 2, 1917, p. 1.)
43La Prensa , November 10, 1917, p. 10; La Razon ,
November 10, 1917, p. 3.
44YPF, Recopilacio'n , I, 74-75.
45La Prensa , October 25, 1917, p. 5; La Epoca , October
27, 1917, p. 1, October 30, 1917, p. 1.
46From available evidence, it appears that Yrigoyen
himself played a significant role in bringing the strike to
a close. On November 7, a messenger arrived in the Capital
from the Commander of the "Rivadavia", Capitan de Navio
Darieaux, who was presiding over the three-man committee
appointed to settle the strike. Darieaux' s report on
55
If there had been any doubt about the Petroleum Com-
mission's fate before the strike, there could have been none
once Pueyrredo'n had removed negotiations from its hands.
The Minister's action amounted to a public disavowal of his
subordinates in charge of petroleum exploitation. Having
suffered heavy criticism while forced to work with limited
funds and reduced authority, the Commissioners probably
welcomed the acceptance of their resignations. Leopoldo
Sol, the administrative chief in the oil fields, completed
the sweep of upper level officials responsible for state
exploitation when he too resigned. 4 ^
The man chosen to replace Sol, first temporarily then
on a permanent basis, was Capital de Fragata Felipe Fliess.
There was nothing in the background of the thirty-nine year
old Fliess which indicated a particular competence for his
new post. He had compiled a distinguished record at the
Naval Academy (1906)
,
progressed regularly through the
officer ranks, and served recently, from 1914 to 1916, as a
professor and subdirector at the Naval Academy. Fliess 's
conditions in Comodoro Rivadavia was delivered to an
audience of President Yrigoyen and his Ministers of Agricul
ture and Navy. According to La Prensa , after hearing the
report, Yrigoyen gave instructions for ending the conflict.
Two days later t/ on November 9, an agreement was reached be-
tween Pueyrredon and the strike committee. (La Prensa ,
November 8, 1917, p. 9.)
47YPF, Recopilacio'n , 75-76.
appointment apparently resulted from his service as the
Commander of the "San Martin" which was sent to Comodoro
Rivadavia in April 1917 to protect the coastline of the pe-
troleum installations. During his month in the area,
Fliess compiled and submitted to the Naval Minister a con-
fidential report on conditions in the oil fields. Fliess
stated to La Epoca that he felt the report had influenced
his selection as the new Comodoro Rivadavia chief. 48
Whatever Fliess' s personal qualifications for the
position, his appointment was a manifestation of the Navy's
interest in domestic petroleum development. Understandably,
the Navy considered the Patagonian deposits as a valuable
fuel source for its fleet. In fact, Law 7,059 which
authorized state exploitation in 1910 stipulated that one of
the objectives was to provide fuel for the squadron. Dur-
ing the 1917 strike, naval personnel not only policed the
state fields, but they also submitted a steady flow of
49
reports on the strike's progress to the Naval Minister.
His offices were as involved as those of the Minister of
Agriculture in eventually ending the dispute. Fliess 's
48La Epoca , November 13, 1917, p. 3.
49 It is interesting to note La Epoca'
s
justification
for the use of naval officials in seeking a solution to the
strike. When La Prensa questioned the wisdom of this idea,
La Epoca responded saying that La Prensa knows "that it is
tHe duty of the military authorities to intervene in such
matters when all possible attempts at peaceful settlement
appointment, therefore, consummated the long-standing naval
concern with petroleum matters, and, further, it established
a precedent for military leadership of the state petroleum
agency which continued unbroken until 19 32.
After the dismissal of the Petroleum Commission, La
Razon reported assurances from the Minister of Agriculture
that a thorough reform of the state petroleum agency was
under consideration, 50 and La Prensa commented that Fliess's
appointment was temporary, and that a definitive reorganiza-
tion would result from a personal fact-finding mission to
Comodoro Rivadavia by President Yrigoyen. 51 These stories
were more wishful thinking than accurate reporting. There
was no major overhaul of the state company in 1917, nor
indeed would there be any until Yrigoyen* s term had nearly
expired five years thence.
Instead of filling the vacant seats on the Petroleum
Commission, the Minister of Agriculture assumed direct
responsibility for state exploitation. Officials in
Comodoro Rivadavia and Buenos Aires, all of whom were
have failed. M (La Prensa , October 26, 1917, p. 8; La Epoca ,
October 27, 1917, p. 1.)
50La Razon, November 15, 1917, p. 1.
. —~ '
51La Prensa, November 14, 1917, p. 9.
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directly responsible to the Minister shared the administra-
tive duties of the enterprise. With Fliess in charge in
the South, the Buenos Aires offices were entrusted to a
"gerente" appointed by the Minister. Enrique V. Plate
served briefly in this capacity until he was replaced by
Sebastian L. Flores in December 1917. Essentially, the
"gerentes" were discharging the duties formerly handled by
the Petroleum Commission. 52
In short, instead of grasping the opportunity to place
state exploitation under the direction of an autonomous
bureau of technically competent men prepared to advance the
government industry, the Yrigoyen administration resorted to
a jerry-built structure ill-designed to produce anything
but stagnation. Argentina's pastoral economy burdened the
Minister of Agriculture with too many problems to allow him
to exercise effectively direct responsibility for petroleum
exploitation. When Colonel Enrique Mosconi assumed control
of the state petroleum concern in 1922, he singled out the
post-1917 administrative structure as the source of many of
the difficulties experienced by the firm:
This original framework of Minister and
Director General in one is, in my judgment,
-> 2The best summary of the administrative changes made
during this period is presented in a report drawn up by the
"gerente" of the state agency
y
in 1922 and printed in
Diputados, Yacimientos petroliferos fiscales ; Antecendentes ,
I, 162-163.
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the cause of all the difficulties and
the source of all the deficiencies and
confusion that can be seen in state ex-
ploitation,
... . As is logical, the
serious error committed in Buenos Aires
had to have repercussions in Comodoro
Rivadavia. 53
Thus, by September 1919, nearly three years after
Yrigoyen's inauguration, there was no marked change in the
status of domestic petroleum development. Despite promises
of reform, it is clear that Yrigoyen led his party to power
with no precise program for immediate implementation. He
and his advisors formulated no long-range policy, but simply
acted on a day-to-day basis, adjusting to situations as
they arose.
While it is not intended here to justify the govern-
ment's apathetic attitude, certain considerations make it
at least understandable. First, in order for domestic pe-
troleum production to have expanded significantly, Argentina
would have had to acquire machinery, pipelines, transport
tankers, and other industrial equipment, and to attract
heavy investment into the private sector of the industry.
But Argentina lacked the metallurgical industry to provide
the necessary heavy machinery, and the war made it all but
5
3
Ibid. , 641. Mosconi's comment was part of a report
he submitted to Minister of Agriculture Tom^s Le Breton on
February 23, 1923.
impossible to secure it from abroad. 54 with respect to
private investment, the war nearly eliminated new foreign
capital as a factor in the Argentine economy, and domestic
savings shied away from industrial ventures. Most of the
unusual profits earned by the rural and industrial sectors
because of the wartime situation were invested in govern-
ment paper, bonds, and treasury notes, and served to pay
current government expenses rather than to stimulate indus-
trial growth. 55 Given these conditions, the administration
may have felt that any attempt to stimulate oil production
was futile until the war was over.
Indirectly, the war contributed in a second way to de-
laying action on petroleum policy. When Yrigoyen's Foreign
Minister, Dr. Carlos Becu, resigned in February 1917, his
duties were assumed on an interim basis by Minister of
Agriculture Pueyrredon who filled both offices until Sept-
ember 1918. Undoubtedly, the responsibilities of the
Foreign Office during these war months severely taxed
54Government publications prior to 1919 consistently
referred to this problem as a major stumbling block to in-
creasing production. Republica Argentina, Ministerio de
Agricultura, (hereinafter cited M,. de Agric.)
,
Memoria
,
1917 (Buenos Aires: Talleres Graficos del Ministerio de
Agricultura, 1920)
,
291; D. G. de Explotacion, Memoria
,
1918
,
4-5; Memoria
,
1919, 3.
55Joseph S. Tulchin, "The Argentine Economy During the
First World War," The Review of the River Plate , No. 3750
(June 19, 1970), 901-903, No. 375T~(June 30, 1970) , 965-
967, No. 3752 (July 10, 1970), 44-46.
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Pueyrredon's time, diverting energies which otherwise
might have been devoted to clarifying the government's pe-
troleum policy. Furthermore, the ministerial change
through which Alfredo Demarchi succeeded Pueyrredo'n de-
prived the Agricultural Department of the continuity which
is essential to effective policy formulation.
A third inhibiting factor was Yrigoyen's highly per-
sonal manner of conducting governmental business. Relying
little on his Ministers, and much less on his lower subor-
dinates, he ran the government with the same authoritarian
hand that ruled the UCR. Working at the same slow and
cautious pace which marked his conspiratorial days,
Yrigoyen often delayed the transaction of government business
by insisting that he directly oversee all matters. Petro-
leum policy would be defined when he, personally, had time
for it. 56
Though the Executive Branch cannot be exonerated for
its failure to formulate a petroleum policy, Congress too
must share the blame for the lack of petroleum legislation
S^Manuel Galvez, Vida de Hipolito Yrigoyen ; El hombre
del misterio (Buenos Aires : Editorial Tor, 1945), 182,
200-201 , 211 . Galvez attributes both Yrigoyen's slowness
to act ana his authoritarian bent to a basically introverted
personality. He relates an incident which is indicative of
Yrigoyen's concept of his role as President. When asked
why he had chosen so many lesser lights for Ministers,
Yrigoyen allegedly replied, "Because I was the President, I
was the Vice President, and I was the Cabinet." ( Ibid .
,
182.)
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and for the limited funds with which the state industry was
forced to function. The same pressures which demanded
results from the national executive - the need for an im-
mediate increase in petroleum production and the obvious
inadequacy of existing petroleum legislation - dictated that
the legislators apply their collective talents to solving
the problem.
While it was advisable for Congress to delay passing
legislation until the President's opinions were known, it
was neither necessary nor prudent to wait three years. By
taking the initiative and presenting the Casa Rosada with
a fait accompli in the form of an enactment embodying its
own designs, Congress could have forced the issue on
Yrigoyen, placing him in a position of having either to
accept their plan or offer an alternative. Congress, how-
ever, chose to remain silent. The Senate, displaying a
lack of sensitivity to public needs incredible for a repre-
sentative body, never even discussed petroleum legislation.
And the Chamber, while showing more awareness of the precar-
ious national fuel situation, did not sanction the sorely
needed general bill on exploration and exploitation of
petroleum resources.
The absence of partisan control over the legislative
machinery was one factor which militated aginst prompt
and productive attention to petroleum or any issue. Con-
servative domination in the Senate was unchallenged.
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Before 1920
,
the Socialists could claim one and the
Radicals never more than four of the thirty seats in the
Upper House. 57 In the chamber
, cofttrol shifted as a CQn_
sequence of the 1918 Congressional elections. The anti-
administration forces held the upper hand prior to 1918
with 67 votes to 48 for the Radicals. After the 1918
elections, the new alignment showed the Radicals ascendant
with 61 seats to 50 for the Conservatives (44) and the
Socialists (6). 58
The prospects for any one group or party guiding
legislation through this political maze were slim at best.
The Radicals could rely on stiff Senate opposition to
almost any measure bearing the UCR label, and the
57Roberto Etchepareborda, "Yrigoyen y el congreso,"
printed in Pueblo y_ gobierno , IV, 62-63.
58The figures presented here do not total 120, the
legal size of the Chamber during these years, because
seats left vacant have not been included. The Radicals
improved their position slightly between 1918 and 1919 by
electing two more members to the Chamber in off-year con-
tests, while the Conservatives gained one more seat. The
figures on the composition of the Chamber have been compiled
on the basis of election statistics published by the Argen-
tine Ministry of the Interior in 194 6, Las fuerzas armadas
restituyen el imperio de la soberania popular
, Tomo I
(Buenos Aires: Imprenta d~e la Camara de Diputados, 1946).
The Conservatives are referred to with an upper case "C M
despite the fact that there was no national Conservative
Party, but a coalition of provincial representatives from a
variety of local political organizations that shared
roughly the same political views and cooperated on a
national level when circumstances demanded it, such as in
the case of presidential elections.
not
Conservative-Socialist anti-administration bloc could
be counted on to cooperate on anything save opposition to
the Radicals. Only if partisan considerations were trans-
cended could Congress have been expected to approach its
law-making task productively.
The Chamber's only debate on petroleum legislation
prior to 1919, and indeed the only major petroleum debate
before 1927, stemmed from the bill introduced by Radical
Deputy Carlos F. Melo in July 1916. At that time, Melo
proposed federalization of the nation's oil deposits,
creation of a state monopoly over their exploitation, and
the expropriation of all oil concessions previously made by
the national or provincial governments.
On August 1 of the following year, Melo and a Conser-
vative Deputy, Rodolfo Moreno (Buenos Aires Prov.)
, sub-
mitted what was essentially a revised version of the 1916
bill. The new proposal included iron ore and coal deposits
along with petroleum and provided for the federalization of
all three. Their exploitation would be regulated by special
legislation to be passed later. The expropriation clause
was to be retained, and Article 9 of the Mining Code which
prohibited mineral exploitation by the national or
provincial governments would be declared null and void. 59
59Diputados, Diario, 1917, III, 45-47. The term "feder-
alization" will be used throughout this study to mean the
Displaying an efficiency which is seldom characteris-
tic of Congressional committees, perhaps because Melo him-
self was a member, the Committee on Legislation reported
the bill out just nine days after it was introduced. 60
Other matters occupied the Chamber's attention during the
waning weeks of the 1917 sessions, however, and the bill
did not reach the debate stage.
After going back to the Committee, the measure again
was sent to the floor on June 12, 1918, 61 and was debated
intermittently over the next several weeks. The bill was
not identical to the Melo-Moreno proposal since the Radical
dominated Committee stipulated that the special legislation
on exploitation would guarantee to the provinces a share of
the profits made from any development of the three minerals
within their respective borders, and that all concessions
made before July 1, 1918 would be respected. 62
The debate was inconclusive since the 1918 sessions
closed before the bill could be brought to a vote. Yet, in
view of the fact that the discussion focused on the
extension of federal legal jurisdiction over provincial
oil deposits. The term "nationalization" is not being
employed because the extension of federal jurisdiction did
not mean the national government actually would exploit the
petroleum deposits.
60 Ibid., 296.
61 Ibid., 1918, I, 382.
6 2 ibid. , 636, One member of the Committee, Francisco
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constitutionality of federalizing mineral deposits, a key
and controversial issue, it cannot be argued that the Chamber
wasted its time. With Deputies Antonio de Tomaso (Social-
ist
- capt. Fed.) and Carlos Melo arguing that federaliza-
tion was within constitutional limits, and Deputies Alberto
Arancibia Rodriguez (Conservative - San Luis) and Matias
G. Sanchez Sorondo (Conservative - B.A. Prov.) holding
forth in opposition, the cases were presented clearly on
both sides.
Sanchez Sorondo and Arancibia Rodriguez contended that
federalization would constitute an affront to provincial
autonomy, robbing the provinces of control over their
mineral resources. While supporting this proposition, the
two Conservative Deputies posed as the defenders of pro-
vincial rights against incursions by the national govern-
ment. Their position was that the Argentine provinces
preceded the nation as legal entities, that the Constitution
of 1853 was written by provincial representatives, and
that, in the Constitution, provincial sovereignty was
protected by reserving to the provinces those powers not
delegated to the national government (Article 104) . This
sovereignty, they argued, was inextricably tied to
Uriburu, a Salta conservative, refused to sign the bill and
presented his own proposal to the Chamber instead.
(Ibid., 1917, V, 264-272.)
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territorial integrity, because, as Arancibia Rodriguez
put it,
without territory there wouid be no
provinces,..., [and] because it is
impossible to conceive of either a
political entity or an autonomous
government that controls its terri-
tory through foreign laws or author-
ities other than those who represent
the sovereignty itself. 63
From these premises, it was but a short step to the
conclusion that since federalization of mineral deposits
involved interference with provincial territorial integrity,
it also impinged on provincial sovereignty and was, there-
fore, contrary to the Constitution. 64
The two Conservative Deputies further argued that
federalization violated the spirit as well as the letter of
the Constitution. Such a measure, they contended, was more
suited to the tastes of the 19th century "unitarious" than
the federalists who drew up the basic charter. Sanchez
Sorondo warned the Chamber that federalization was another
in the series of laws passed in the last three decades which
had established a dangerous trend toward centralization of
power in the hands of the national government. It was a
trend he abhorred
63 Ibid,, 1918, I, 653.
^ 4For the constitutional arguments of Arancibia
Rodriguez and Sanchez Sorondo, see Ibid. , 647-657.
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»
because it leads us astray from wise
practices, because it disrupts the
federal balance, [and] because [these
laws] accustom us to considering the
Constitution as a dead letter, leaving
us, therefore, without protection in
times of danger 65
Against this argument, which could have been drawn
almost verbatim from the treatises of 19th century Argen-
tine federalists, Melo and the brilliant young De Tomaso
posed the more modern concept of increased governmental
interference in the economic sphere. They did not deny the
political autonomy of the provinces, but simply contended
that, under Article 67, Section 11 of the Constitution, the
national Congress was empowered to dictate the national
Mining Code, This being the case, it was illogical to
assume, as De Tomaso pointed out, that
this Congress could have the power to establish
the basic legislation and then could not,...,
decide at any time on what it may consider to be
more consistent with the country's interests in
the matter of ownership of mineral deposits. 66
Melo hastened to remind the Chamber that sovereignty can be
either complete or partial, and that the national govern-
ment was the only totally sovereign entity in Argentina.
The provinces enjoyed partial sovereignty, exercising legis-
lative autonomy within the limits fixed by the Constitution.
65ibid
.
, 652.
66ibid., 639.
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In the case of mineral matters, Article 67, Section 11 left
no doubt that responsibility lay with the national govern-
ment, 67
Where their opponents hewed almost exclusively to the
constitutional issue, Melo and De Tomaso strengthened their
case by arguing that the practice of placing vital mineral
resources under the protection of the national government
was a current world-wide trend. It stemmed in part from the
mounting importance of minerals like coal, iron ore and oil
for industrial development and national defense, and from
the protective measures adopted by the belligerent powers
during WW I. Melo maintained that the trend reflected a
changed concept of the government's function in the economic
sphere. No longer was the state viewed in 19th century
liberal fashion as an impartial arbiter and, when necessary,
coercive agent. The contemporary concept, according to
Melo, was that of "the defender of the collective rights and
interests... and the representative of all sectors of the
society." 68
On a more practical plane, De Tomaso argued that,
given the importance of the minerals under consideration
and the eagerness of foreign capital to exploit them, it was
67ipid
. ,
1918, IV, 144-145.
68Ibid., 1918, II, 179.
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unwise to rely for protection on fourteen separate policies
pursued by the provinces as they enforced the Mining Code.
Without saying as much, he was implying that the provincial
governments, either by choice or by circumstance, might not
prove equal to the task of safeguarding the nation's vital
mineral wealth. 69
Melo, on the other hand, sought to convince the Chamber
that under the Mining Code as it stood, private interests
alone benefited since all mines had to be turned over to
them for exploitation. If, however, the bill under dis-
cussion were passed, the provinces would share in the profits
reaped from the development of petroleum, coal and iron ore,
and they would be free to undertake any other mineral ex-
ploitations they considered advisable. 70
Although on theoretical as well as practical grounds,
De Tomaso and Melo presented the more convincing arguments,
no vote was taken to test their persuasiveness on the
Chamber. Still, the debate did provide some indications as
to the thinking of the three major political groups on pe-
troleum legislation, and, particularly, on federalization.
Given the strict internal discipline of the Socialist Party,
it can be assumed that De Tomaso' s strong support for the
69 Ibid
. ,
1918, I, 638, 642.
70 Ibid., 437; 1918, II, 148, 175, 185-187.
bill accurately mirrored his party's position. Also, there
is little reason to suspect that the majority of the
Chamber's Conservatives disagreed with the constitutional
views expressed by Arancibia Rodriguez and Sa'nchez Sorondo.
However, the fact that the original bill was co-authored by
a Conservative, Moreno, emphasizes the need for exercising
the basis of this debate.
As far as the Radicals are concerned, the Chamber dis-
c ussions reveal that while some elements within the party
were willing to back federalization, this was not yet an
established party policy. Melo co-authored the initial
proposal, and he and four other UCR Deputies signed the
Committee on Legislation despatch. Yet, what was primarily
a Radical measure in origin was not even brought to a vote
in a Radical-controlled Chamber. The majority of the UCR
Deputies preferred to wait for the President's initiative
before committing themselves on this question.
In mid-February 1917, the Chamber provided the only
positive item in its petroleum record for the first half of
Yrigoyen's presidency by approving a special outlay of
16,000,000 $m/n for developing the state operations in
Comodoro Rivadavia. The Executive Power had presented the
original proposal to the Extraordinary Sessions of Congress
71
which opened in December 1916.
71see above, pages 43-44. The Chamber's Treasury
72
The debate on the petroleum funds centered on the
question of how the administration intended to invest the
money. Several Deputies noted the irregularity of approving
a financial measure without knowing the destination of the
funds. Deputy Escobar vividly stated the case when he
said the nation demanded
an end to experiments, to probes and
trials; the country demands purposeful
efforts, carefully considered solutions,
[and]
, better said Mr. President, ideas
and action. 73
Minister of Agriculture Pueyrredon addressed the
Chamber briefly on February 9, 1917 to present the adminis-
tration's policy, but neither he nor the two Radical Deputies
who shared the task of defending the government's request,
Horacio B. Oyhanarte and Alfredo Demarchi, gave convincing
evidence that the government had a carefully thought out
petroleum policy, or that it had a detailed program for the
use of the 16,000,000 pesos. Pueyrredon informed the
Chamber that the government's primary objective was to
extend exploration. Without ignoring efforts to increase
Commission combined this bill with another on debt consoli-
dation in its despatch to the Chamber floor. Article 2,
Section 9 alloted 16,000,000 $m/n for the state oil industry.
(Diputados, Diario, 1916-1917, V, 4620-4621.)
72Diputados, Diario
,
1916-1917, V, 4746, 4756, 4876,
4907.
73lbid., 4941.
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production, the administration, he said, intended
to explore thoroughly the area, demonstrating
to the entire nation whether we actually have
an abundance of oil, or whether, on the con-
trary, the deposits are limited to that small
corner of the reserve zone. That, gentlemen,
has not been done, and, in my judgment, it is
the true task of the government. 7 ^
According to Pueyrredo'n, this was all the Deputies needed to
know.
The details are not of interest to the
Congress; the Deputies cannot ask the
Executive Power exactly what must be pur-
chased for this exploitation.
..
.75
With the Chamber now instructed as to its own limita-
tions, Demarchi and Oyhanarte advocated approval of the
petroleum funds. They contended that petroleum exploitation
was an expensive business, and that the vast potential of
the Comodoro Rivadavia fields would lie dormant if substan-
tial new investments were not made. Essentially, they
were arguing that the government should either do the job
right or not do it at all, that either the funds should be
supplied to raise production to a point where significant
amounts of petroleum were being provided for national use,
or the whole operation should be abandoned. As Oyhanarte
bluntly put the alternatives,
74 Ibid. , 4962-4963,
75ibid. , 4963.
74
*
either exploit Comodoro Rivadavia intensively
and scientifically according to procedures
already well known, or cap the wells and stoppouring money into this matter. 76
On close inspection, a notable lack of agreement
emerges between the remarks of Minister Pueyrredon and
those of the two Radical Deputies. While the Agricultural
chief spoke of broadening exploration, Demarchi and
Oyhanarte were impressing upon the Chamber the expense of
such equipment as distilleries, tanker transports and
storage facilities, all equipment related to production not
exploration. And while Pueyrredon urged exploration as a
means to gain the knowledge of Argentina's oil reserves
necessary to formulate the best national petroleum policy,
Demarchi and Oyhanarte had their sights trained on the much
more ambitious objective of supplying the entire nation
with cheap, abundant fuel. 77 The Chamber had to decide
which of the Radical speakers most accurately represented
the government's intentions.
Nicolas Repetto, the 46 year-old surgeon-Deputy,
offered the only opposition during the debate, and his
objective was to have the funds reduced. The Socialist
leader was unconvinced that the Radical administration
7 6 Ibid. , 5005. For the remarks of Demarchi, see Ibid .
,
4949-4959, 5009-5019; and for those of Oyhanarte, 4992-
5009.
77 Ibid.
,
4959, 4963, 5002, 5004.
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intended to alter the past policies which had suffocated
the state petroleum industry. Claiming that he was anxious
to avoid a national disaster in Coinodoro Rivadavia, Repetto
urged the government to adopt a cautious short-range policy
and suggested the Chamber approve 5 , 000, 000 $m/n to finance
• 7 8it. It is probable that the chance to exert a degree of
Congressional control over the notoriously independent Chief
Executive also entered into Repetto' s calculations.
In any case, he advised the Radical government to lay
aside, at least temporarily, the grandiose design of supply-
ing the whole domestic market and concentrate on covering
the needs of the government agencies. To this end, main-
tained Repetto, the government should exploit its 5,000-
hectare reserve, while releasing the larger government
reserve for private industry. 79 When the state firm could
supply the government's own needs, it could place the sur-
plus in the public market. For such a moderate and practical
program, Repetto saw no need to vote more than 5,000,000
$m/n.
It is difficult to believe that the Chamber's approval
of the full 16,000,000 $m/n was attributable to the
78For Repetto's remarks, see Ibid
. ,
4947-4948, 4964
4971, 5114-5133.
.
79Repetto's reference was to the reserve created by
Saenz Pena in 1913 to check speculative activity in
petroleum concessions. See Chapter I, pp. 13-15.
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persuasive powers of Melo, Demarchi and Pueyrredo'n. Rather,
it may be taken as an indication of the widespread consensus
in favor of state exploitation. Significantly, not one
Deputy argued that the money should be flatly refused, or
that the government should pull up stakes in Comodoro
Rivadavia and leave the petroleum industry in private hands.
Theoretical considerations aside, the state industry repre-
sented a sizable investment not only in money but in national
prestige. Admitting defeat would have been a blow to
Argentine national pride which the legislators were unwilling
to accept.
The general acceptance of state exploitation was mani-
fested in the Chamber's approval of another bill submitted
by Deputies Melo and Demarchi. Originally presented as
amendments to the money bill, its articles were passed as a
separate enactment. As sent to the Senate, the measure con-
firmed the 5 , 000-hectare region in Comodoro Rivadavia as a
permanent reserve for government exploitation, and author-
ized for that purpose investment of the 16,000,000 $m/n
just voted by the Chamber as well as the profits made by
the state firm until January 1, 1926. 80
80oiputaods, Diario
,
1916-1917, V, 5191. This bill
was passed on February 16, 1917 immediately after final
approval of the measure containing the 16,000,000 pesos for
petroleum exploitation.
The Senate, however, failed to act on either the money
bill or the Melo-Demarchi bill, consigning both to the
legislative graveyard, 81 On March 5, 1917, President
Yrigoyen, protesting that Congress had delayed too long in
passing either the administration's proposals or substitute
measures of its own, closed the Extraordinary Sessions and
withdrew the bills submitted the previous December. It is
noteworthy that while the decree closing Congress reserved
to the Executive Power the right to submit any or all of
the withdrawn bills at a later date, the administration did
not again request funds for petroleum development. 82
The failure of national leadership in petroleum matters
whether in Congress or the Casa Rosada, inevitably took its
toll, retarding the growth of the state oil firm. Enrique
Hermitte, head of the National Bureau of Mines and interim
President of the Petroleum Commission in 1917, alluded to
the situation in his department's year-end report for 1917:
Because of the change in administration,
state exploitation is in a period of
transition and production remains stationary.
The National Government has not spelled out
its policy with respect to the oil works,
81The Senate met for the final time during the 1916-191
Extraordinary Sessions on February 15, 1917, the day before
the Chamber passed on to it the bill containing the alloca-
tion for petroleum development.
82For a copy of the Executive Decree closing Congress,
see La Prensa, March 6, 1917, p. 10.
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and, therefore, no significant alerations
£53m?S T^t in the development programestablished [before President Yrigoyen
took office]. 83 9
To complicate matters, two other problems of major pro-
portions also affected the Comodoro Rivadavia enterprise,
the difficulty in obtaining industrial machinery, already
mentioned, and the outbreak of new strikes. The work stop-
page which occurred in October and November 1917 was only
the most serious of a number of labor disputes which plagued
the state industry. In 1918, 15 days were lost through
strike activity, and the following year 50 days were lost. 84
Officials of the state company estimated that production in
1919 would have increased by 8% over 1918 instead of de-
creasing as it did by almost 5% had it not been for the
strikes. 85
In the midst of these difficulties, it is surprising
that the state industry not only maintained its position
from 1916 to 1919, but registered tangible advances in
several areas. The firm's capital, built up through
reinvesting profits, expanded from less than 12,000,000 $m/n
83M. de Agric, Memoria
, 1917, 291.
84 D, G, de Explotacion, Memoria, 1918, 9; Memoria,
1919, 3.
85Ibid.
to nearly 39,000,000 $m/n86
, while production rose from
129,890 m3 of crude oil in 1916 to 188,093 m3 in 1919. 87
Storage facilities in Comodoro Rivadavia were slowly ex-
panded from a capacity of 71,675 m 3 to 84,675 m 3 88
, and
the tanker fleet which transported 9 8,040 tons of crude
oil in 1916, carried over 190,000 tons three years later
with one less ship. 89
Commercially, the firm's record also shows token ad-
vances. The state industry sold 61,174 tons of crude oil
in 1916 and 95,279 tons in 1919. 90 Both government
agencies and private consumers continued to use state oil,
with the price for the latter determined by the prices
charged by private distributors. Those responsible for
state exploitation felt that selling the limited government
oil supply at a price below the market level would have
meant creating a privileged group of consumers. 9 * As state
86YPF, Desarrollo de la industria
, 53, 61.
87BIP, December, 1936, 18.
88Diputados, Yacimientos petroliferos f iscales ;
Antecedentes
,
I, 306
.
89YPF, Desarrollo de la industria
,
374.
yuDiputados, Yacimientos petrol ros fiscales;
Antecedentes
,
I, chart facing 348.
91lbid., 171-172; M« de Agric, Memoria, 1919, 19.
production expanded, the question of constructing a major
distillation facility to take advantage of valuable petro-
leum by-products became increasingly urgent. By 1919, how-
ever, a distillery was still in the planning stage. 92
Outside of Comodoro Rivadavia, some hope for the
future was provided by the 1918 discovery of high quality
petroleum by the Bureau of Mines in Plaza Huincul (National
Territory of Neuquen)
,
93
Though the Patagonian deposits
had been worked more intensively than those in Plaza
Huincul, they too supplied more hope for the future than
satisfaction for the present in 1919. Only the uninformed
could have disputed the statement in the Minister of Agri-
culture's Memoria for 1919 to the effect that the Argentine
petroleum industry was still in its nascent stage. 94
The private sector of the petroleum industry showed
no more of a tendency toward rapid expansion than the
public sector. While production more than doubled between
1917 and 1919 - from 10,667 m3 to 23,188 m3 - the latter
figure represented the work of only two companies and was
92 Ibid. , 17.
93The best short account of the discovery at Plaza
Huincul appears in Enrique Mosconi's El^ petro^leo
argentino
,
28-29.
94M. de Agric, Memoria, 1919, 15-16.
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insignificant in terms of the national fuel market. 95
That private exploitation was starved for a lack of
capital has already been noted. Had there been willing in-
vestors, foreign or domestic, it is unlikely they would
have encountered any government hostility. On May 24, 1918,
an article appeared in the semi-official La Epoca touting
the oil industry as a promising field for private invest-
ment. 96 Seven months later, on December 30, the same
source reported that exploitation in Comodoro Rivadavia had
been discussed in a Cabinet meeting, and that
it is the intention of the government
to maintain the state industry, with-
out, however, excluding the concurrence
of private capital that would be able
to expand exploitation. 97
In 1919 Yrigoyen himself stated in his message opening
Congress
,
Legislating on state-financed petroleum
development is necessary in order to
clear the way for private participation
in the exploitation of deposits located
outside the State reserve. 98
On a rhetorical level then, the government welcomed
95BIP, December, 1936, 19, 20.
96La Epoca
,
May 24, 1918, p. 24.
97Ibid
.
, December 30, 1918, p. 1.
98Pueblo y_ gobierno , IV, 179.
private investment in the petroleum industry. What the
government failed to provide was effective follow through
on its declared policy. Absent was any forceful effort to
enact a petroleum law that would have cleared up the un-
stable legal atmosphere surrounding' private exploitation
and, in so doing, would have provided a powerful stimulus
to private investment.
A discrepancy between words and deeds provided the
leitmotif of the petroleum policy pursued by the Radical
government from October 1916 to September 1919. Yrigoyen
had no well-defined petroleum policy when he became Pres-
ident, and three years of experience proved that the vague
concept of "reparacion" , while rhetorically appealing, I
provided no answers for practical questions. While the
President and other Radical leaders like Pueyrredo'n, Melo,
Demarchi and Oyhanarte frankly acknowledged the need for a
law which would define the nation's objectives in terms of
petroleum development and place both the public and private
sectors of the industry on a firm legal basis, there
was no sustained effort to secure the law. Congress, like
the President, refused to take the initiative. The
great majority of the Radical Congressmen, as befitted
well disciplined Yrigoyen subordinates, were willing to
wait indulgently for their caudillo to take the first step,
and the Conservative and Socialists seemed content to sit
back and watch the Radical administration strain, and
hopefully buckle, under the weight of government responsi
bility.
Thus, by default, the domestic petroleum situation
remained essentially unchanged from the pre-Yrigoyen
years. If the nation's industrial future and economic
independence rested on domestic petroleum development,
then it also rested on the ability of strong, purposeful
national leadership to transform Argentina's petroleum
potential into reality.
CHAPTER III
YRIGOYEN II: A POLICY OF WORDS NOT DEEDS
After nearly three years of unfulfilled promises, the
Yrigoyen administration finally presented its proposals for
petroleum legislation to Congress in September 1919. The
two bills clarified the government's position on both the
public and private sectors of the industry, but subsequent
events demonstrated that the Radicals still preferred words
to deeds, Yrigoyen «s oil bills proved to be simply another
well-timed nationalistic note from the Radical's political
trumpet. They were never brought up for debate in a
Chamber dominated by his own party, and when he left the
Casa Rosada in 1922, national oil legislation still re-
mained a matter of speculation. As a consequence, the
state oil enterprise advanced slowly, constantly hindered
by the lack of either a sound legal basis or purposeful
leadership. And while private investors displayed a
quickening interest in Argentine petroleum after 1920,
many continued hesitant in the face of the legal vacuum
which masqueraded as Argentine petroleum law. When in
June 1922, four months before the end of his term,
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Yrigoyen belatedly took substantive action in petroleum
matters, it was for distinctly negative reasons.
Despite the failure of the legislature to act,
Yrigoyen »s petroleum bills throw light on administration
thinking and deserve careful analysis. The first bill,
which entered the Chamber on September 24, 1919, called for
the federalization of the nation 's oil resources, granted
the national government the right to explore and exploit
petroleum deposits on its own behalf, and prescribed the
conditions under which petroleum rights would be issued to
private interests. 1
In the accompanying message, Yrigoyen and Agricultural
Minister Demarchi argued for federalization on the basis
of
the financial as well as the social
benefits which result from the many
uses of that fuel. 2
With all deposits under the exclusive control of the
national government, their argument continued, the State
could oversee petroleum exploitation and
prevent private interests from wasting
[the oil] , or damaging it through
ignorance or impulsiveness, or rendering
[the deposits] improductive through
•-Diputados, Diario
,
1919, V, 480-485.
2 Ibid. , 480.
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negligence or financial incapacity,.... 3
Given this framework, the National Executive was willing to
promote private participation in the petroleum industry
"within prudent limits and under certain conditions," and,
particularly, to encourage private operations in areas as
4yet unexplored.
The nationalistic tone of the measure established by
the call for federalization likewise pervaded the articles
governing private concessions. The regulations recommended
by the administration obviously were intended to produce
small-scale, closely-checked private operations which
would surrender a share of any profits to the national
treasury.
The guiding concept for granting private rights was
adopted from the Rumanian oil law of 1906. Basically, it
involved dividing the nation's territory into three
categories: 1) recognized petroleum lands, 2) lands with
unknown petroleum potential, 3) lands reserved for state
activity.^ The terms of each concession depended upon
3Ibid.
4 Ibid. , 481,
5The three areas were not precisely defined in the bill
There was no indication, for instance, of how far from a
producing well an area had to be located to be classified
as a "recognized petroleum zone". Had the bill passed,
such determinations apparently would have been left to the
discretion of the National Bureau of Mines.
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whether the land in question was classified under category
one or two, and every grant of category-two lands eventual-
ly added to the government's reserve.
From the investor's point of view, the one significant
new advantage offered in the government's proposal was an
extension of the time period allowed for completing ex-
ploration work. Under the Mining Code, concessionaires
had only 300 days to complete their search, with possible
short extensions under special circumstances. Because of
the necessary drilling operations, this was an extremely
abbreviated period for oil exploration. The government's
bill alloted private investors a full five years for this
critical and complicated task.
On the other side of the ledger, there were numerous
provisions guaranteeing strict federal control over all
facets of private operations. Every concessionaire had
to supply proof of his financial capacity to undertake
exploration and/or exploitation, and each was required to
execute certain field activities to maintain his rights. 6
Out of each 2000-hectare exploration plot, 500 hectares
6When the government's bill went to Congress, con-
cessionaires were required to actively work the lands
granted in an exploration permit, but once an oil dis-
covery was made they could maintain their rights by paying
an annual fee to the government. (See the provisions ot
fLaw 10,273, Jeronimo Remorino, ed., Anales de legislacion
argentina
,
complemente affos , 1889-1919 (Buenos Aires:
Editorial La Ley, 1954), 1042-1044; Velarde, Las minas
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automatically were to become part of the federal reserve,
and in the case of a discovery, the concessionaire was
obliged to divide his land into three equal parts from
which the government would choose the one it preferred.
The National Executive was empowered to dictate the manner
in which oil companies constituted their capital, the
accounting procedures to be employed, and the method of
calculating profits. Government inspectors were to keep a
watchful eye over the technical conduct of all private
operations, and the land, the production and the profits
7
of private companies were subject to a series of taxes.
On the commercial side of the industry, the Executive's
bill empowered the national government to fix the sale
price for petroleum to both private and government con-
sumers, to control exportation of oil, and to exercise a
preferential right to acquire all the oil necessary for
de petroleo , 4 8-50.) The administration's bill demanded
ten exploratory wells within five years for each 1500-
hectare exploration permit (Art. 14) , and the production of
5000 tons of crude oil within five years from each 100-
hectare exploitation grant (Art. 15). This was not an ex-
cessive demand, but it was insurance against a concession-
aire capping his wells and holding his deposits in reserve.
7Under Article 24, the concessionaire was required to
pay in annual taxes to the national government: 1) 100 $m/n
for each hectare of exploitation land, 2) 8% of his gross
production of crude oil, either in kind or in value as the
government saw fit, 3) 25% of all profits in excess of 35%
of the company's invested capital. If the deposits were
located on provincial lands, the Province would receive
50% of the production tax and all of the excess profits
government agencies and for stockpiling, m addition,
both the transfer of petroleum rights and the association
of two or more concessionaires for exploitation purposes
was prohibited without permission from the National Executive
Finally, the administration's bill included a catch-
all article, Article 34, designed to repair any loopholes
in the scheme to exclude the feared oil trusts from
Argentina. Every concession of oil rights was to be
subject to any future measure enacted
for the purpose of combatting attempts to
corner or monopolize the production, trans-
port, storage, refining and commerce of oil
and its by-products. 9
Amidst all this detail, the outstanding characteristic
of the government's bill was the absence of anything novel
in its provisions. The system of concurrent and separate
state and private exploitation already existed in fact, if
not in law. Federalization had been discussed at length in
the Chamber in 1918, and several previous petroleum bills
had proposed adoption of the Rumanian model as the basis for
levy (Art, 25)
.
pBarring extraordinary circumstances, concessionaires
could not pool assets which totaled more than 6000 hectares
of exploitation lands (Art. 37) . Any transfer of exploita-
tion rights required payment to the government of 30% of
the transfer price, an amount which could not be less than
one-fifth of the value of the average annual production
over the past two years (Art. 35b).
9Diputados, Diario, 1919, V, 485.
granting private concessions. 10 What the Yrigoyen admin-
istration was offering for petroleum legislation was
essentially what nationalists had been advocating since oil
had become an issue of public concern.
The second of the administration's oil bills dealt
exclusively with the public sector of the industry and
was presented to the Chamber on September 27, three days
after the first bill. 11 Again, there was little that was
new. Had the measure been written into law, it simply
would have supplied a legal foundation for the already
operative state petroleum enterprise.
The bill authorized the national government to create
petroleum reserves within which the State could explore
and exploit oil deposits either on its own or in conjunc-
tion with the provincial governments. The authorized
capital for state operations was set at the current level
of capitalization of the state firm, and procedures for
making new capital investment and for distributing profits
were outlined.
Article 7 was the only innovative part of the
proposal, calling as it did for the creation of the
lOpor previous bills which incorporated the Rumanian
model see Ibid . , 1914, III, ,681-688 (Repetto) ; 1916, I,
378-384 (De la Plaza-Calderon) ; 1917, V, 264-272
(Uriburu)
.
11Ibid., 1919, V, 664-666.
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"direccio'n general de los yacimientos petroliferos
fiscales" to administer the publicly-financed petroleum
industry. Projected as a division of the Ministry of
Agriculture, the powers and duties of the new bureau were
to be defined by the Executive Power. This article
represented the government's first attempt at a permanent
solution to the problem created by the resignation of the
original Petroleum Commission in November 1917.
An immediate question raised by the administration's
bills is their timing. Why did the Yrigoyen government
choose to clarify its petroleum policy in September 1919,
three years after coming to office and less than a week
before the close of the 1919 Congressional sessions?
Possibly, Yrigoyen and his aides were anticipating
an influx of foreign capital after WW I and wanted oil
legislation both to stimulate and to regulate investment
in the petroleum industry. In addition, Law 7,059, which
provided the existing legal basis for state exploitation,
12
was due to expire in 1920. Yrigoyen may have wanted to
erect a new and permanent basis for the state industry to
serve in place of the 1910 measure. If, however, these
considerations made petroleum legislation a priority matter
12Law 7,059, passed in 1910, was valid for five years,
and was extended for another five years by Law 9,664,
passed in 1915.
for the administration, it is difficult to understand why
Yrigoyen did not include such legislation among the topics
designated for Congressional attention during the 1919-1920
Extraordinary Sessions 13
, or why the Executive took no
action to replace Law 7,059 when it expired, or why,
finally, the administration, as we shall see, made no
concerted effort at any time to secure Congressional sanc-
tion of its oil proposals.
In truth, the Executive's new found urgency to secure
petroleum legislation probably stemmed from the political
needs of the Radical Party rather than the economic needs
of the nation. Yrigoyen and his advisors were, in all
probability, looking forward to the national Congressional
elections scheduled for March 7, 1920 and calculating the
polling-booth profits which a nationalistic petroleum
policy could be made to yield. Special importance was
attached to these elections because of the number of seats
at stake. On the basis of the 1914 census, the lower
house was to be expanded from 120 to 158, and the addition-
al 38 seats were to be filled in 1920 along with the
customary biennial renovation of one-half of the Chamber's
13Subjects which Yrigoyen chose for treatment during
these sessions included loans to France, England, and Italy
so they could purchase Argentine products, public health
laws, social laws, and the budget. For a copy of the Execu
tive Power decree, see La Epoca , October 20, 1919, p. 1.
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membership.
Shortly after the administration's bills entered
Congress, the pro-administration La Epoca admitted that
the Radicals were thinking about the upcoming elections.
Denying an accusation by the conservative daily La Nacion
that Yrigoyen was flooding Congress with legislative
proposals in September 1919 to beef up the Radical record
prior to the elections, La Epoca explained:
There is no substance to "La Nacic-n's"
charges of petty politicking. On the
contrary, [the bills] not only bear
witness to the Executive's desire to
provide the legislation the country
demands, but they provide the electorate
with the chance to express itself in-
directly on the bill's merits or
demerits.
Thus, the series of proposals, with the petroleum bills
among them, were presented not simply to attract votes,
but to make of the 1920 elections a referendum on the
policies defined. Had the Radicals followed their victory
in 1920 with a sustained effort to obtain petroleum legis-
lation, La Epoca '
s
statement would now appear more
convincing.
The Radicals did not make the government's oil
policy the pivotal issue of the 1920 campaign, but it is
clear that administration backers used it in their efforts
14La Epoca , October 1, 1919, p. 3.
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to win votes for UCR candidates. On several occasions,
Radical spokesmen in the Federal Capital praised the
party's support for federalizing oil deposits and emphasized
the benefits of such a policy for national economic develop-
ment. 15
Politically, it was an astute maneuver. For a party
which generated much of its electoral support through a
nationalistic appeal to the nation's middle and lower
classes, the mantle of protector of the country's natural
resources was tailor made. The stark contrast between this
policy and the public land giveaways indulged in by
"regimen" governments made a convincing argument for the
Radical cause.
Presentation of the administration's oil bills in
September 1919, then, was motivated, at least in part, by
electoral considerations. Apparently, the Radical's
instinct for political survival was at least as strong a
motivating force as the dream of Argentine industrial
development and economic independence.
Periodically over the next three years, Yrigoyen
approached Congress on the subject to oil legislation,
15Ibid
. ,
December 17, 1919, pp. 4-5; January 12, 1920,
p. 6; January 19, 1920, p. 5; January 21, 1920, p. 5;
February 8, 1920, p. 3; February 27, 1920, p. 6. La
Epoca '
s
reports on campaign speeches are sketchy, often
pointing out only general areas commented upon. Therefore,
petroleum may have been mentioned much more often than the
encouraging passage of his proposals. 16 His efforts were
seconded by the Minister of Agriculture in his department's
1919 Memoria. Demarchi noted the importance of special
petroleum legislation as a stimulant to both the public
and private sectors of the industry and impressed upon the
legislators the urgency of either approving the administra-
tion's bills, or drafting a law of their own. 17
Congress remained passive despite this persistent
prodding. It sanctioned no law governing either the private
or public sector of the oil industry and authorized no new
investments in the state enterprise beyond the profits
which that firm could show. A distinguished Argentine
scholar of the Radical period, Roberto Etchepareborda, cites
obstructionist tactics on the part of the Socialists and
the Conservatives to explain not only the failure of
Congress to pass petroleum legislation, but the general
lack of legislative success which plagued Yrigoyen's admin-
istration. 18 Exonerating the Radicals on this basis,
instances cited here.
16Senadores, Diario, 1921-1922, 17; Diputados, Diario,
1921, II, 211; Senadores, Diario
,
1922, 88.
17M. de Agric, Memoria
, 1919, 3, 18.
18Etchepareborda, "Yrigoyen y el congreso," 58-62.
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however, fails to take into account the overpowering
majority enjoyed by the President's party in the Chamber of
Deputies. Undoubtedly, the opposition Deputies had no
qualms about blocking proposals originating from the Casa
Rosada, and the Senate stood as a conservative-dominated
bulwark to the ultimate approval of any Radical measure. 19
Yet the question remains as to why the UCR did not push
its priority measures, and particularly Yrigoyen's oil
bills, through the Chamber where it enjoyed an almost two
to one advantage over the combined opposition from 1920 to
1922. Even the Chamber committees to which the petroleum
proposals were directed for study were controlled by
Radical chairmen and Radical majorities. 21 As La Vanguardia
,
the Socialist mouthpiece, pointed out, given these
In 1920 and 1921, the Senate was composed of 15 Con-
servatives, 1 Socialist and 8 Radicals, one of whom was a
dissident Radical from Santa Fe Province. In 1922, 12 Con-
servatives sat in the Senate along with 1 Socialist and 9
Radicals, and again one of the latter was the Santa Fe
dissident. Ibid
. , 63.
20 In 1920, the Radicals held 102 seats in the Chamber
as compared to 10 for the Socialists and 4 6 for the Conser-
vatives. In 1921, 100 Radicals sat along with 10 Social-
ists and 4 5 Conservatives, and in 1922, there were 102
Radicals, 10 Socialists and 40 Conservatives.
21xThe bill on private concessions went to the Committee
on General Legislation while the one on state exploitation
went to the Committee on Agriculture. Only twice was the
pattern of Radical domination of these committees broken.
In 1920, Nicola's Repetto, the Socialist, chaired the
Committee on Agriculture, and in 1922, the Radicals were
outnumbered 4 to 3 on the Committee on General Legislation.
circumstances, Yrigoyen's repeated requests that Congress
pass his oil bills had a hollow ring, 22
The course pursued by the administration subsequent to
the introduction of its petroleum bills, therefore, was
marked by the same penchant for words rather than deeds
that had characterized Yrigoyen's oil policy prior to 1919.
It might seem fair to conclude, then, that the Radicals
were mere political opportunists, their objective having
been to drain the oil issue of all the political capital
possible, while doing nothing to develop or protect the
nation's petroleum resources.
While this conclusion is essentially correct, the
explanation of the government's motives is incomplete. For
it could be argued that if the Radicals were seeking poli-
tical advantage, their best strategy would have been to
promote passage of the national petroleum law which was
recognized as a desirable end by Argentines of all political
persuasions. To understand fully the government's choice of
inaction over action we must consider the internal situa-
tion of the Radical Party, It is evident that while there
was political leverage to be gained by talking about
petroleum legislation, there was a good deal more to be
lost by actively seeking passage of a law.
22La Vanguardia
,
May 5, 1920, p. 1.
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Yrigoyen's primary political objective during the
latter years of his tenure was to insure victory for the
Radical candidate in the 1922 presiaential election. Only
in this manner could he guarantee continuation of the
"reparacio'n" and prevent restoration of the "regimen".
Threatening success in 1922 was the possibility that
internecine conflict would sap the Radical Party's voting
strength. From its inception, the party had been a
strange conglomeration of potentially antagonistic elements,
and during the second half of Yrigoyen's term, dissatisfac-
tion among some Radicals with the President's dictatorial
control over party affairs neared schismatic proportions.
By 1921, radicals opposed to Yrigoeyn's methods were
meeting to discuss ways of preventing the President from
personally controlling the party's 1922 nominating conven-
tion. And in Congress, Yrigoyen did not enjoy the
degree of control which the numerical alignment suggests.
Out of the 1922 Radical contingent, at least 6 of the 9
Senators and 2 8 of the 102 Deputies were either already in
open opposition to the party chief or would join the
anti-Yrigoyen ranks with the definitive party split in
23RRIAA
,
White to Hughes, August 16, 1921, 835.032/44;
White to Hughes, September 15, 1921, 835.00/244; White to
Hughes, February 13, 1922, 835.00/279, enclosure 1.
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1924.24
Under these conditions, it was incumbent upon
Yrigoyen to discourage the discussion of any issue which
might have aggravated an already tense situation and pre-
cipitated an irreparable party rift before the elections.
Oil was not in 1920 or 1922 the dominant and explosive
issue it would become by 1927, but the question of federal-
ization was a sensitive one. If the administration had
forced a vote on its oil bills and a sufficient number of
Radical Deputies had voted against federalizing the oil
deposits, party solidarity and with it the Radical's
chances for victory in 1922 would have suffered. 25
Thus, Yrigoyen and the Radicals acted consistently on
the issue of petroleum. Following a course dictated by
political expediency, they offered a nationalist policy
when it was convenient to do so, and ultimately opted for
inaction for the same reason. 26
^ q Ibid
. ; Gabriel del Mazo, El radicalismo
, Notas sobre
su historia y doctrina (1922-1952T (Buenos Aires: Editorial
Raigal, 19 55), 36, 4 3-46; Federico Pinedo, En tiempos de la
republica
,
Vol. I (Buenos Aires: Editorial Mundo Forense,
1946) , 49.
"Charge Francis White reported from Buenos Aires that
Congressional approval of Yrigoyen' s oil bill was unlikely
because of opposition among provincial representatives to
federalization. RRIAA
,
White to Hughes, November 30, 1921,
835.6363/95.
26Although the case presented here is admittedly
hypothetical, Yrigoyen 's choice of Marcelo T. de Alvear as
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As was the case during the 1916-1919 period, the
failure of Yrigoyen's government to provide constructive
leadership for national petroleum development was reflected
also in its handling of the state oil company. From
September 1919 until its reorganization in June 1922, the
administration of the state enterprise followed the pattern
of improvisation established after the dismissal of the
Petroleum Commission in November 1917.
The three ranking officials in 1919 were Capitan de
Fragata Felipe Fliess, field chief in Comodoro Rivadavia;
Sebastia'n Flores, manager in charge of the Buenos Aires
offices; and Joaquin Spinelli, head accountant and financial
watchdog of the bureau. 27 Fliess continued to direct field
operations until mid-September 1921 when he resigned and
was replaced by Capitan de Fragata Antonio Abel on an
interim basis and then by the new permanent head, Capitan
de Fragata Francisco Borges. Flores also resigned in 1921,
and Spinelli assumed his duties as well as retaining his
position as "contador inspector". As a result, until
June 1922, one man, Spinelli, was responsible for directing
his successor supports this interpretation. The elevation
of one of the party's leading "Blues" was intended to
cement the diverging Radical factions.
27Spinelli's title was "contador inspector". For the
Ministerial Resolution appointing Spinelli, and defining his
duties, see Diputados, Yacimientos petroliferos fiscales
;
Antecedentes
,
I, 203-204.
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the Buenos Aires offices, advising himself on financial
matters, and overseeing the bookkeeping operations of the
company.
The issues which provoked Fliess's resignation provide
some insight into the situation produced by the firm's
haphazard management structure. After nearly four years
of patient service, he was worn down by the frequent lack
of Ministerial leadership, the consequent disharmony among
subordinate personnel, and, particularly, the constant
bickering between the officials in Comodoro Rivadavia on
the one hand and those in Buenos Aires on the other. 28
Spinelli singled out this lack of harmony and coordination
for special comment in a report to Minister of Agriculture
Demarchi early in 1920.
With the sole exception of the "drilling
and extraction division" , the functioning
of the departments of the bureau, including
its bookkeeping division, was subject in
practice to the standards, aptitudes and
personalities of the separate department
heads. That is to say, there was an
absence of rules, regulations and prac-
tices which would have systematized and
harmonized the functioning of the individual
departments with that of the bureau as a
whole. 29
In May 1922, Spinelli pointed out another of the basic in-
adequacies in the administration of the state oil agency.
28ibid. , 642.
29 Ibid. , 164.
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In a note to the Minister of Agriculture, he lamented the
fact that since 1917 such a vital task as the systematic
study, preparation and authorization of the bureau's annual
budget had been treated as a matter of secondary importance? 0
Added testimony to the Yrigoyen government's mis-
handling of state exploitation was given by Col. Enrique
Mosconi following his appointment as Director of state
operations in October 1922. After inspecting his new
charges, Mosconi submitted two reports to Minister of
Agriculture Tomas Le Breton in which he analyzed the factors
hindering expansion of the state industry and recommended
reforms. 31
According to Mosconi, the primary obstacle facing the
state enterprise was the absence of a national petroleum
law clearly defining the objectives of state exploitation.
Without first establishing these objectives, argued
Mosconi, it was difficult to draft guidelines for the
expansion of exploration and exploitation activities.
Another debilitating factor, second in importance only
30 Ibid
.
, 444.
^Mo'jconi's two reports were submitted on November 18,
1922 and February 23, 1923. Copies may be consulted in
Ibid
.
, 545-556 (November 18, 1922), 636-720 (February 23,
1923) . Further comments attributed to Mosconi are drawn
from these reports unless otherwise indicated. Only direct
quotes are footnoted.
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to the legislative void, was
the absence [since 1917] of a directorate
or administrative commission which operates
with the autonomy that is indispensable tothe efficient management of the industry,
and which, being immune to petty politicalinfluences, can guide its efforts by a con-
cern for only those things which promote
the bureau's prosperity
, ....
32
From these two basic deficiencies, contended Mosconi, arose
many of Lhe problems which had characterized state opera-
tions from 1917 to 1922 - low production at high costs, in-
adequate storage and transportation facilities, excessive
numbers of administrative employees, and inconsistent if
not arbitrary price-setting policies.
Some of Mosconi* s most severe criticisms were leveled
at the financial conduct and the bookkeeping practices of
the state firm. On November 18, 1922 after his initial in-
ventory of the company, he reported to Le Breton that,
the financial condition of this bureau
can, beyond any doubt, be termed extremely
bad. Lacking a budget that would guide
its development, [the firm's] expenditures
have increased extraordinarily in relation
to its income,.... 33
So badly disorganized were the firm's books, that it took
over four months of intensive work to straighten them out.
Antonio F. Molinari, the government accountant saddled
3
2
Ibid. , 638-639
33Ibid. , 546.
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*
with that task, informed Mosconi that
There is no doubt that there have been
deficiencies in both the system used and
in its implementation, deficiences
which eventually can be corrected. It is
also clear that there has been an absence
of an established financial policy rela-
tive to long-term expenditures required by
oil exploitation, a lack of control over
such spending, and, therefore, as can be
easily proven, a waste of public monies
which must be checked in order to defend
the interests of the state. 34
Even admitting that it was to Mosconi' s advantage to
emphasize the negative aspects of state exploitation, there
can be no doubt that the government enterprise was in a
sad state of repair by 1922. It is not surprising that
the Yrigoyen administration, as we shall see, consistently
rebuffed efforts by opposition forces to publicize the
facts about the post-1917 evolution of state oil exploita-
tion.
Quite naturally, the government's handling of both
the legislative and industrial aspects of the petroleum
question aroused considerable criticism. Outstanding
amidst the published commentary was a tendency to urge
private investment as the key to increased production.
This trend did not result from a flagging of the wide-
spread nationalistic zeal for safeguarding the country's
oil resources, but from the failure of state exploitation
34 Ibid., 698.
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to produce oil on a scale commensurate with the nation's
needs. As Rear Admiral M. J. Lagos (Ret.) informed his
audience on July 7 , 1922:
It is time that it v/as understood that
a mine is of value when it is producing,
that it is of no value while it lies un-
exploited, and that if every time capital
proposes to exploit the mine, the owner
tries to maximize his own profits (taking
advantage of the gringos) , it is clear
that, generally speaking, the results
will be unsatisfactory, and the mine will
continue unproductive with the nation
being the first to suffer for it. 3 5
Among the major Buenos Aires dailies, La riacion
branded the public industry a failure and stated that the
•future success of Argentine petroleum development depended
upon the contribution made by private investors. 36 La
Razon and La Prensa also counselled reliance upon private
capital, but, unlike La Nacion
,
they wanted to exclude
foreign investment. La Razon advocated what it termed
"a practical nationalism". In practice, this meant
private investment by Argentines only, provision of new
capital for expanding state operations, an autonomous
bureau to run the state's interests, and the training of
more Argentine nationals as petroleum technicians. 37
3
^M. J. Lagos, La politica del petroleo ; Contribucion
al estudio (Buenos Aires: L.J. Rosso, 1922), 110. Under-
TTned words italicized in text.
36La Nacion , November 17, 1919, p. 4.
37La Razon, November 1, 1919, p. 1; December 20, 1919,
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La Prensa continued its campaign against government in-
action, emphasizing the need for oil legislation and
encouraging increased investment to expand production. 38
Reversing its former stand, however, it now supported the
idea of combining state and private capital for developing
the federal reserve in Comodoro Rivadavia. Leaving aside
the question of the innate capacity of any government to
administer an industrial enterprise, La Prensa argued in
August 1922 that,
The Executive Branch has not been organized
to act as an industrial entrepreneur, and
the treasury does not hold the funds necessary
for the [oil] business. For these two reasons,
consideration should be given, as soon as
possible, to a mixed enterprise employing
state and private capital. 39
La Vanguardia joined the chorus of critics demanding
that the Yrigoyen government adopt a petroleum policy
designed to increase the flow of domestic petroleum to
the marketplace. Although approving of Yrigoyen* s mainte-
nance of Comodoro Rivadavia as a reserve for state activity,
La Vanguardia compared the government to a miser who so
carefully guarded his treasure that it was of no practical
p. 4.
38La Prensa
,
January 5, 1920, p. 6; September 10, 1921,
p. 6; August 6, 1922, p. 5.
39 Ibid.
,
August 8, 1922, p. 7. Another La Prensa
article published on January 5, 1920 (p. 6) made clear
that paper's preference for domestic over foreign capital.
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value to him or anyone else. 4 ° if state control over the
nation's oil deposits meant that they would remain unex-
ploited, stated the Socialist organ,
we would not hesitate to support
any other system of exploitation
that would permit taking advantage
of that wealth now. 41
Public discontent with the government's oil policy
found another outlet through Congressional channels. On
August 24, 1920, Nicola's Repetto introduced a resolution
requesting that the Minister of Agriculture come before
the Chamber prepared with information on state oil
exploitation. 42 In so doing, the articulate Socialist
spokesman touched off extended discussions which occupied
the Chamber's attention intermittently until the following
April. 43
At the outset, Repetto 's thinly disguised intention
was to engage Minister of Agriculture Demarchi in an open
discussion of the government's petroleum policy on the
floor of the Chamber. Sensing this, the Radical Deputies
40La Vanguardia
,
July 7, 1920, p. 1.
41Ibid.
42Diputados, Diario, 1920, IV, 452,
43For the Chamber discussions which stemmed from
Repetto's resolution, see Ibid
. ,
1920, IV, 452-463, 698-
711, 770-791, 838-873, 948-965; 1920; V, 410-413, 448-455,
482-483, 548-577; 1920; VII, 18-21, 351-369, 371-432, 435-
470, 481-507, 510-538, 550-565, 572-596, 600-645, 650-693,
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employed their numerical superiority to delete from
Repetto »s proposal a request for information concerning the
"definitive mode of exploitation to be employed in the
Comodoro Rivadavia fields/' while lending their approval
to a more innocuous application for statistical data on
the state firm. 44
When Demarchi refused to attend the Chamber and instead
sent a written reply, Repetto resorted to an alternate
plan of attack. He confronted the Chamber with a series of
allegations to the effect that Finance Minister Domingo E.
Salaberry had used his official position to gain advantages
for the Astra petroleum company in which the Minister had
an active financial interest. 45 Originally, Repetto
699-722, 804-809.
44Specifically
,
Repetto requested information on the
number of wells in the federal reserve, the monthly produc-
tion, transport and sale of petroleum, and the contracts in
existence for the sale of state oil.
4 5Salaberry was a partner in the firm of Salaberry and
Bercetche, which held shares in the Astra oil company which
had producing wells in Comodoro Rivadavia. Repetto alleged
that Astra was being allowed to use the State's machinery,
laborers and police, and that the crude oil which Astra
sold to the State contained up to 30% water when the maxi-
mum tolerance level was 2%. He further charged that state
owned shipr, were transporting Astra's oil to Buenos Aires
for a minimal fee while Astra's own tanker was transporting
frieght back and forth from Brazil for rates considerably
above what the company paid the State to transport oil.
Finally, Repetto charged Salaberry with malfeasance in con-
nection with the transfer of some property in the Dock Sur
region of the Capital where government permission to build
a depository for inflammables was involved. For the intro-
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probably intended to explode these charges on the head of
the Minister of Agriculture had Demarchi come to the
Chamber, but now he settled for the appointment of an in-
vestigating committee.
Though the Radical Deputies put up a stiff resistance,
their position was untenable. Had they voted down an in-
vestigation of Repetto's charges, the presumption of guilt
would have lain as a heavy burden on both Salaberry and the
administration. Left without recourse, the Radicals did
the next best thing. They approved an investigating com-
mittee and staffed it with a majority from their own party.
The committee's majority report, which was signed only by
the three Radical members and approved by the Chamber,
completely exonerated Salaberry. 46
duction of Repetto's charges, see Diputados, Diario , 1920,
IV, 847-850, 956.
46Both the majority and the minority reports are
printed in the Diario , 1920, VII, 18-21. On the basis of
the Chamber debates, and in the absence of any documenta-
tion on the Committee's work, it is fair to conclude that
the charge involving the Dock Sur lands was totally un-
founded (see Delfor de Valle's refutation, Ibid . , 1920,
IV, 852-853, 951.), and that, at best, Salaberry was guilty
of indiscretion for maintaining private oil interests while
a government Minister. Salaberry' s position was not en-
hanced by the fact that his dealings in the sugar industry
were also under investigation, arid tne same committee which
handled the petroleum charges was assigned to look into
allegations that Salaberry had participated in import-export
dealings designed to defraud the government of duty revenues
These latter charges were the subject of the minority report
from the committee.
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The significance of the prolonged and often heated
Chamber exchanges lay not so much in the success or failure
of Repetto's maneuvering as in the Radical's hesitancy to
disclose information regarding the government's petroleum
policy. The Radical Deputies were on the defensive through-
out this affair, constantly back peddling in the face of
the onslaught led by Repetto. When challenged on a matter
of primary public importance, neither the UCR Deputies nor
the administration came forward with evidence of a care-
fully considered policy designed to maximize the nation's
benefits from its oil resources.
The consistent badgering of the government over its
management of petroleum matters and the chaotic adminis-
trative condition of the state oil firm combined to pro-
duce the only positive and enduring contribution of
Yrigoyen's first presidency to national petroleum develop-
ment. Through an Executive Decree issued on June 3, 1922,
Yrigoyen and his Minister of Agriculture created the
"Direccion General de Yacimientos Petroliferos Fiscales"
(YPF) to administer the state industry. 4 7 In establishing
what would eventually become a model government agency,
however, Yrigoyen was reacting to events rather than
shaping them. In particular, he was responding to mounting
47YPF, Recopilacion
,
I, 95-97.
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pressure for a full scale inquiry into the post-1917
record of the state oil firm which arose after the
resignation of Demarchi as Minister of Agriculture in
March 1922.
Following Demarchi" s departure, Foreign Minister
Pueyrredo'n doubled as Agricultural Minister until the
appointment of Eudoro Vargas Gomez to fill the post on
April 8. Vargas Gomez, a native of Corrientes, had pre-
viously served the Yrigoyen government as a federal inter-
vener in Mendoza and was the Second Vice President of the
Radical Party.
Before holding office one month, the new Minister
focused government and public attention on the state oil
company. He stopped payment for goods and services deliv-
ered to it by domestic and foreign concerns, pending an
investigation into alleged irregularities in the conduct
of the firm's affairs which had been brought to his
AO
attention. While no specific charges were made public,
La Prensa reported from an extraof ficial source that in a
May 5th Cabinet meeting Vargas Gomez discussed a cutback in
production in Comodoro Rivadavia due to insufficient storage
and transportation facilities, the lack of a uniform market
48La Prensa
,
May 2, 1922, p. 9, June 1, 1922, p. 10;
La Nacion , June 2, 1922, p. 4; RRIAA , Riddle to Hughes,
May 10, 1922, 835.00/298.
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price for state oil, irregularities in the firm's bookkeep-
ing, and the increasing number of highly-paid administra-
tive personnel in Comodoro Rivadavia. 49 In addition,
questions were being raised about the management of the
government-run store in Comodoro Rivadavia and the system
used to pay laborers. 50 In short, Vargas Gomez was con-
fronting essentially the same questions which would be
treated later in Mosconi's reports.
Despite the seriousness of the charges, Vargas Gomez
was unable to win support for an investigation from either
the Cabinet or the President. While some Ministers backed
his demand, others preferred simply to intervene the petro-
leum administration and place control in the hands of a
committee similar to the one which existed prior to
November 1917."^ Lacking the executive support which was
crucial to his designs, Vargas Gomez attempted to apply
pressure through a personal boycott. Beginning on May 22,
he refused to enter his office or to perform any of his
duties as Minister of Agriculture, While officially
pleading illness, he closeted himself in his La Plata home,
emerging only to discuss the oil question with Yrigoyen
49La Prensa
,
May 6, 1922, p. 11.
50Ibid
. ,
May 4, 1922, p. 8.
51Ibid.
,
May 10, 1922, p. 7.
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and/or the Cabinet. 52 Pressure for prompt executive action
mounted with the report that when the 1922 Congressional
sessions opened, Rodolfo Moreno Jr. (Conservative Party,
B.A. Prov.) intended to introduce a motion requesting de-
tailed information from the Executive Branch on the affairs
of the state petroleum enterprise.
5
3
Yrigoyen could delay no longer. At the same time,
he was not about to sanction Vargas Gomez's investigation
since it would disclose, if not malfeasance, at least the
negligence and incompetence with which the state oil firm
had been handled since 1917. His answer was the June 3
decree creating YPF. 54
Aside from the first two articles which provided for
the creation of YPF within the Ministry of Agriculture and
placed the Plaza Huincul installations under YPF's juris-
diction, the decree clearly reflected the spate of charges
which led to its issuance. Article 3 empowered the Minister
of Agriculture to fix periodically the price for state oil
52La Raz^n, May 31, 1922, p. 1, June 3, 1922, p. 1;
La Prensa , June 1, 1922, p. 10, June 2, 1922, p. 11; La
Vanguardia , June 2, 1922, p. 1; RRIAA , Riddle to Hughes,
June 8, 1922, 835.00/302.
53La Prensa
,
May 3, 1922, p. 11. The regular 1922
CongressTonal sessions did not open until July.
-^1 have no information on why Vargas Gomez yielded
and signed this decree. Given Yrigoyen' s attitude toward
ministerial advice, however, the outcome was not surprising
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products, and Articles 4 through 7 minutely detailed the
procedures YPF was to follow in making all purchases.
Most interesting of all, however, was the final provision,
Article 8:
The Ministry of Agriculture will authorize
the payment of the accounts contracted by
the present Petroleum Administration, [and]
the Executive Power hereby approves theinvestments, accounts and activities
authorized to date by the Ministry of
Agriculture. 55
Here was Yrigoyen's answer to the proposed investigation.
He summarily wiped the slate clean and decreed a new
beginning.
The outstanding characteristic of the June 3 decree
was the extent to which ultimate control over state ex-
ploitation was left to the Minister of Agriculture. Not
only was he empowered to set market prices, but his
authorization was required at every stage of the process
through which YPF was to make its purchases. This tendency
toward exaggerated ministerial control was re-emphasized
in Vargas Gomez's Ministerial Resolution on June 8, 1922
which spelled out the steps for implementing the decree. 56
55YPF, Recopilacion
,
I, 97, The section of this
article referring to approval of the accounts of the petro-
leum agency was contrary to Article 16 of the National Budget
which provided that the^ureau's accounts had to be sub-
mitted to the "Contaduria General de la Nacion" for review.
56YPF, Recopilacion
,
I, 98-102.
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The new bureau, as it emerged from these two docu-
ments, was an advisory rather than a decision-making one.
YPF was to function as a clearing house, gathering informa-
tion on pertinent matters for presentation to the Minister
of Agriculture. Particularly because of the lack of
autonomy, there was little to distinguish YPF from the Pe-
troleum Commission of pre-1917 days.
Yrigoyen's creation of YPF understandably drew fire
from the opposition press. La Vanguardia described the new
oil agency as "an absurd bureaucratic mechanism" whose
only purpose was to spread "a pious cloak over such an ugly
matter,- 57 while La Prensa charged that Vargas Gomez
had sponged off the slate of petroleum
administration, a slate whose picture
shocked him, and which [the administra-
tion] considered it expedient to write
on anew without worrying about past
incidents. 58
Both papers criticized YPF's lack of autonomy, 59 but
frustration was the keynote in their comments - frustration
born of the knowledge that Yrigoyen had outmaneuvered the
opposition and successfully whitewashed five years of
mismanagement in the state petroleum firm. As La Vanguardia
57La Vanguardia , June 8, 1922, p. 1.
58La Prensa , June 5, 1922, p. 5.
59La Vanguardia , June 4, 1922, p. 1; La Prensa ,
June 5,~T922, p. 5, June 21, 1922, p. 6.
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put it,
For all the noise made, something else
should have happened. We confess that
our thunder has been stolen. 60
One last, anticlimatic attempt to force the adminis-
tration into a public disclosure of the facts surrounding
the development of the public oil industry followed the
opening of the 1922 Congressional sessions on July 6.
Two weeks into the sessions, five Conservative Party
Deputies, all from Buenos Aires Province and led by
Rodolfo Moreno Jr., requested Chamber approval of a list
of 51 questions addressed to the Executive Power on the
subject of state exploitation. 61 There was nothing novel
in the list. In fact, it was nothing more than a restate-
ment of past allegations about the Radical government's
conduct of the public's petroleum company.
From July 20 to July 28, Moreno, ably seconded by
Nicola's Repetto, fought for approval of the questions in
6 2
a debate frequently marred by heated exchanges. Their
bULa Vanguardia , June 4, 1922, p. I.
61Diputados, Diario
,
1922, II, 39-41. For the ensuing
debate, see 42-72, 214-251, 368-399, 442-451.
62So heated did the discussions become that five
challenges for duels were issued and two were actually
fought. La Prensa
,
July 29, 1922, p. 11, July 30, 1922,
p. 12, July 31, 1922, p. 7; RRIAA , Riddle to Hughes,
August 16, 1922, 835.00/360.
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efforts, however, had little chance for success. Optimism
beyond all reasonable bounds plus a large measure of
political naivete' were necessary to believe that the
Yrigoyen administration, less than three months from its
termination, was going to divulge information which might
tarnish its reputation. Radical Deputies loyal to the
President used their voting power to emasculate the proposal,
reducing the original 51 questions to 11 innocuous queries
which could have been answered by reading the newspapers.
Still, the administration was taking no changes. Not until
February 1, 19 23, long after Yrigoyen had left the Casa
Rosada, did the Chamber receive a reply to its inquiries. 63*****
Viewed as an industrial venture, the state oil company
displayed amazing resilience under chronic mismanagement.
Few private businesses could have survived under similar
circumstances. The firm's energies, however, were
apparently dissipated in the fight for survival, for its
63Diputados, Diario
,
1922, VI, 128-129. The text of the
reply was not printed in the Diario, but a copy may be con-
sulted in Diputados, Yacimientos petroliferos f iscales ;
Antecedentes
,
I , 137 -544 . This, document is dated Augus t 2 3,
1922 and was prepared by Joaquin Spinelli. It was, there-
fore, at Yrigoyen' s disposal had he chosen to submit it to
the Chamber.
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productive capacity expanded slowly from 1920 to 1922.
In April 1919, Fliess, then the head man in Comodoro
Rivadavia, presented the Minister of Agriculture with a
five-year plan for increasing production in the federal
reserve. He offered both a maximum 'and a minimum program,
each to be financed from the sales of state oil. The
minimum plan was based upon the continued use of the same
number of drilling machines employed in 1919 and projected
a yield of 300,000 m3 of crude oil in 1920, 380,000 m3 in
1921, and 430,000 m3 by 1922. The maximum plan presupposed
additional drilling apparatus and forecast the extraction
of 650,000 m3 of crude oil by 1922. 64 in reality, the
Comodoro Rivadavia fields produced 226,554 m 3 in 1920,
277,807 m3 in 1921, and 343,910 m3 in 1922. 65
In terms of domestic oil consumption, Comodoro
Rivadavia supplied less than one-third of the national
market in 1922, and the demand was expanding faster than
64M V de Agric, Memoria , 1919 , 18; Felipe Fliess,
"El petroleo de Comodoro Rivadavia," Boletin del Centro
Naval
,
XXXX (November-December 1922) , 439-446.
65BIP
,
December 1936, 18. The Plaza Huincul installa
tions remained under the control of the National Bureau of
Mines until the June 3, 1922 decree creating YPF. YPF
actually took over in December of that year. Production
from these deposits was still minimal - 611 m3 in 1920,
919 m3 in 1921, and 4,978 m3 in 1922. Ibid., 29.
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the production capacity of the state enterprise. 66
Furthermore, Argentina imported well over 2,000,000 tons of
coal in 1922. in short, Argentina was becoming less
rather than more self-sufficient in terms of fuel supply.
Although problems with the acquisition of industrial
machinery68 and labor unrest69 continued to hinder the
state' firm's development, the best tonic for its lagging
growth rate would have been competent, efficient leadership
in the top administrative positions.
As far as private exploitation was concerned, Yrigoyen
66BIP, May 1927, 471. In 1922, Argentina consumed
1,073,599 tons of crude and fuel oil as compared to the
state company's production in Comodoro Rivadavia of
320,863 tons. Private companies made up only a fraction of
the difference with their 97,972 tons, while the remainder,
654,764 tons, was imported. Between 1921 and 1922, con-
sumption rose nearly 150,000 tons, and the government firm
increased its output by 65,420 tons; the figures for
1922-1923 were 170,000 tons of increased consumption as
compared to an increase of 61,005 tons in state production.
6
7
Ibid.
68D. G. de Explotacion, Memoria, 1920, 67. The petroleum
agency's 19 21 Memoria explained that, in contrast to the war
years, the problem of acquiring new machinery was not avail-
ability but inflation in the most prominent manufacturing
countries which weakened the purchasing power of Argentina's
foreign exchange. Memoria, 1921, 12-13.
69For comments on labor conditions in the state company,
see Ibid., 1919
, 5; Diputados, Diario , 1920, IV, 846
(Repetto) ; La Vanguardia
,
April 1, 1921, p. 1, March 20,
1922, p. 4, June 10, 1922, p. 1; RRIAA , Riddle to Hughes,
June 6, 1922, 83 5.6363/14 6, enclosure 1. The major oil
strike of this period occurred between December 1919 and
March 1920 in the Comodoro Rivadavia fields. La Vanguardia'
s
daily reports on the strike's progress provide the most
complete, if biased, account of this incident.
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maintained his policy of welcoming both foreign and
domestic capital, while doing nothing to make petroleum
investment an attractive proposition. Most importantly,
the national oil law which had been promised since 1916
was still nonexistent. The administration's 1919 bill on
oil concessions was prompted, according to Yrigoyen, by
the desire to promote private production.™ However, as we
have seen, the Radicals made no serious effort to win
Congressional sanction of that measure.
In the resulting legislative void, as one American
official commented, the advisability of investing in
Argentine oil depended upon whether or not
the Argentine Government, through its Bureau
of Mines, is going to so supplement, and
construe, and apply the provisions of the
existing general Mining Code as to make it
as easy and as favorable as possible for
petroleum mining operation. 7 ^-
The security of invested capital, therefore, depended as
much upon the attitude of government officials as it did
upon legal statutes. Even given the fact that the National
Bureau of Mines, the department responsible for granting
mineral rights, consistently pursued an "exceedingly
liberal policy" with respect to oil concessions during the
70Diputados, Diario, 1919, V, 481.
7
^RRIAA, Robertson to Hughes, June 1, 1922,
835.6363/147.
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Yrigoyen years, 72 conditions were less than ideal for
petroleum investment.
Among prospective investors, North Americans proved
more hesitant to accept the prevailing legal situation
than their European counterparts. Stanley C. Herold, a
mining engineer experienced in the Argentine petroleum
arena, explained what American investors were looking for.
We do not ask for unbounded liberality,
nor do we seek special favors. We only
want definite, practical regulations by
which we can clearly abide without re-
course to technical evasion of the law,
and which will give our capital a chance
of producing proper returns. Technical
evasion of the law has a very bad taste
to the oil capitalist, for he is aware
of the risk involved. We may not accuse
him for being an angel, but we may safely
consider him a good business man.... 73
Specifically, the inducements Americans were seeking in-
cluded larger land grants for exploration and exploitation,
more time to conduct geological studies and drill test
wells, assurances against prohibitive production and export
taxes, and the exemption from import duties of necessary
industrial equipment. 74
7 2ibid.
7
3
Ibid. , Gibson to Hughes, December 29 , 1921,
835.6363/100, enclosure 2.
74 Ibid
.
, White to Hughes, June 22, 1921, 835.6363/65;
A.C. Veatch (Sinclair Exploration Co.) to Hughes,
September 29, 1921, 835.6363/80; A.C. Veatch to Hughes,
October 27, 1921, 835.6363/89; Gibson to Hughes
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Without saying so explicitly, U.S. investors pre-
ferred conditions which would have permitted petroleum
exploitation on the same large scale to which they were
accustomed to operating in the United States and other
foreign lands like Mexico, This, of course, was precisely
what Yrigoyen did not want. Large-scale operations were
impossible under the provisions of the 1886 Mining Code,
and they also would have been out of the question had the
government's bill on oil concessions become law. Minister
of Agriculture Demarchi emphasized the government's position
on oil trusts in a 1920 interview with Alberto A. Moreno,
a reprensentative of Standard Oil of New Jersey:
As you are no doubt aware, there has
always been a prejudice against the
encouragement of monopolistic tenden-
cies in the development of the resources
of the country, and to be quite candid
with you, the Standard Oil Company has
enjoyed the reputation of favoring those
tendencies to the extent of requiring
Government intervention. You would be
welcome in Argentina only if you adjust
yourself to the laws of the country. 7
5
North Americans were also handicapped by their igno-
rance about Argentina, a condition attributable in part to
the relatively recent entry of American capital into that
December 29, 1921, 835.6363/100; A.C. Veatch to Hughes,
February 17, 1922, 835.6363/108.
75Ibid
.
, Wadsworth to Colby, October 30, 1920,
835.6363/38, enclosure 1.
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part of the world. An Argentine oil man, explaining to
Ambassador Stimson why Argentines preferred to deal with
British rather than American capitalists, noted that
Americans displayed little knowledge of Argentina's
Physical characteristics. American companies often
arrived equipped for work in a tropical climate when the
latitude of the Comodoro Rivadavia area was comparable to
that of Maine or North Dakota in the United States.
Furthermore, he added, Americans demanded excessive
guarantees for their capital, while the British, who were
familiar with the country, its people, and its government,
knew how to operate effectively under existing conditions. 76
American representatives in Buenos Aires cautioned
that U.S. investors had to overcome their squeamishness on
pain of being crowded out of the Argentine petroleum
industry particularly by the British and the Germans. 77
Their warning, however, had little effect. Aside from the
efforts of Standard Oil (New Jersey) to gain control over
oil lands in Neuquen, Salta, and Jujuy, American capitalists
76 Ibid
. , White to Hughes, June 22, 1921,
835.636 3765".
7
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Ibid.
, White to Hughes, June 22, 1921, 835.6363/65;
Stimson to Hughes, June 27, 1921, 835.6363/67; White to
Hughes, December 23, 1921, 835.6363/101.
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were content to let Europeans take the lead. 78
Private and state exploitation remained separated,
as the government refused to enter into a mixed company
arrangement. The most serious offer along these lines
came from the Lord Cowdray interests of London in 1920.
After first approaching Yrigoyen through the Argentine
Minister in London, Alvarez de Toledo, Cowdray sent an
agent to speak with the President about joint state-private
development of the federal reserve in Comodoro Rivadavia.
Their negotiations broke off when the government refused
to concede full technical control over the proposed opera-
tion to the private investors. 79
Despite legal and other difficulties, both private
production and speculation in exploration rights increased
significantly between 1920 and 1922. Crude oil production
rose from 35,372 m3 in 1920 to 106,609 m 3 in 1922. 80 in
78For the progress of Standard's activities in
Argentina, see Ibid
. , Wadsworth to Colby, October 30, 1920,
835.6363/38; Warfield (Standard Oil) to Hughes, September
28, 1921, 835.6363/79; White to Hughes, November 30, 1921,
835.6363/95; White to Hughes, January 28, 1922, 835.6363/
111, enclosure 1,
79La Epoca
,
July 4, 1920, p. 1; La Nacioji, July 10,
1920, p. 4; RRIAA , Bursley to Colby, January 9, 1920,
835.6363/16; Wiley to Colby, July 30, 1920, 835.6363/29.
80BIP
,
December 1936, 19-22. Of the four producing
companies in 1922, all were located in Comodoro Rivadavia,
two were formed with British capital, one primarily with
German funds, and one with principally Argentine capital.
RRIAA, White to Hughes, November 30, 1921, 835.6363/95.
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absolute terms, the 1922 production level was not impres-
sive, but due to the relative stagnation of state opera-
tions, private capital expanded its share of the total
national production from 13.4% in 1920 to 23.4% in 1922.
More extraordinary was the literal explosion of
speculative activity in petroleum exploration permits. In
the best known oil districts - Chubut, Santa Cruz, and
Neuque'n - the government registered 322 requests for
mineral exploration rights between 1917 and 1919. Between
1920 and 1922, 6,926 applications pertaining to those
three areas flooded across government desks. 81
The speculative nature of this activity clearly
emerges from a comparison between the number of applications
which were followed up by the original applicant until an
exploration permit was actually issued, and the number
which were transferred by the original applicant to some-
one else while the application was still pending government
action. In the three oil districts mentioned above, the
number of permits issued remained roughly the same for two
periods 1917-1919 and 1920-1922 - 106 in the first case
81D. G. de Minas, Memoria
,
1923
,
20-22. The figures
given above represent the total number of requests sub-
mitted for mineral exploration rights, not solely those
which related to petroleum. However, nearly all the
requests for the three regions cited were for oil rights.
Ibid
. ,
13-14; RRIAA , Riddle to Hughes, April 18, 1922,
835.6363/138.
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and 113 in the sernnH 82co d. At the same time, the number of
transfers recorded jumped from 40 in the first period to
532 in the second. m nearly every case, the transfer
involved a request for oil exploration rights being
processed by the government." i„ short, the objective of
most of the original applicants was to gain paper rights
over potential petroleum lands and to sell those rights at
a profit. So prevalent was this type of activity that one
American official saw fit to report in November 1921 that
All the good claims for oil are in thehands of big petroleum companies or ofpersons connected with or directed by
them, with whom negotiation is im-
possible. When the prospecting per-
missions now pending with the Govern-
ment will be granted [they] will form
with the secured concessions the best
of what can be obtained in Comodoro
Rivadavia. 84
The termination of WW I and the consequent renewed
flow of capital in international circles was undoubtedly
the prime factor in making funds available for investment
in Argentine petroleum. In addition, the war experience
magnified the importance of oil in war time and in peace,
and, in so doing, made the petroleum industry and even more
82D, J, de Minas, Memoria, 1923, 20-22,
83Ibid
. , 15, 38.
84 RRIAA
,
White to Hughes, November 30, 1921,
835.6363/95. enclosure 6.
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attractive and potentially lucrative field of investment.
Beyond this general incentive, the outburst of private
speculation in Argentina may have been connected with the
inauguration of Marcelo T. de Alvear as President in
October 1922. Private interests may have been jockeying
for position, attempting to gain control over as much oil
land as possible in the hope that the Alvear administra-
tion would adopt a petroleum policy to their liking.
In December 1921, the American Embassy predicted that
if Alvear were elected, legislation permitting large-scale
petroleum operations would follow. 85 six months later,
after Alvear' s election, the American Consul General
restated the earlier prediction, adding,
the President-elect, Dr. Alvear, is a man
of such family connections and personal
antecedents as to inspire full confidence
in the progressiveness of his coming ad-
ministration. Accordingly, there would
seem to be reason to feel sure that the
National Government will not impose in the
future an annual tax upon petroleum areas
that would be unjust or confiscatory, and
that it will not impose unreasonable
production taxes upon mines located in the
National Territories, or unreasonable
export taxes upon oil. 86
Another look at the figures on applications for
8
5
Ibid. , White to Hughes, December 23, 1921,
835.63637101.
8
6
Ibid.
, Robertson to Hughes, June 1, 1922, 835.6363/147.
See also, Riddle to Hughes, July 26, 1922, 835.6363/172.
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exploration rights also suggests that investors were
gambling on Alvear's policy, of the 6,926 applications
submitted between 1920 and 1922, 65; were submitted in
1922 when Alvear's succession was assured, and if you
include 1921 when Alvear's choice as Yrigoyen's replace-
ment was rumored, the figure reaches 90%. 87*****
As Yrigoyen's term drew to a close on October 12,
1922, there was little to distinguish the Argentine
petroleum picture from what it had been on October 12 six
years before. On the level of rhetoric, the Radical
government had ennunicated a nationalist oil policy
which featured federalization of the nation's oil deposits,
state exploitation of the Comodoro Rivadavia and Plaza
Huincul reserves, and closely-regulated, small-scale
private exploitation in all other areas. However, in
practice it took no effective measures to implement this
policy, and Yrigoyen's first administration bequeathed a
petroleum record nearly barren of accomplishments. The oil
question which had presented both a challenge and an
opportunity to Yrigoyen in 1916 was passed to Alvear for
solution.
87 D. G. de Minas, Memoria, 1923, 20-22.
CHAPTER IV
ALVEAR I: THE MOSCONI ERA
Marcelo T. de Alvear's election as Yrigoyen suc-
cessor was welcomed by interested observers for varying
and even contradictory reasons. Alvear's long and close
relationship with Yrigoyen, along with the superficial
unity which still characterized Radical ranks, made plaus-
ible La Epoca's prediction that Alvear would continue the
work of the "reparacion"
.
1 it was expected that Alvear
would seek and execute Yrigoyen' s desires while the Party's
chieftain took a constitutionally mandated six-year res-
pite from the official seat of power.
Meanwhile, those connected with the private sector of
the petroleum industry were looking for change. Conversant
with Alvear's conservative reputation, they entertained
guarded hopes that the new administration would relieve
the legal uncertainty which had burdened the petroleum
industry in the past and provide a framework which would
^La Epoca , October 5, 1922, p. 3.
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stimulate rather than intimidate private investment.2
Both La Epoca and private investors were to be disappointed
The prediction of the one and the hopes of the other would
fall victim to a strongly nationalistic petroleum policy
which few expected from Alvear's government on October 12,
1922.
The overall record of Alvear's administration was no
surprise to those who expected something of a conservative
reaction after six years of Yrigoyenist Radicalism.
Yrigoyen's long-time friend and political lieutenant
directed his government along lines more consonant with
19th century liberalism than with the philosophy of in-
creased governmental interference in social and economic
affairs espoused by Yrigoyen. Favored with six years of
domestic peace and prosperity, Alvear's term was discreet
and correct. His biographer, Felix Luna, accurately
sketched the general outlines of Alvear's government,
Certainly during the tranquil years of his
presidency, state interference in national
affairs was at a minimum. .. .Given to
imitating the general principles of the old
European politics within the Argentine
framework, Alvear believed in the virtues
of a liberalism dedicated to preserving
the status quo from afar.
3
2RRIAA, Robertson to Hughes, June 1, 1922, 835.6363/
147; Riadle to Hughes, July 26, 1922, 835.6363/172.
3Felix Luna, Alvear (Buenos Aires: Libros Argentinos,
1958) , 64.
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The problem is, however, that the tenets of 19th century
liberalism provide no clues for understanding the national-
istic oil policy of Alvear's government and particularly
the vigorous support afforded YPF's development. Doctrinal
consistency should have prompted Alvear to phase out state-
funded industrial activity, leaving the field to interested
private firms.
That this failed to materialize can be traced to at
least three sources. First, state petroleum exploitation
was an ongoing enterprise - part of the status quo - and to
halt it would have aroused stiff opposition among its sup-
porters. Secondly, as we shall see, during the Alvear
years the case of the oil nationalists became increasingly
popular, and, therefore, a government policy in accord with
their demands was a political asset. Lastly, and most
importantly, Alvear's conception of the Chief Executive's
role in government made possible and even predictable a
degree of doctrinal diversity in the government's policies.
Unlike Yrigoyen, he viewed excessive presidential
authority as one of the key weaknesses in Argentine
political life. Drawing perhaps upon his knowledge of
European political institutions gained during long
periods of residence abroad, Alvear preferred the position
of moderator in a government actually run by carefully
chosen and capable Ministers. This explains why his
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Ministerial appointments were all men of outstanding
reputation as opposed to the lesser figures who had served
in Yrigoyen's Cabinet. Alvear's implementation of his con
cept of the Executive is reflected in the taunt from
critics that his government was one of "eight presidents
and a secretary general". 4 Given the Alvear approach, his
chief subordinates were in a position to exercise a
decisive influence on policy making. In the case of pe-
troleum, both Tomas A. Le Breton, Alvear's first Minister
of Agriculture, and General Enrique Mosconi, Director
General of YPF (1922-1930) , took full advantage of the
opportunity.
5
Intensive activity took place on two fronts of the
petroleum question during the early months of Alvear's
administration. Minister Le Breton, for his part, concen-
trated upon the dual problem of halting speculation in oil
exploration rights and obtaining the long overdue national
oil law. Mosconi, meanwhile, dedicated his efforts to
reorganizing the state oil industry and turning it into a
major producer of domestic fuel.
Le Breton's expertise lay in agricultural matters,
4Del Mazo, El radicalising , 24; Luna, Alvear , 57-58.
5Mosconi's rank was that of a Colonel when he took
charge of YPF in 1922, but he was promoted to General in
1926 and will be referred to by that rank in the text.
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but his initial concern as Minister was to stop the wild
speculation in petroleum exploration rights which developed
during the final years of Yrigoyen's presidency. 6 He
wasted no time. His first official act was to instruct the
Director of the National Bureau of Mines to suspend the
processing of all requests for exploration permits and to
conduct ^in investigation into the status of all pending
requests. It was an unprecedented action, but one jus-
tified in Le Breton's mind by the need to halt the chaotic
scramble for petroleum rights which threatened to cripple
the industry. 7
Speculators had found the road to profit paved by the
archaic provisions of the 1886 Mining Code. Le Breton
outlined the speculator's game for the Chamber of Deputies
in October 19 23:
[The speculator] requests exploration
permits and seeks a buyer, but while
he does not find one, he interrupts
and prolongs the processing of his re-
quest. Thus, we find the situation
where exploration works that should
have been initiated within 30 days [of
the submission of the permit request]
have been delayed for five and one-half
years with absolutely nothing having
6See Chapter III, 125-127.
7Diputados, Diario , 1923, VII, 490.
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been done until the day the desiredbuyer is found, and then that ex-
ploration permit which only cost 10pesos is sold for 100,000 ptsos 8
Central here is the fact that formal issuance of the
exploration permit was not necessary to secure the appli-
cant's claim to the lands concerned. The speculator's
preferential rights were established with the registration
of his request and were maintained while it was being
processed.
Though not absolutely necessary, it was to the
speculator's advantage to sell his rights before the ex-
ploration permit was issued. If he was unable to do so,
he faced the expense of the official measurement and
marking of his claim, along with the fact that his rights
would then be secure for only the 300-day terra of the
permit. 9 More importantly, once a permit was issued,
8Ibid. , 489. Le Breton's reference to 10 pesos was to
the cost of the official paper upon which all requests for
mineral rights had to be submitted to the Bureau of Mines.
^Measuring the boundaries of a claim and placing the
markers was one of the final steps before the permit was
granted. Under ordinary circumstances this task was en-
trusted to the concessionaire, but in the case of valuable
minerals like oil it was done by government employees at
the expense of the concessionaire. In Chubdt (Comodoro
Rivadavia) and Neuquen (Plaza Huincul) , the areas of
primary interest to speculators, the cost of measuring a
claim was about 1000 pesos. If a large number of permit
requests reached the measuring stage, the speculator faced
a considerable investment if he wanted to maintain his
rights. Velarde, Las minas de petroleo , 41-42.
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exploration work had to be started within 30 days and sus-
tained for the duration of the grant. Failure to comply
with these regulations meant the immediate termination of
the concessionaire's rights. 10 Clearly, therefore, maximum
profit lay in peddling exploration rights prior to issuance
of the actual permit. The scale upon which some parties
indulged in this activity may be guaged from the fact that
in 1922 one individual had pending before the mining
authorities 242 permit requests involving over 300,000
hectares of land, and another group had submitted over
1000 requests covering about 1,000 ,000 hectares. 11
While there seems to have been little basis for the
fears held in some quarters that speculation was aimed at,
or would lead to, monopolization of Argentina's petroleum
reserves, *2 j.t did create problems for nearly everyone
10 Ibid
. ,
60-61. Le Breton suggested that failure to
enforce these regulations in the past had facilitated the
designs of speculators, (Diputados, Diario , 1923, VII,
489.) while the Bureau of Mines complained about insuffi-
cient funds to adequately inspect private works and en-
force the law. D. G. de Minas , Memoria , 1923 , 15.
UDiputados, Diario , 1923, VII, 489-490.
12Carlos E. Velarde who served as Chief of the
Inspectior. Division of the Bureau of Mines during part of
the Yrigoyen presidency denied there was any serious threat
of monopoly. If the prospect arose, he claims, it could
have been quashed simply by enforcing the requirement that
each and every exploration lot be continuously worked. No
company, he maintained, had sufficient resources to fulfill
this condition on enough lots to monopolize any of the
nation's oil districts. Velarde, Las minas de petroleo ,
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connected with the nation's oil industry, m the case of
the National Bureau of Mines, the flood of exploration
permit requests paralyzed the machinery for processing the
applications. Unable to contend with the superabundance
of work foisted upon it, the Bureau by 1922 was paying lit-
tle or no attention to pending applications, and almost no
permits were issued during the latter half of the year. 13
Le Breton's order to halt processing of exploration permits
simply placed the official stamp on an administrative
logjam inherited from the Yrigoyen administration.
Legitimate private investors intent upon developing
oil deposits found their situation doubly complicated.
Those seeking exploration lands were often forced to deal
with speculators who not only received substantial prices
for high-potential areas but frequently demanded a royalty
as well on any oil discovered. 14 Investors who had permit
requests pending before the authorities, either through
original application or through purchase from speculators,
encountered a different problem. Acting under the
assumption that their requests would be processed in accord
60-61.
13RRIAA, Riddle to Hughes, May 23, 1923, 835.6363/222,
enclosure.
* 4B. Menendez, "Las concesiones de petro'leo y los
propietarios de tierra," La Accion , November 30, 1922, p. 5.
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with the Mining Code, several companies had timed the
arrival of exploration equipment and crews to coincide
with the anticipated acquisition of their permits. When
their permits were delayed, they went ahead with operations
anyway and thereby created a new legal problem. If one of
these companies discovered oil, would the government deny
the firm exploitation rights on the grounds that the dis-
covery had been made on land for which no valid exploration
permit had been issued? 15
Officials of the state enterprise were not happy
about the effects of speculation either. They were
especially anxious over the possibility that private inter-
ests would lay claim to all or most of the nation's oil
lands and leave YPF without room for expansion. 16 Mosconi,
in the light of this danger, actively supported the ef-
forts to ferret out irregularities in the granting of
petroleum rights and advocated the immediate creation of
new federal oil reserves in the Patagonian area and in
17the northern and western reaches of the country.
15RRIAA , Riddle to Hughes, May 23, 1923, 835.6363/222,
enclosure; Gibson to Hughes, November 28, 1923, 835.6363/
263, enclosure.
16Diputados, Diario, 1923, VII, 492 (from comments
made before the Chamber by Minister Le Breton)
•
^Mosconi, El petro'leo argentino , 128-129.
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With speculation responsible for so many inconven-
iences, there appeared to be little reason for anyone to
oppose Le Breton's attack on the problem. Private oil
interests, however, regarded his order halting permit
processing as an arbitrary and unfriendly act. 18 One
observer suggested the new Minister was mistakenly trying
to apply in Argentina theories about government control
over business to which he had been exposed while he was
Argentine Ambassador to the United States. 19 From a legal
viewpoint, Le Breton's action may also have been question-
able, but the true source of the private investors'
negative reaction was not so much damage sustained as a
general suspicion of any government measure that remotely
suggested close control over or exclusion of private capital
from Argentina's oil industry.
There is no reason to believe Le Breton wanted to
eliminate the private sector. In May 1923, Bernard S. Van
Rensselaer, a lawyer for Standard Oil of California,
reported being told by Le Breton that
all serious companies which had under-
taken work in good faith might safely
proceed with their operations in the
18RRIAA, Riddle to Hughes, May 23, 1923, 835.6363/222,
enclosure; Robertson to Hughes, September 11, 19 23,
835.6363/249.
19 Ibid. , Riddle to Hughes, May 23, 1923, 835.6363/222,
enclosure.
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assurance that they would be amply
protected and fairly treated by the
Government. 20
Less than two years later, Le Breton confirmed this
position in talks with Teodoro Becu, a lawyer representing
Standard Oil of New Jersey. He assured Becu that the
Alvear administration had favored private participation in
the oil industry from the beginning, because the national
government lacked sufficient financial resources to explore
all the nation's oil territories. 21 Speculators rather
than legitimate investors were the target of the govern-
ment's policy which Le Breton described as "mines for the
miners" .22
Speculation was a nuisance, but it was merely an
outgrowth of a more fundamental problem, the lack of
adequate national petroleum legislation. Le Breton himself
is alleged to have expressed amazement at the fact that
2 <>Ibid.
21Ibid. , Riddle to Hughes ,
f
March 25, 1925, 835.6363/284,
enclosure 8. According to Becu, Le Breton cited Comodoro
Rivadavia as the only area where the government was
interested in limiting private activity. Le Breton had also
indicated to Van Rensselaer in 19 23 that he was not pleased
with private companies located hard on the boundaries of
the federal reserve in Comodoro Rivadavia where they could,
without expense, take advantage of exploratory work done
by YPF. Ibid . , Riddle to Hughes, May 23, 1923, 835.6363/
222, enclosure.
22Diputados, Diario, 1923, VII, 489.
.*
*.
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foreign firms "dared" enter Argentina under existing
mineral laws. 23 His first corrective step ±n ^
was an emergency measure intended to place petroleum be-
yond the province of the Mining Code until a definitive
oil law was passed. In May 1923, he went before the
Chamber's Finance Committee to request the insertion of a
rider in the 1924 budget bill which would have empowered
the Minister of Agriculture to use his own discretion in
deciding which petroleum concessions would be made and un-
der what conditions. His proposal was unanimously reject-
ed. 24 Temporarily stymied, Le Breton turned to more con-
ventional means, submitting two bills to Congress in
September 1923 over his signature and that of President
Alvear. 25 The more important of the two measures proposed
RRIAA, Robertson to Hughes, September 11, 1923,
835.6363/249.
24Diputados, Diario, 1923, IV, 516-517; RRIAA , Riddle
to Hughes, May 23, 1923, 835.6363/222, enclosure. Romeo
David Saccone, a member of the Finance Committee, para-
phrased Le Breton's proposal for the Chamber this way,
"The Executive Branch is empowered to grant concessions
to companies whose interests would coincide with those of
the State." (Diputados, Diario
, 1923, IV, 516.) That Le
Breton chose to present his proposal to the Finance Com-
mittee is explained by the fact that since 1915 the annual
budget lav: had contained articles empowering the Executive
Branch to reinvest profits earned by the state oil works,
market state-produced products, etc.
25Ibid.
,
VI, 244-256.
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alterations in 33 provisions of the Mining Code, while
the second bill outlined new procedures for handling
applications for mineral exploration rights. Strictly
speaking, they were not oil bills since they referred to
mineral deposits in general. Each contained a number of
articles which applied only to oil along with other articles
which either did not apply to oil or did so only under
special circumstances. This failure to concentrate spe-
cifically on petroleum is surprising in view of Le Breton's
consistent emphasis on oil problems.
The basic premise of the proposed Mining Code reform
insofar as it related to petroleum was described by Pres-
ident Alvear in a 1925 note to the Chamber requesting con-
sideration of the bill:
It is indispensable to ensure that the
exploitation of national fuel is carried
out under legal conditions which assure
perfect control of the national interests,
and that the benefits of the mineral
wealth fulfill the public needs at the
provincial as well as the national
level. 26
Basic to the bill were two general provisions which would
have federalized all mineral deposits and authorized their
exploitation by the State. These were not new proposals,
but their enactment would have altered fundamentally the
26 Ibid.
,
1925, IV, 307.
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nation's mineral law, centralizing control over all
mineral development in the hands of the national government.
The petroleum provisions would have required all
private firms to be organized in accord with Argentine law,
domiciled within the country, and subject to inspection
regulations established by the Executive Power. 27 Explora-
tion concessions were to be issued only to those who could
prove their capacity to fulfill the conditions of the grant.
Concessions were to consist of a maximum of 2000 hectares
and to last for three years with possible extensions of up
to one more year. While no limit was to be placed upon the
number of concessions one person or firm might acquire, con-
cessionaires were obliged to begin exploring each lot within
six months of the issuance of the permit, maintain the work
uninterrupted" for the duration of the grant, and pay an
annual tax of 100 pesos on each 500 hectares held plus a
royalty of 20% on any crude oil and derivatives produced
in the process of exploration.
If oil was discovered, the concessionaire was to be
entitled to a 33-year renewable lease over an area ranging
from 81 to 810 hectares depending upon the number of
27specifically prohibited from entering the Argentine
oil industry were all foreign nations and any corporations
in which a foreign government was a financial partner.
This provision was obviously aimed at the Anglo-Persian
syndicate in which the British government was a major
stockholder.
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discoveries made and the number of investors involved.
The remainder of the exploration lot was to revert to the
government either to be reserved for state exploitation or
declared open for new private activity. Concessionaires
were to pay a royalty of from 5 to 20% upon production
depending upon the location of the wells and the quality
of the oil. They were also to be liable for maintaining a
level of production dictated by the Executive Power in
accord with the conditions of the deposit. Finally, the
bill prohibited either the transfer of petroleum rights or
the exportation of oil without permission from government
authorities.
There can be no doubt that this bill was designed with
control of private companies in mind, but in some particu-
lars it was more liberal than existing provisions of the
Mining Code. Most important in this respect was the ex-
tension of the exploration period from 300 days to 3 and
possibly 4 years. Furthermore, no limits were placed upon
the number and location of exploration lots, and the maxi-
mum size of the exploitation grant was expanded from 56 7 to
810 hectares. 28 Concessionaires were also given protection
28There was no limit on the location of exploration
lots in the original Mining Code, but a Ministerial Resolu-
tion of January 31, 1911 declared there had to be a space
equal to the size of a third lot (2000 hectares) between
any two lots granted to the same party. It was an attempt
to protect against the danger of one company obtaining ex-
clusive rights over any single petroleum district. The
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against any increase in taxes or royalties for the duration
of their grant.
The bill on the processing of applications for mineral
exploration rights was an attempt "to assure the just
application of the Code and.
. .protect the legitimate
interests of those who dedicate themselves to mining." 29
It specified the data to be supplied to government authori-
ties, the exact time periods for the execution of each
step of the process, the penalties for failure to comply
with the regulations, and, in cases involving privately
owned lands, the prodedures for settling disputes over the
concessionaire's right of way. Insurance against specula-
tion in petroleum rights was sought in two forms. First,
all applicants had to prove ownership of adequate drilling
equipment and deposit in the National Bank a sum equal to
one-third of the value of that equipment. The money was to
be returned only if the concessionaire started working his
lot within 30 days of the issuance of his permit. Secondly,
the rigid time limits established for the completion of
each step involved in processing a permit request would
have made it impossible for a speculator to keep his
resolution had little effect, however, since companies
simply took care never to request adjoining lots under the
name
/
of the same individual. Velarde, Las minas de
petroleo , 58-59.
29Diputados, Diario , 1923, VI, 245 (from the message
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request pending indefinitely while he sought a buyer.
The administration's bills stirred only limited com-
ment. Expected praise appeared in the government's semi-
official press arm, La Accion
, along with a warning against
Congressional failure to sanction the proposed reforms.
Such inaction, it was observed,
would amount to conspiring knowingly,
through error or incompetence, against
the country's most vital interests,
against the very future of the nation. 30
The strongest criticism came from those most likely to be
affected by the suggested reforms, the private investors.
Sir John Cadman of the Anglo-Persian syndicate took the
position that although the broad principles of the Mining
Code bill were sound, its datails were "too rigid and
inelastic" given the technical difficulties of oil
exploitation in Argentina. El petroleo argentino , a
semimonthly oil journal, claimed the bill bore no relation-
ship to the needs of the nation's oil industry, and that
the conditions proposed for oil concessions would
which accompanied the bill)
.
30La Accion , October 18, 1923, p. 16; see also
November 3, 1923, p. 16; November 17, 1923, p. 16.
31RRIAA , Robertson to Hughes, October 26, 1923,
835.636 3/259, enclosure.
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effectively exclude private capital from all areas except
those in which oil deposits were known to exist and where,
therefore, the investment risk was low. 32 The general re-
action of private interests was summarized well in the
comment of an official United States observer:
It is generally considered here that this
project of law, if approved, will make
petroleum matters even worse here than does
the present Argentine Mining Code, and the
project appears to have been drawn up by
someone regrettably ignorant of petroleum
mining and of the necessities of the case. 33
Time was to prove that private investors had nothing
to fear from these particular proposals since Congress
virtually ignored them. Repeatedly the Executive Branch
requested Congressional action, but to no avail. Le Breton
himself appeared before the Chamber on October 17, 1923 to
impress upon the Deputies the urgency of passing oil legis-
lation. 34 His pleas went unanswered. President Alvear
emphasized the same point in his messages opening the
Congressional sessions of 1925, 1926, and 1927. 35 He
included petroleum legislation among the topics selected
for consideration in the 1925 and 1926 Extraordinary
32
"Las reformas al Co'digo de Mineria," El petroleo
argentino , No. 11 (September 25, 1923), 1.
33RRIAA , Robertson to Hughes, October 11, 19 23,
835.6363/255.
34Diputados, Diario, 1923, VII, 488-493.
35 Senadores, Diario, 1925, I, 60-61; 1926, I, 37;
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Sessions of Congress ,36 and on three occasions the Presi-
dent and the Minister of Agriculture sent notes to the
Chamber specifically asking for approval of the bills
submitted in 1923.37 Through it all
, congress remained
unmoved, and the administration's bills remained buried
in Committee.
Forced to act without Congress, Le Breton and Alvear
turned to the Executive Decree, the instrument used so
frequently in the past in relation to petroleum matters.
They signed two decrees on January 10, 1924 which, accord-
ing to one Argentine scholar-statesman, "marked the opening
of a new era in the defense of Argentina's oil wealth. "38
The first decree set aside for oil exploration by the
National Bureau of Mines a massive three-part federal
reserve totaling nearly 33 million hectares. 39 i t en-
compassed practically all known and alleged petroleum land
1927, 35.
36Diputados, Diario, 1926, VI, 12; 1927, I, 23.
37 Ibid
. , 1925, IV, 306-307; 1926, III, 5; 1927, I, 23.
•5 O / /JOFrondizi, Petroleo y_ politica , 160.
3 9YPF, Recopilacio^
,
I, 145-146. The first segment of
the reserve embraced the National Territory of Neuqu^n a-
long with parts of the Territories of La Pampa and Rio
Negro (27,600,000 hectares). Segments two and three were
smaller consisting of the mid-eastern sector of the Ter-
ritory of Tierra del Fuego (430^,000 hectares) and a block
encompassing southeastern Chubut and northeastern Santa
Cruz Territories (4,800,000 hectares). Three more Execu-
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under the jurisdiction of the national government. No
new requests for petroleum exploration permits relative to
lands included in the reserve would be accepted by the
mining authorities, and all pending requests were to be
processed according to regulations to be established in
the second decree.
The provisions of that decree followed closely the
pattern set in the administration's legislative proposal
of the previous September. 40 The objective again was to
prevent speculative activity by demanding proof that appli-
cants possessed the financial capacity for exploration and
by preventing bureaucratic delays in the issuing of permits
Confirmation that this decree stemmed from Le Breton's
announced policy of "mines for the miners" came in an
interview he gave to a La Prensa correspondent:
With regard to the regulations established
for persons who have already requested
exploration rights in areas reserved by
yesterday's decree, those regulations
tended to favor the real miners and, at
the same time, to avoid the abuses that
have been committed in the past. 41
tive Decrees issued in 1927 at the request of YPF expanded
the reserve to almost 40 million hectares . Lands were ad-
ded in the western part of Chubut and in the western and
southern parts of Santa Cruz. ( Ibid . , 255, 266, 270.) The
task of exploration was originally entrusted to the Bureau
of Mines, but YPF was subsequently authorized to aid in
the work. Ibid . , 163-164, 246.
40Ibid. , 147-151.
41La Prensa, January 11, 19 24, p. 12.
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As a counteroffensive against speculation, these
decrees were a spectacular success. On January 10, 1924
there were 7,237 applications pending before the Bureau of
Mines for oil exploration rights involving 8,116,000
hectares. Slightly over three years later, on March 10,
1927, there were 72 applications covering 73,500 hectares. 42
Supplementing the national government's policy of
creating official reserves was the action taken by the
authorities of several provinces. Governors issued decrees
creating reserves that encompassed the entire provinces of
Santa Fe and Entre Rios , and substantial portions of Salta
and Jujuy. 43 The combined national and provincial reserves
left only some geographically uninviting areas in Mendoza
Province where private interests might still request new
exploration rights.*****
For all of Le Breton's persistent and effective fight
D. G. de Minas, Produccion de petroleo en la
repiiiblica argentina durante el ano 1926 £ otros datos
mineros (Buenos Aires: D. G. de Minas, 1927) , 1."
43yPF, Recopilacion
,
I, 130 (Santa Fe, October 10,
1923), 165-166 (Jujuy, December 10, 1924), 170-171 (Salta,
December 12, 1924), 191-192 (Entre Rios, June 8, 1925).
While the Santa Fe reserve was created prior to the
national reserve, the introduction to the provincial decree
indicates that the action was taken to coordinate Santa
Fe's policy with directions already indicated by the
national government.
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against speculative waste, the commanding figure of the
Alvear years insofar as petroleum was concerned was YPF's
new Director General, 45-year-old Army Colonel Enrique
Mosconi. The son of an Italian immigrant, Mosconi gradu-
ated from the Military Academy at the head of his class in
189 4 and held a civil engineering degree from the Univer-
sity of Buenos Aires (1903), Assigned to the Army Engineer-
ing Corps, Mosconi traveled to Europe three times before
WW I as part of study and purchasing commissions, and on
two occasions he put in stints with the German Army. Regu-
lar promotions brought Mosconi to the rank of Colonel in
1917 and to the post of Director of the Army Air Force in
1920. In that capacity, Mosconi demonstrated the dedica-
tion, energy and extraordinary administrative talents which
were to be the hallmark of his career with YPF. 44 He
always believed that his accomplishments with the Army Air
Force were a determining factor in his choice as YPF head
in 1922. 45
The details of Mosconi' s appointment on October 19,
1922 are not entirely clear. Though a man of ability, his
reputation did not extend beyond military circles. In fact,
44The biographical data on Mosconi is from Raul Larra's
ni, general del petroleo (Buenos Aires: EditorialMosco
Future ' 19371 , r4=7T, lyb-m.
45Mosconi, El petroleo argentino , 18
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neither the man nor his career were known to Alvear or
Le Breton until just before the appointment was made.^
Other than the need to procure fuel for his Army planes,
Mosconi's involvement with oil matters prior to 1922 was
limited to participation in the Second Engineering Con-
gress held in Buenos Aires in 1921. He presided over the
Committee on Aviation which discussed the importance of
domestic oil to guarantee vital fuel supplies. 47 in
short, his chief asset in October 1922 was his proven
administrative expertise rather than knowledge of, or
experience in the petroleum industry. In estimating the
importance of this asset, it is well to keep in mind that
the state oil enterprise was sadly disorganized in October
1922 and much in need of strong, disciplined leadership.
Alvear permitted his Ministers considerable latitude
in the choice of administrative subordinates, and, there-
fore, the actual choice of Mosconi was made by Le Breton.
Le Breton first offered the YPF Directorship to a friend
who in declining called the Minister's attention to
Mosconi's name. After looking into Mosconi's background
4^Larra, Mosconi
,
33-34; Frondizi, Petroleo y_ politica ,
154. Unless otherwise indicated, the details of Mosconi's
appointment are taken from Frondizi.
47Mosconi, El petroleo argentino , 16. Mosconi's
report to the Congress contained no specific recommenda-
tions concerning petroleum, Enrique Mosconi, Dichos y_
hechos, 1904-1938 (Buenos Aires: Librer/a "El Ateneo"
,
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and speaking with both the candidate" and the Minister of
War, Agustr'n P. jwto ,A9 Le Breton made his
In addition to his administrative talents, Mosconi
brought to his new post two convictions which would influ-
ence his actions throughout his career with YPF. He
firmly believed that the State could run an industrial
enterprise effectively, and that under no conditions should
control of the domestic petroleum market be abandoned to
large foreign firms. Against doubters, Mosconi defended
the feasibility of government-run industries given high
administrative standards and exemption from political
interference. 50 In the final meeting of YPF's Administra-
tive Commission held during Alvear's presidency, Mosconi
traced much of YPF's success to the fact that the President
1938) , 93-95.
48La Epoca
, October 19, 1922, p. 1.
a a
La Prensa, October 19, 1922, p. 12. According to
Frondizi, Mosconi never knew the circumstances surrounding
his appointment. Larra contends that Alvear originally
considered appointing Mosconi as Minister of Public Works,
but changed his mind when warned by War Minister Justo
against including too many military men in the Cabinet.
(Larra, Mosconi, 33-34.) This undocumented account may
have some substance to it, but it runs counter to Alvear's
known practice of cnoosing prestigious figures for Cabinet
posts.
50 /
Mosconi, El petroleo argentino
,
13-14, 183-184.
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and his Ministers had met these requirements:
The Executive Power has been primarily
responsible for the accomplishments which
the Petroleum Administration believes it
has achieved, because the President of the
Nation,..., seconded by Ministers Dr. Le
Breton and Engineer Mihura, has set and
maintained standards necessary for effective
management, standards which excluded entirely
political influence. That is an indispensable
condition for the success of an industrial
and commercial enterprise. ... 51
With regard to the domestic petroleum market, Mosconi
consistently emphasized the need to increase YPF's produc-
tion to the point where the state industry could exercise
a controlling influence in setting market prices. In
19 36 when Mosconi looked back upon his eight years with
YPF, he placed attainment of this objective at the top of
his list of accomplishments. 52 He dated his drive to
control the foreign "trusts" from an incident which
occurred while he headed the Army Air Force. When the
manager of a Standard Oil affiliate denied him delivery of
aviation fuel on anything but a cash-and-carry basis,
Mosconi, according to his own account, swore on the spot
"to cooperate by all legal methods in breaking the
51Y1"F, "Acta No. 831," (October 9, 1928) (Located in
the collection of the Centro de Estudios iMacionales, Buenos
Aires) , 50-51. Emilio Mihura replaced Le Breton as Min-
ister of Agriculture on September 1, 1925.
52Mosconi, El petro'leo argentino , 16-18.
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trusts. -53 whether th±a incident alQne was responsible fQr
kindling the fires of economic nationalism in Mosconi is
difficult to tell, but certainly his words and deeds as
YPF's chief would display an aggressive nationalist, anti-
trust tone.
Mosconi' s appointment touched off a six-month
long house cleaning in the state oil agency. He thoroughly
investigated the past history and the existing condition of
his new charges, calling in a state auditor to go over
YPF's books, and writing exhaustive reports to Le Breton
describing his findings and recommending changes. 54
On a list of twenty-three suggested reforms submitted
to the Minister on February 23, 1923, top priority was
assigned to the need for petroleum legislation on the one
hand and for reorganization of YPF's administrative struc-
ture on the other. 55 Congress held the key to the legisla-
tive problem, but administrative remodeling was subject to
immediate and independent Executive action. Mosconi 's
objection to the structure of YPF lay in the lack of
53ibid
.
, 17.
54For a summary of Mosconi 's more important criticisms
of how the agency had been run in the past, see above,
Chapter III, 102-104. One report of interest not cited in
those pages was sent to Le Breton by Mosconi after the
latter visited Plaza Huincul. See Diputados, Yacimientos
petroliferos fiscales; Antecedentes , I, 560-621.
Ibid. , 636.
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*
autonomy under which the bureau was forced to labor. He
complained to Le Breton on November 18, 19 22 that Yrigoyen's
administration had made YPF
so dependent upon the [Agriculture] Ministry
that it was impossible for the agency to
employ the commercial procedures which are
essential to any industrial enterprise, a
category within which state oil exploita-
tion must be placed. 55
Mosconi's request for more independence was accomodated
through an Executive Decree issued April 12, 1923. 57 No
longer would YPF operate solely as an advisory body with
decision-making power monopolized by the Minister of Agri-
culture. Henceforth, the Director General and a six-man
Administrative Commission would exercise nearly autonomous
control over YPF's activities. Ministerial approval would
be necessary only for the department's annual budgets, for
credit operations, and for major purchases as in the case
of petroleum tankers and refining equipment. The willing-
ness of Le Breton and Alvear to oblige Mosconi on this
point was a manifestation of the Executive support YPF
would receive throughout Alvear' s administration.
Fully aware of his problems and resources and armed
with an administrative mechanism of his own design,
56 Ibid. , 549.
57YPF, Recopilacio'n , I, 115-119.
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Mosconi set about the task of producing "the most oil
possible at the lowest cost possible. -58 He and his
dinates devoted their energies to improving and expanding
every phase of the industry from exploration and production
to transportation, distillation, storage, and commercial-
ization. The key to progress, however, lay less in devel-
oping the necessary auxiliary services than in harmonizing
them to achieve the goal of the highest production at the
lowest cost. This is precisely where Mosconi* s adminis-
trative talents asserted themselves, guaranteeing an
efficient coordinated operation. His success allowed
Mosconi to bequeath to the nation a vertically integrated
state oil industry when he stepped down as Director General
in September 19 30.
Statistics do not tell the entire story, but a compar-
ison of several growth indices for 1923 and 1928 provides
a measure of YPF's expansion during the Alvear years.
The firm's capital base grew from 61,969,913 $m/n to
166,291,826 $m/n.^^ The number of drilling apparatus in-
creased from 39 to 53, total meters drilled from 28,303 to
5^Dipi:tados , Yacimientos petroliferos fiscales ;
Antecedentes
,
I, 703.
59YPF, Desarrollo de la industria, 230.
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108,640, new wells from 53 to 168, and producing wells
from 144 to 660. 60 Gross production of crude oil
spurted from 407,186 to 860,604 m3
,
61
storage capacity
went from 265,959 to 504,307 m3
,
62 and the capacity of
YPF's maritime fleet increased from 22,700 to 50,236
tons. 63
Other significant improvements were less easily
quantified. 64 In Comodoro Rivadavia, electricity was pro-
vided for the field's power needs, and docking facilities
were improved. Steps were taken to train technical personnel
at home and abroad, while living conditions for laborers
were improved through new housing, schools, hospitals,
churches, food cooperatives and amusement facilities.
In the Federal Capital, Argentines were treated to
evidence of YPF's rising fortunes in the form of an im-
pressive new office building on Paseo Colon. Finally,
and most significantly for YPF's commercial expansion, a
60 Ibid
. ,
213, 249. These figures do not include YPF's
work in Salta which only began in May 192 8.
61BIP, December 1936, 18, 29, 34.
62YPF, Desarrollo de la industria , 378.
63Ibid
.
, 363.
64For a concise summary of YPF's year by year activ-
ities, see Ibid . , 77-165 (Comodoro Rivadavia), 245-249
(Plaza Huincul) ; YPF, "Acta No. 831," 5-35.
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major refinery was constructed in La Plata, the capital
of Buenos Aires Province. 65
Since the marketing of petroleum by-products was
potentially the most profitable phase of the oil business,
discussion about installing a state refinery was nearly as
old as the 190 7 Comodoro Rivadavia discovery itself. 66 Yet
by 1922, small distilleries in Comodoro Rivadavia and
Plaza Huincul represented the sum total of state refining
activity. After taking over as Director General, Mosconi
became an enthusiastic advocate for the building of a major
state facility. On May 20, 1923, he sent a memorandum to
Le Breton emphasizing the importance of the undertaking and
submitting a concrete plan for a plant. Le Breton and
Alvear responded with a request to Congress for authoriza-
tion to invest 20,000,000 pesos in the state oil industry,
part of which would be earmarked for building refineries. 67
While Congress ignored the bill, and private interests
attacked it as another step in the Le Breton-Mosconi plot
65For a complete and convenient summary^ of the building
of the La Plata plant, see Mosconi, El petroleo argentino ,
113-119. Unless otherwise indicated, tne following comments
are based upon that account plus YPF, Desarrollo de la
industria , 309-331.
66Fliess, M E1 petro'leo y Comodoro Rivadavia," 439-440,
446; La Epoca, December 24, 1920, p. 2, December 23, 1925
p. 1.
67Diputados, Diario, 1923, III, 296-298. The money was
to have been borrowed and repaid out of YPF's earnings.
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to suffocate private exploitation, 68 YPF negotiated a pre-
,
liminary agreement with the Bethlehem Steel Company (U.S.)
for the construction of a distillery in La Plata. The fi-
nancial problem was solved by a Ministerial Accord signed
on December 31, 1923 which authorized the use of credit
operations to fund the proposal. 69 with all roadblocks
removed, construction was begun in January 1925, and on
February 1, 1927 YPF personnel took charge of a fully
functioning installation equipped for "topping" or primary
distillation and for "cracking" gas oil in order to
increase the yield of gasoline. 70 Subsequently, the La
Plata facilities were expanded with the addition of a
"cracking" plant designed to increase the gasoline yield by
68 RRIAA, Robertson to Hughes, June 26, 1923,
835. 6363/232 , enclosure.
69YPF, Recopilacion
,
I, 138-140. The fact that the
section of the budget law which constituted the only legis-
lative basis for state oil exploitation did not authorize
the use of credit operations by YPF placed Executive
authorization of such activity upon questionable
grounds. Recognizing this, the Ministerial Accord reasoned
that since the budget law authorized reinvestment of YPF's
earnings to increase production, the investment in a dis-
tillery was in accord with the law. The decision as to
how the investment was actually made, it was argued, was
up to the Executive.
70,, Topping" is the initial refining process which
yields gasoline, kerosene, gas oil and fuel oil. The
latter two may be "cracked" to increase the yield of
by-products
.
»
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breaking down the fuel-oil residue of primary distil-
lation. 7
1
Construction of the refinery marked an important
plateau in the vertical integration of the state industry.
No longer limited to the production of crude oil, YPF
emerged after 1925 as an increasingly powerful force in the
domestic petroleum market. State sales of crude oil fell
from nearly 500,000 tons in 1925 to just over 4,000 tons in
1928. During the same years, sales of fuel oil shot up
from 25,753 to 434,799 tons, kerosene sales from 4,578,073
to 25,578,730 liters, and gasoline sales from 5,941,538 to
100,050,105 liters. 73 Argentines, who before 1926 could
purchase YPF's products at a single distribution center in
Buenos Aires, found them available in 19 28 at over 900
locations throughout the Federal Capital and the interior
of the nation. 74
Despite YPF's dramatic advances under Mosconi,
7
^Mosconi, E_l petroleo argentino , 119-121; YPF
Desarrollo de la industria , 331. This plant too was con-
structed by Bethlehem Steel. It was handed over to YPF
in working order on February 26, 1929.
72Ibid. , 389.
7
3
Ibid. , 391. Due to the nature of the sources, all
the figures cited in this study on the production and sale
of gasoline contain small quantities of airplane fuel as
well.
74 Ibid. , 399. The actual task of retailing YPF products
was subcontracted to J.F. Auger and Co. from 1926 to 1929.
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Argentina remained a major fuel importer. President Alvear
set the goal of self-sufficiency for his administration
in his address opening the 1923 Congressional sessions, 75
and on the same occasion in 19 25 he predicted rapid
fulfillment:
Petroleum production will soon be
sufficient to satisfy the national
market, and definite assurances can
be given that fuel autonomy is a
fact. 76
Yet by 1928, YPF's increased productivity combined with a
marked rise in private production still left a sizeable
"fuel gap" that had to be plugged through importation. 77
In 1928 when YPF registered fuel oil sales of 434,799 tons,
Argentina imported an additional 806,741 tons; kerosene
75Senadores, Diario , 1923, I, 24
7
6
Ibid.
, 1925, I, 60. While the figures which follow
make Alvear' s prediction seem ridiculous, the conditions
under which it was made must be taken into account. Not
only was the La Plata refinery under construction, but
Le Breton and Alvear had approved an expansion plan for YPF
drafted by Mosconi and the Administrative Commission that
promised state production of crude oil would reach
1,943,000 m3 by 1927. In fact, production in 1927 would be
fi. YPF, "Acta No. 831," 8-9; Eduardo M.
Gonella, La explotacion oficial del petroleo ; Su evoluci6n
only 822,875 m
economica y_ financiera (Buenos Aires: Imprenta de la
Universidad de Buenos Aires, 19 27) , 57-58.
77Private production rose from 123,023 m3 in 1923 to
581,459 m3 in 1928. In terms of total national production
of crude oil, the private sector's share increased from
23.2% to 40.3%. Nearly all (92.7%) private production came
from Comodoro Rivadavia, and while 15 companies contributed
to the 19 28 total, 3 firms accounted for almost 87% or it;
Compania Ferrocarrilera de Petroleo (owned by British
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sales of 25,578,730 liters were supplemented with
60,969,822 imported liters, and the figures on gasoline
were 100,050,105 liters sold by YPF and 398,789,485 liters
imported. Coal imports likewise remained high, increasing
from 2,579,466 tons in 1923 to 3,121,969 tons in 1928. 78
The financial handicap imposed by the lack of fuel autonomy
is apparent from the fact that in 1927 outlays for foreing
coal and petroleum products amounted to over 40% of the
total value of the nation's imports. 79
YPF's emphasis upon maximum production was spurred not
only by the desire to attain fuel autonomy, but also by the
need to awaken public confidence in the state industry. As
in the pre-1922 period, state exploitation was often greet-
ed with indifference if not hostility. While most were
forced to admit the feasibility of state exploitation in
Comodoro Rivadavia, a considerable body of opinion advo-
cated halting operations in Plaza Huincul where YPF by 1925
Railroads) , Astra (primarily German with some Swiss and
French capital)
,
Compania Industrial y Commercial de
Petroleo (Anglo-Persian affiliate). BIP, December 1936,
19-28, 30-31, 33, 35.
78 Importacion de combustibles y_ lubricantes Nafta y_
Caminos (JIP Reprint) (Buenos Aires: Talleres Graficos
R. Canals, 1938), 12, 15, 30.
79
"Expresion grafica de hechos economicos," Revista de
Economia Argentina, XXI (August 192 8) , 94.
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had still not turned a profit. 80 Mosconi, testifying be-
fore the Chamber Committee on Industries and Commerce,
noted the debilitating effect of public opinion which
-consistently feeds on malignant rumors." The resulting
mental strain on the firm's employees
leads to wariness and, therefore, to a
coo frequent turn over in high level
personnel, something which is contrary
to improving administration. 81
The danger to YPF posed by public indifference became
apparent when the Administrative Commission attempted to
market the bond issue to finance construction of the La
Plata refinery. No purchasers could be found until a
member of the Commission, Dr. Carlos Madariaga, offered his
personal fortune as a guarantee to prospective investors. 82
YPF encountered similar problems in the retail market. The
absence of public confidence combined with a campaign by
private oil interests to discredit YPF's products forced
YPF officials to visit retail distribution centers and
80La Accion , October 30, 1925, p. 3. Though the crude
oil from Plaza Huincul was of higher quality than that from
Comodoro Rivadavia, freight costs for transporting it to the
La Plata refinery were prohibitive, doubling production
costs. Gonella, La explotacion oficial del petroleo , 25.
81Diputados t/ Comision de Indus trias y Comercio, Anexo
a la orden del dia No . 66 ; Antecedentes de _la comision de
TncHIs/trias y_ comercio en el_ proyecto de ley org^nica del
petroleo (Buenos Aires: Imprenta de la Camara de Diputados,
1926), 55. See also BIP, No. 4 (December 1924), 311-312.
82YPF, "Acta No. 831," 50.
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attempt to convince motorists of the quality of state-
produced commodities. 83 It is not surprising, therefore,
that YPF's authorities emphasized increasing production as
a means of presenting tangible and convincing evidence that
the state industry was serving the nation.
The price of YPF's single-minded concentration on
production was insufficient exploration of Argentina's pre-
sumed oil reserves. Denied additional funds by Congress
and, therefore, entirely dependent upon profits for expan-
sion, it would have been unreasonable to expect YPF to have
financed extended exploration either of its original re-
serves in Comodoro Rivadavia and Plaza Huincul or of the
massive stretches set aside by the January 10, 1924 decree.
Exploratory wells sunk by private companies outnumbered
those of YPF by almost 3 to 1 in the Alvear years. 84 No less
an authority than the Ministry of Agriculture admitted in
1932 that since the Bureau of Mines discovery at Plaza
Huincul in 1918, "serious exploration or the search for new
85
deposits by the State has been almost non-existent." As
83Frondizi, Petroleo y_ politica , 169-170; Mosconi, El
petroleo argentino , 128.
84Frondizi, Petroleo y_ politica , 165.
85Quoted in Eduardo I. Rumbo, Petrqleo v_ vasallaje ;
Carne de vaca y_ carnero contra carbon mas petroleo (liuenos
Aires : Hechos e Ideas, 1957) , 62.
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a result, YPF's crude oil production flowed almost exclu-
>
sively from the vein tapped in 1907, and plans for expan-
sion had to be formulated without full knowledge of under-
ground reserves. 86 The petroleum potential of the areas
reserved in 1924 remained a mystery, unexplored by the
State and inaccessible to private interests.*****
Mosconi and the Administrative Commission were pri-
marily concerned with YPF's industrial development, but
petroleum legislation was also a matter of interest to
them. Actually it was impossible to separate the two
phases of the oil question, because any decision on the
legal framework for national oil development was bound to
have repercussions on the scope and direction of the state
industry. Repeatedly, Mosconi pinpointed the lack of
comprehensive legislation as a critical problem and
requested that his superiors pressure Congress for passage
of a law. 87 On August 6, 1926, testifying before the
Chamber Committee on Industries and Commerce, he warned
that YPF's continued success was endangered by the absence
86 In 1928, over 94% of YPF's crude oil came from the
central field in Comodoro Rivadavia. No new vein was
tapped until the following year when production from the
central field began to decline. Ibid . , 49.
87Diputados, Yacimientos petroliferos fiscales ;
Antecedentes
,
I, 636; Diario , 1926, III, 610-613,
624-627.
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of adequate legislation. 88 And less than a month later
on the occasion of his promotion to General, Mosconi
informed a gathering of well-wishers that although YPF had
accomplished much since 1922, more would have been done had
Congress cooperated by providing an oil law. 89
Mosconi' s specific recommendations for a law must be
prefaced by a glance at petroleum matters as they were un-
folding in the northern provinces of Salta and Jujuy.
Events in that theater helped shape Mosconi' s thinking,
thrust him onto center stage in the debate over petroleum
legislation, and stirred public concern over national
petroleum policy.
In 1923 and 1924, the mining authorities in Salta and
Jujuy faced the same situation as the National Bureau of
90Mines.
*
v Nearly all the supposed oil lands within their
p O f
°°Diputados^ Comision de Industrias y Comercio, Anexo
a la orden del dia No . 66 , 50.
89Mosconi, Dichos y_ hechos, 133.
90Unless otherwise indicated, this brief account of
events in the North is based
7
upon the following sources:
"El Intransigente" , El petroleo del norte argentino :
Comentarios del diarXo *' E1 Intransigente " de la cludad de
Salta (Salta; Imprenta C. Velarde, 1928) , v-xxxii (pro-
-
logue by E. Mosconi); Diputados, Pi ario , 1926, III
610-613, 624-627 (two notes from Mosconi to Le Breton),
1926, VI, 757-766 (memorial to the Chamber from the Execu-
tive Power of Salta Province) ; Provincia de Jujuy, El pe-
troleo y_ la constitucion nacional (Jujuy: Talleres GrafTcos
del Estado, 1926) . One of the best compilations of documents
on this matter appeared in BIP, No. 28 (December 1926)
,
1321-1404.
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jurisdictions were the subject of requests for private
exploration permits. In Salta alone, 563 such applications
awaited processing by late 1924, and in August 1923 repre-
sentatives of Standard Oil of New Jersey (SONJ) unsuccess-
fully approached Salta's Governor, Adolfo Gueraes, with a
proposal which would have given SONJ development rights
over 90,000 hectares for 20 years. 91
In December 1924 after YPF expressed interest in
undertaking exploratory work in Salta and Jujuy, Le Breton
commissioned Mosconi to personally contact the provincial
Governors and discuss the situation created by the numerous
applications for exploration permits. Mosconi' s objective
was to obtain provincial action similar to that taken by
the national government in its January 10, 1924 decrees,
action which would have compelled serious companies to
explore their grants and forced to the sidelines those
with purely speculative interests. The lands recovered
from speculators were to be turned into a reserve where YPF
could carry out geological studies and exploratory drilling.
He returned to the Capital convinced of the success of
his mission. In each province, two decrees were issued
Gueraes was an Yrigoyenist Radical. SONJ's repre-
sentatives included the conservative lawyer-politician
Francisco M. Uriburu. A member of the Union Provincial,
the Salta conservative party, Uriburu had served as a
National Deputy from 1914 to 1918.
16 8
in December 1924 which followed the pattern established by
the national decrees of the preceding January. Reserves
were created which the national government was expected to
explore, and stiff regulations were set up for processing
applications for exploration permits. 92
Over the next two years, Mosconi changed his mind
about the fate of his trip to the North. In a series of
communiques to Le Breton, he alleged that the provincial
decrees had not altered conditions in the North. Mosconi
admitted that some speculators had been eliminated, but he
charged that improper enforcement of the regulations
governing petroleum grants had permitted SONJ in Salta and
Leach Brothers in Jujuy to retain control over the most
promising oil lands. 93 As a result, he claimed, YPF was
denied access to oil areas for exploration in the North
when it had the men, money and materials for the job. Re-
buttals quickly issued from the governments of Benjamin
Villafane in Jujuy and Joaquin Corvalan in Salta, and a
verbal battle ensued during 1925 and 1926 which projected
9 2The only substantial difference in the decrees was
that Salta* s reserve was limited to five years while Jujuy'
s
was created without a time limit. For copies of the
decrees, see YPF, RecopilacioVi
,
I, 165-175.
93Leach Brothers was a firm with agricultural and
mercantile interests owned by wealthy Englishmen. They
sold their petroleum rights to SONJ in 19 26. RRIAA ,
Saddler (SONJ) to Kellogg, November 5, 1926, 835.6363/291.
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petroleum developments in the North into the national
limelight. 94
Technical points about how the regulations were or
were not being enforced were wrangled over by national and
provincial authorities, but the spirit with which they were
enforced was as much the crux of the matter as anything.
Mosconi, speaking for YPF and the national government, de-
manded the strictest possible enforcement of the regulations
in order to exert pressure on private companies and open up
the maximum amount of land for exploration by YPF. Provin-
cial authorities, on the other hand, probably tended to see
increased national government interest in provincial oil as
the opening wedge for federalization, a measure they oppos-
ed. They were, therefore, prone to a more liberal inter-
9 5pretation of the regulations on private oil grants.
Mosconi was so obviously the spearhead of the attack
on the provincial authorities that La Prensa suggested he
Villafane was an anti-Yrigoyenist Radical. Corvalan
belonged to the conservative Union Provincial, the party of
Francisco Uriburu and Robustiano Patron Costas.
95Sufficient work has not been done to date on petrole
urn matters in the northern provinces to clarify why provin-
cial authorities opposed federalize tion. It should be
noted, however, that Salta and Jujuy were extremely poor
areas, and federalization of their oil could have been view
ed as another step in the long-established process of
draining off provincial wealth for the benefit of the lit-
toral area. For evidence of this kind of thinking, see
Jujuy, El petro'leo y_ la constitucion nacional, 17.
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was overstepping the bounds of his office, and that if he
felt obligated to act, he should refrain from using "dogma-
tic language" and an "acerbic tone" in addressing provincial
officials. 96 Mosconi and his associates on the Administra-
tive Commission were so anxious to get their case before the
public that they personally financed the publication in La
Nacion of some of the more extensive notes sent to the
provincial governments. 97 The impact of events in the
North upon Mosconi can be seen in the fact that after 19 24
he almost never spoke or wrote about oil without making
specific reference to Salta and Jujuy.
Mosconi' s writings and speeches reveal that he had no
rigidly defined criteria for legislation in 1922, and that
his position evolved in response to his growing experience
and knowledge of petroleum matters. Running through all
his comments, however, and providing a thread of consis-
tency was the spirit of economic nationalism. In a 1927
radio address, Mosconi presented one of his most compre-
hensive statements on this theme. He acknowledged the con-
tributions men and capital from abroad had made to Argen-
tina's development and granted the continuing need for
foreign aid. At the same time, he advocated replacing the
96La Prensa , September 27, 1926, p. 8.
97Mosconi, El petroleo argentino , 19 3.
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old policy of "economic internationalism" with one he
termed "a nationalist economic framework" as the guideline
for accepting such aid:
The time has now arrived for admitting
men and capital on a selective basis,
and also for establishing protection
for nationals and domestic capital. By
undertaking the exploitation and develop-
ment of the nation's resources with the
nation's own men and money, we will
obviously improve our standard of living,.... 98
In agriculture, industry, commerce and finance, urged
Mosconi
,
it is now time that Argentine intelligence
and capital intervened on a wider scale
and received the collective benefits which
today slip through our fingers. 9 9
Specifically on petroleum, he continued, Argentina had
to protect its deposits "from any but eminently nationalist
influences." 100
The key to Mosconi' s nationalist policy was federaliza-
tion of the nation's oil reserves. While he supported this
measure from the beginning, his advocacy became more
insistent and vociferous with the increasing involvement of
SONJ in Salta and Jujuy. To his superiors in the Executive
branch and to the Chamber Committee on Industries and
98Mosconi, E_l petroleo argentino, 200.
"ibid.
100 Ibid., 201.
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Commerce, he defended federalization on the grounds that
the provinces lacked both the money and the technical facil-
ities necessary to control the industrial and commercial
phases of the oil industry. 101 However impolitic it may
have been, Mosconi told the Chamber Committee that national
and provincial interests were not necessarily coincident in
the northern provinces, and that federalization was essen-
tial to guarantee predominance of the former. 102 He also
argued that petroleum was an important factor in contempor-
ary international relations and, therefore, should be under
the jurisdiction of the national government. Finally, he
added the sugar coating usually offered by advocates of
federalization by pointing out that national control did
not mean that the provinces would be denied participation
in the financial benefits from deposits exploited within
their boundaries. 10 "*
Private exploitation enjoyed conditional support from
Mosconi prior to the Congressional debate on oil legislation
in mid-19 27. It was a question of resources rather than
ideology, for, as Mosconi pointed out, during the Alvear
years Argentina lacked the funds and the technical and
101DipUtados, Comision de Indus trias y Comercio, Anexo
a la orden del dia No. 66, 56, 60; Diario, 1926, III, 612.
102Diputados, Comision de Industrias y Comercio, Anexo
a la orden del dia No. 6_6, 60.
103ibid.
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administrative personnel to operate without foreign
capital. 1 He, therefore, supported private exploitation
so long as it was controlled effectively and speculation
was curbed. As he explained to the Chamber Committee
in August 1926,
The work of private companies is not a
problem; on the contrary, it is beneficial
as long as it is always controlled by the
state. The problem is speculation in
exploration rights .... 10 $
He v/ent on to recommend that a royalty of not less than
10% be placed on private production, the proceeds of which
would fund a mining authority capable of enforcing all
mineral laws and regulations.
By 1925 , Mosconi had added the final element in his
pre-1927 legislative formula, the combination of private
and state capital in mixed companies. In August 1925 , he
recommended this solution for the problems which had arisen
10 7in the northern provinces, and in 1926 before the
Chamber Committee, he presented mixed companies as the
Administrative Commission's considered choice for a general
^-^Mosconi, El^ petroleo argentino , 180.
105Diputados, Com^sion de las Industrias y Comercio,
Anexo a la orden del dia No . 66 , 52.
106 ibid.
107Diputados, Diario, 1926, III, 612-613.
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answer to the question of who should exploit the nation's
oil deposits. 108
Citing the Anglo-Persian combine as a prototype,
Mosconi recommended organizations in which the State would
supply 51% of the capital and hold veto power over all
decisions affecting general petroleum policy. All techni-
cal and administrative decisions would be left to represen-
tatives of the private investors. In view of the many en-
emies of state exploitation and the lack of public con-
fidence under which YPF labored, Mosconi thought mixed
companies presented the best alternative:
State exploitation and private exploitation
are two divergent systems: mixed exploitation
combines all forces, conciliates all inter-
ests, and coordinates all factors, thus assur-
ing the achievement of maximum efficiency. 109
Particularly noteworthy in Mosconi' s testimony is the
absence of any suggested limitations on the sources of
private capital to be included in mixed companies. Appar-
ently foreign capital was as welcome as domestic.
Mosconi' s voice, for all its influence, was only one
among many in a growing national debate over petroleum
policy. The nagging absence of oil legislation, YPF's
growth under the General's aggressive leadership, and
108Diputados
,
Corrosion de las Indus trias y Comercio,
Anexo a la orden del dia No. 66, 54-55.
109 Ibid., 55.
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events in the northern provinces all stimulated a widening
public discussion in which capable spokesmen emerged on all
sides
.
The Buenos Aires press reflected the mounting sense of
urgency over petroleum affairs with its unanimous demand
for petroleum legislation. 110 More significant still was
the agreement among major dailies on the advisability of
federalization. By July 1927 when Congress began debating
an oil law, La Nacion stood alone in its contention that
federalization violated the Constitution. 111 La Prensa
,
though a latecomer among supporters of federalization,
accurately summarized the press's arguments in its favor:
At the present juncture, oil arouses the
greed of the imperialist countries. It
is a serious error, therefore, to with-
hold control over it from the national
authorities. The same concern for public
welfare which places with the National
Congress the power to regulate domestic
and foreign trade, and the same powerful
motive of general security which gives
Congress exclusive control over national
defense, dictate the necessity of re-
forming petroleum legislation.
La Accion , November 3, 1923, p. 16, March 14, 1925
p. 14, March 15, 1926, p. 8, February 10, 1927, p. 1; La
Epoca
,
May 23, 1925, p. 1, February 15, 1927, p. 1; La
Nacidn , June 5, 1923, p. 4, August .12, 1926, Sect. 1, p. 6;
La Prensa , October 21, 1923, p. 5, September 17, 1926,
p. 9, July 22, 1927, p. 9; La Vanguardia , November 10, 1925,
p. 1.
11:LLa Nacion , July 23, 1927, p. 6, July 27, 1927, p. 6.
112La Prensa, July 22, 1927, p. 9. See also La Epoca ,
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The language of the petroleum nationalists had invaded the
editorial columns of one of the Capital's leading conser-
vative spokesmen.
On the question of exploitation rights, a note of
unanimity, albeit a negative one, again appeared in the
Capital's press. No major newspaper advocated turning ex-
ploitation over exclusively either to the State or to
private investors. All favored some combination of the two
sectors. La Prensa opted for the existing system of con-
current and separate state and private exploitation, but
with regulations liberal enough to attract the large-scale
investors that La Prensa considered necessary to translate
the nation's oil wealth from possibility into reality. 113
La Razon and La Accion backed the creation of mixed
companies as a means for attracting the necessary capital. 11
As La Accion explained, the State was without sufficient
funds, and
May 24, 1927, p. 27, October 29, 1926, p. 1; La Vanguardia
January 6, 1925, p. 1; La Razon , December 3, 1922, printed
in RRIAA, Riddle to Hughes, December 28, 1922, 835.6363/195,
enclosure 3. Less than a year before the editorial comment
cited above appeared, La Prensa was arguing against the
constitutionality of federalization. (September 28, 1926,
p. 10, September 30, 1926, p. 10.) No explanation was
offered for the turnabout, but the timing suggests events
in Salta and Jujuy may have been influential.
x La Prensa , October 21, 1923, p. 5, September 17,
1926, p. 9.
114La Razon , December 3, 1922, printed in RRIAA ,
Riddle to Hughes, December 28, 1922, 835.6363/195,
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m this business with its brilliant and
secure future, limited earnings are
preferable to no earnings at all. 115
La Vanguardia, the Socialist paper, continued its support
for Nicola's Repetto's 1914 bill which called for state and
private exploitation, and speculated on the possibility of
limiting private oil investment to domestic capital. 116
La Epoca
,
the Yrigoyenist paper, merits special
attention on the matter of exploitation rights. In various
editorials, it set forth what it claimed to have been the
oil policy of Yrigoyen's government and offered this as
the proper guideline for the future. Thus La Epoca wrote:
At the heart [of President Yrigoyen's oil
policy] lay the firm intention to reserve
for the State the exploitation of a natural
wealth whose alienation would not only be
economically unwise but also dangerous to
the international tranquility of the
Republic. 117
Displaying a truly nationalist spirit,
enclosure 3; La Accion , June 7, 1924, p. 16. La Accion 's
suggestion applied specifically to petroleum deposits yet
to be discovered and not to the existing federal reserves.
La Razo'n did not specify where mixed companies would
operate.
115La Accio'n , June 7, 1924, p. 16.
ll6La Vanguardia , May 1, 1923, p. 37; August 22, 1923,
p. 2.
La Epoca , October 21, 1923, p. 1.
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Dr. Yrigoyen felt that the country
should carry forward [oil] exploita-
tion by using only its own efforts and
resources, totally rejecting the partic-ipation of foreign capital which was
offered without limit for this task. 118
The nation's sources of wealth must be
developed by the nation itself, with
the resources it has available [and]
with all foreign activity excluded,.... 119
Depending upon how the words "state" , "country" , and
"nation" are interpreted, La Epoca appeared to be supporting
either exclusive state exploitation, or at least the limita-
tion of private investment to nationals.
This interpretation is contradicted, however, by
another statement which appeared in April 19 25;
the resources necessary for taking
advantage of the wealth contained in
the oil deposits must be found inside
or outside of the country , but foreign
firms cannot be allowed to intervene
in the administration of petroleum
development. 12 0
While a literal interpretation of La Epoca 's comments
produces only contradictions, it is fair to conclude that
the Yrigoyenist press favored a strongly nationalistic oil
policy, the most aggressively nationalist of all newspapers
in fact. Still, prior to July 19 27, La Epoca ' s comments
118Ibid
.
, December 14, 1924, p. 1.
119 Ibid.
,
January 8, 1926, p. 1.
12Qlbid.
,
April 5, 1925, p. 1. The underlining is
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fell short of a forthright demand for a full-dress state
monopoly over petroleum development.
La Epoca ' s attempt to pass off its editorials as
accurate descriptions of Yrigoyen's petroleum policy repre-
sented nothing more than "court history". As we have seen,
Yrigoyen»s policy was informed by a nationalist sentiment,
and he was concerned about trust activity. Nonetheless, he
did not reject but welcomed private investment both foreign
and domestic.
Events in Salta and Jujuy did not escape the purview
of the Capital's press. La Epoca devoted the most ink to
developments in the North, featuring increasingly strident
demands for corrective action against SONJ's onslaught.
Typical was the following selection from a January 1927
editorial:
The intervention of the federal authorities
is essential and urgently needed when,
through misunderstanding or ciminal activity,
oil deposits might be surrendered to the
greed and voracity of private companies
whose activities are the source of a conflict
of incalculable gravity, one destined to
compromise the very sovereignty of the
Nation. 121
Less than two weeks later, La Epoca lamented that it was
already too late for action, that the provincial govern-
mine.
121Ibid.
,
January 27, 1927, p. 1.
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raents had handed out their oil wealth to private firms, and
that "Argentina will not exploit its oil deposits except
through others and for others." 122 Conditions in the
North as they were portrayed by oil nationalists were
ideally suited for La Epoca 's drive to grab for the
Yrigoyenist Radicals the mantle of chief protector of the
nation's oil deposits.
Private oil investors and their supporters entertained
a somewhat different view of oil matters than the Buenos
Aires press. Hopes that Alvear's administration would
provide an acceptable legal framework for private operations
were soon dissipated, and while Congress delayed legisla-
tion, advocates of the private sector were reduced to
grumbling about how private exploitation was being
stymied. 123 The government's tough line on the granting
of exploration permits prompted one source to suggest that
the national authorities were sacrificing the national
oil industry in their effort to stimulate the public
122Ibid
. ,
February 15, 1927, p. 1.
123
"E1 gobierno nacional debe fomentar, estimular y
proteger la accion particular," Petr^leos y_ Minas , No. 2 8
(August 15, 1923), 7-9; "Una orden ministerial y sus conse-
cuencias," El Petroleo Argentine No. 11 (September 10,
1923), 4; Buenos"
~
~A.ires Herald , January 11, 1923, printed in
RRIAA, Riddle to Hugnes, January 16, 1923, 835.6363/198, en-
closure, November 28, 1923, printed in RRIAA , Gibson to
Hughes, November 28, 1923, 835.6363/ 263, enclosure; Buenos
Aires Standard , September 21, 1923, printed m RRIAA
,
Robertson to Hughes, September 25, 1923, 835.6363/250,
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sector. 124 as we have seen, the bills sent to Congress by
the President in September 1923 drew only increased pro-
test from private interests. In fact, by late 1923 reports
were circulating that forcast the imminent withdrawal of
major foreign companies. 125 They proved to be no more
than rumors, however, as most foreign companies adopted
a "wait and see" attitude. 126
Faced with a growing nationalist campaign for the
protection of Argentina's oil resources, private interests
and particularly foreign investors felt called upon to I
justify the existence of the private sector of the oil
industry. Their case in its most complete form was laid
before the Chamber of Deputies in July 1927 in a memorial
from seven firms organized as a "special section" of the
Union Industrial Argentina. 127 Making adroit use of
statistics, the memorial purported to show that despite
considerable capital outlays by both the state and private
enclosure.
124,, La industria petrolera argentina," El Petroleo
Argentino , No. 10 (August 25, 1923), 2-6.
125n Una orden ministerial," El Petroleo Argentino , 4;
RRIAA, Robertson to Hughes, October 11, 1923, 835.6363/256,
Riddle to Hughes, December 3, 1923, 835.6363/265.
12
6
Ibid
.
, Gibson to Hughes, September 9, 1924,
835.63637276.
127Diputados, Diario, 1927, II, 220-237.
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sectors, national production of petroleum products was
falling increasingly behind national consumption. 128
Despite being faced with a widening
-fuel gap", their
brief continued, Argentines were being misled by an exceed-
ingly optimistic picture of the nation's oil wealth for
which there was no basis in fact. Comodoro Rivadavia
was the single oil field of proven commercial capacity,
and even there YPF was not obtaining results commensurate
with its investment. The conclusion, asserted the memorial,
was self-evident:
for the government as well as for the
country in general, it is desirable to
increase exploration and to maintain
private industry as the indispensable
partner of the State in this phase of
the latter* s activity. 129
12 8The memorial listed 37 companies as having been
organized to exploit Argentine oil as of January 1, 1927,
28 of them having made capital investments totalling
120,313,265 pesos. It asserted that 24 of the companies
had already folded with capital losses totalling 26,850,000
pesos. Of the remaining 13, the five major investors were:
Standard Oil Cia., S.A. Arg. 22,729,000 pesos
(SONJ)
As,tra, Cia. Arg. de Pet. S.A. 15,500,000
Cia. Comercial e Industrial de 13,500,000 "
Pet.
Diadema Argentina, S.A. 13,200,000 "
(Royal Dutch Shell)
Cia. Ferrocarrilera de Pet. 11,000,000 "
Ibid
. , 221-222.
129 Ibid., 234.
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This could be done, it was suggested, by radically altering
the situation created by the 1924 decrees so as to permit
exploration under the kind of technical,
legal, and political conditions which
are essential for the development of
this work. 130
Such conditions along with a law allowing private firms to
compete on an equal footing with YPF were what private
investors were seeking.
The terms of exploitation grants were of particular
importance to oil investors. They were anxious to avoid
excessive duties, taxes, and royalties which would deprive
them of profits. The journal Petroleos y_ Minas referred to
such burdens on private investment as "stones thrown at our
131
own roof. 1' The oil companies' memorial to the Chamber
warned that legislation imposing restrictive conditions on
private investors would, in practice, produce a state
132
monopoly since private interests would withdraw.
*
Recognizing the need for some control over private exploi-
tation, the memorial offered the following advice,
the restrictions or controls which the
State might impose on private industry
to protect the community's interests
can and should be established easily,
while taking into account at the same
time that protection, that guarantee
130 Ibid.
131Petroleos y Minas , No. 19 (November 15, 1922), 18.
132Diputados, Diario, 1927, II, 234.
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for capital investments, and thatpromotion of the industry which weare requesting. 133
In truth, of course, it was no facile undertaking to find a
compromise between the protection for national interests
demanded by nationalists and the liberal operating con-
ditions requested by investors.
The pleas of private investors ran counter to the
spreading nationalist sentiment regarding oil, but the
private sector was not without influential Argentine advo-
cates. Chief among them was Matias G. Sanchez Sorondo,
prominent lawyer, National Deputy (B.A. Prov.
, Conservative
Party, 1918-1926), and University Professor of Mining Law.
Speaking with undeniable expertise, Sanchez Sorondo
commented on oil legislation before a meeting sponsored by
the Instituto Popular de Conferencias in November 1923. 134
133Ibid
. , 236.
Matias G. Sanchez Sorondo, Politica del petroleg;
La legislacion (Buenos Aires^ Agencia General de Libreria,
1923). The discussion of Sanchez Sorondo's ideas is based
upon this pamphlet, and only direct quotes will be cited.
For those who shared his belief about the need to stimu-
late private exploitation, see Guillermo Hileman, Sobre
legislacion del petroleo en la republica argentina (Buenos
Aires: Imp^enta T, La Aurora 11", 1927) ; Eduardo Bidau,
"Legislacion sobre petroleo," La Nacion
, November 9, 1926,
p. 6;
7
0. M. Figueroa, "La explotacion de petro'leo," La
Nacion
,
March 26, 1923, p. 4. Hileman was an engineer and
geologist who had worked in the oil fields in California
and Comodoro Rivadavia and served, as Director of Mines in
Mendoza Province. Bidau, like Sanchez Sorondo, was a lawyer
and University Professor who specialized in mining law.
Figueroa, when he wrote his article, was employed by the
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He, like private investors themselves, emphasized that
prophesies about Argentina's fabulous oil wealth were not
based upon knowledge of proven reserves, and that money
rather than myths was necessary for oil exploitation. The
extensive and expensive work inherent in the industry made
large companies as essential in the oil as in the railroad
business. Argentines, he warned, had to abandon their
preconception of large companies as enemies:
To speak against the large companies
that explore for oil is, in my opinion,
to demonstrate ignorance of the de-
mands of the industry, or, if you
prefer, to propose killing the
goose that lays the golden eggs;....-*- 35
Sanchez Sorondo advocated an "open doors" policy, wel-
coming all the so-called "trusts'* as long as they came open-
ly under their own names and competed fairly under Argentine
laws. The objective of Argentina's new oil law, he maintain
ed, should be to lure private capital by granting the
legal security and... the prospect of
capital returns insofar as they result
exclusively from the investor's own
efforts. 13S
The security of investors' rights against arbitrary altera-
tion by new laws or executive decrees was of such overriding
Anglo-Persian syndicate.
135Sanchez Sorondo, Politica del p_etroleo, 15.
136 Ibid., 18.
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importance to him that Sanchez Sorondo felt it should be
protected through a contractual agreement. The new oil
law, he suggested, might empower the national authorities
to arrange contracts with private investors and provide a
general outline for the agreements. The specific details
would vary with the geographic and geological conditions of
each grant. Contracts would thus provide flexibility
as well as security. 137
Sanchez Sorondo' s position was, naturally, an open
invitation to criticism from oil nationalists. Anticipating
their attack, he lashed out at the "xenophobic" argument as
unworthy of a civilized and advanced people and vehemently
denied giving away anything. As he succinctly put it,
What would we be giving away? A hope.
What would we be receiving? A mag-
nificant reality. 138
Well might Sanchez Sorondo have been wary of criticism
from the nationalists, for their message to Argentines was
exactly the opposite of his own. Where he predicted that
dire consequences would flow from the exclusion or exces-
sive regulation of large companies, oil nationalists saw
the same course as being the only way to guarantee that
137Sanchez Sorondo presented a bill to the Chamber
drafted along these lines, Diputados, Diario, 1925, II,
546-564.
138Sanchez Sorondo, Politica del petroleo , 32.
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Argentina's oil would benefit Argentines. By 1927, the
nationalists' ranks included not only Mosconi and a large
segment of the Capital's press, but also such notables as
Ricardo Oneto, the long-time oil propagandist; Dr. Eduardo
A. Ramos, Professor of Law and Social Sciences at the
National University in La Plata; Luis Colombo, President of
the Union Industrial Argentina; and General Alonso Baldrich,
Chief of the Army Engineering Corps. 139 Baldrich 's Army
career paralleled Mosconi 's in many respects. A graduate
of the National Military College and the holder of a degree
in Civil Engineering from the University of Buenos Aires,
Baldrich too had experience in Germany and had served as
Chief Administrator in the Comodoro Rivadavia fields of YPF
from April 1923 until January 1924. 140 He would assume an
increasingly vociferous role in petroleum matters. In
addition, organizations like the Federacion Universitaria
de Buenos Aires 141 and the Alianza Continental enlisted
•"^Oneto, El centinela , 165-201; Eduardo A. ^ Ramos , El
petroleo en la republica argeqtina ; Su legislacion (Buenos
Aires: Valerio Abeledo-Libreria Juridica, 1927) ; Luis
Colombo, El petroleo argentino y_ la necesidad de su legis-
lacion (Buenos Aires: Talleres GraTicos Caracciolo y
Plantie', 1927); Alonso Baldrich, El petr6le,o ; Su importancia
comercial , industrial y_ militar ; Legislacion petrolera
(Buenos Aires: Imprenta "El Misionero", M.d.).
140
"General Alonso Baldrich," Estrategia , No. 4
(November-December, 1969), 135-136; Baldrich, El petroleo , 5.
141La Vanguardia , February 5, 1927, pp. 1-2; La Epoca ,
June 20, 1927, p. 2; Diputados, Diario, 1927, I, 709.
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their services in the nationalist cause. 142
The nationalist argument, whether it came from the
newspapers, from General Mosconi, or from one of the men
or organizations cited above, was shot through with the
rhetoric of anti-imperialism and tended to change little in
form or content from article to book to speech. The
standard approach was to emphasize domestic oil as the key
to industrial growth and military defense and to suggest
that this invaluable resource was threatened by the greed
of the "great world oil trusts." North American interests
represented by SONJ and British interests under the guise
of Royal Dutch Shell and Anglo-Persian, it was alleged,
were locked in a death struggle for control of the world's
oil reserves. The financial power of these concerns, their
frequently corrupt methods, and especially the fact that
they enjoyed the support of their home governments made
them a constant threat to the domestic peace and even the
sovereignty of host nations. To buttress claims about the
potentially disturbing effect of the trusts, nationalists
142La Epoca , June 26, 1927, p. 4; La Vanguardia , July
27, 1927, p. 4; Mosconi, El petroleo argentino , 235. The
Alianza Continental was founded in May 192 7 to fight foreign
imperialism in general and U.S. "Dollar Diplomacy" in par-
ticular. Its leaders hoped to foster a continent-wide
sense of unity among Latin American peoples in order to pro-
tect the area from foreign powers who would attempt to
deprive Latin America of its natural riches. "Alianza
Continental: A los pueblos de sur y centro america, mexico
y las antillas," Revista Juridica y_ de Ciencias Sociales
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often attributed the outbreak of the Mexican Revolution to
competition between British and North American oil inter-
ests.
The following introduction which General Baldrich used
for an address before the Centro Naval on February 2, 1927
outlined the essential points of the nationalists' case,
Because of its significance for the industrial
progress of the country, because of its in-
creasing importance for national defense, be-
cause of the lessons which other nations offer
us through their improvidence or apathy, com-
promising their economic and financial future
and reducing or losing their sovereignty, be-
cause of all this... I will concern myself
[with petroleum] , convinced as I am of the
immense importance for us... of this magical
source of national wealth that foreign
interests seek, covet and menace. 143
Predictably, events in Salta and Jujuy served to
intensify both the anxieties and the rhetoric of the
nationalists, and to maize SONJ more and more the focal
point of their attacks. This again is Baldrich from his
February 2, 1927 speech:
Through the North, gentlemen, the Spanish
invasion under Pezuela attempted to enter
in order to smother our new born political
independence! Through the North, Argen-
tines, Standard Oil has taken the first
(RJCS ) , ano XLIV (Nov. 1926-May 1927), 43-50; Arturo
Orzabal Quintana, "Nuestro nacionalismo continental," RJCS,
ano XLIV (Aov. 1926-May 1927) , 51-53; "La Alianza con-
tinental," RJCS, ano XLIV (May 1927), 84-91.
143Baldrich, El petroleo , 8.
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step in an invasion designed to smother
our economic independence without which
political independence is a fiction. 1 * 4
The first step in preventing "trustification" of
Argentina's oil by foreign firms, claimed the nationalists,
was federalization of the nation's deposits. Occasionally
proponents of federalization engaged the opposition on con-
stitutional grounds and argued the legal nuances of the
matter. 145 More often, however, nationalists branded the
constitutional attack on federalization as sophistry and
insisted that the urgency of the situation and the magnitude
of the threat were sufficient justification for the measure.
Pleading "general interest" as the proper criteria for
deciding the issue, Baldrich stated,
The Constitution is a life giving
instrument, not a cross upon which
the Republic remains nailed while
its riches are withdrawn from it in
the name of an inapplicable Code.... 146
Agreement also existed among nationalists on the
proper role for private capital in the domestic petroleum
industry. Not surprisingly, they followed Mosconi's lead
144 Ibid., 21.
145Ramos, El petroleo en la republica argentina ,
272-275.
146Baldrich, El petroleo , 30.
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and recommended the creation of mixed companies. 147 Among
the men cited above, only Ramos would have excluded foreign
capital from these firms. 148 The others were united in
their support for a bill placed before the Chamber in 1926
by the Committee on Industries and Commerce which would not
have excluded foreign investment from mixed companies. It
is also worth noting that the Committee's bill called for
federalization and state control over the transportation of
domestically produced petroleum and petroleum by-products,
but it did not provide for either the expropriation of
existing private holdings or the cessation of grants to
private investors. 14 ^*****
Care must be taken not to distort the importance of
the petroleum issue in the period prior to mid-1927,
Argentina was by no means a major world producer of oil,
and oil legislation was not an issue in the Congressional
elections of 1924 or 1926. 150 Even as late as March 1926,
1470neto, El centinela , 201; Colombo, El petroleo
argentino, 15; Ramos, El petroleo en _Ja repi?blica
argentina" , 224-225; Baldnch, El petroleo , 22.
148Ramos, El petroleo en la rr.publica argentina ,
218-221.
149For a copy of the bill, see Diputados, Sesiones
ordinarias
,
1926.;, Orden del dia num. 66_ (Buenos Aires:
Imprenta de la Camara de Diputados, 1926).
150Only the Socialists and the anti-Yrigoyenist
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La Accion complained that Argentines did not attach suf-
ficient importance to the oil problem, and noted that an
urgent need existed to arouse public opinion so pressure
might be exerted upon Congress for study of the matter. 151
Nevertheless, the preceding survey indicates that
pressure for the passage of petroleum legislation was
building, and that by mid- 1927 it was more intense than
it had ever been. Equally important was the explosive
potential of this issue as the anti-imperialist rhetoric
of the nationalists promised to push the debate into the
realm of ideology. Congress, in whose hands lay the
crucial legislative decision, was facing a problem that
daily was growing more complex and volatile.
Radicals published programs for the 1926 Congressional
elections, and both documents were silent on the question
of petroleum legislation. La Vanguardia , January 31, 1926,
p. 1; La Accion , February 2, 1926, p. 5.
151La Accion, March 22, 19 26, p. 6.
CHAPTER V
ALVEAR II: THE GREAT PETROLEUM DEBATE
Prior to mid-1927, as we have seen, Alvear's adminis-
tration witnessed vigorous action on several fronts of the
domestic petroleum scene, including the attack on permit
speculation directed by Le Breton, the brilliant accomplish-
ments of YPF under Mosconi, the increased crude oil produc-
tion of private companies, and the steadily developing
nationalist campaign demanding strict government supervision
of the nation's oil wealth. Yet these activities unfolded
under legal conditions so ill-defined as to deny all
parties, public and private alike, any security for their
interests and investments. Few denied the need to reform
or supersede the 1886 Mining Code insofar as petroleum was
concerned, but year after year the opportunities passed
without definitive Congressional action. Not until
September 1927, almost twenty years after the Comodoro
Rivadavia discovery, was an oil bill approved by even one
chamber rf the national legislature.
Congress's apparent unwillingness to satisfy the con-
sensus demand for petroleum legislation should not be
attributed to ignorance of, or apathy toward, this problem
193
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in particular. During the Alvear years, Argentina's
national legislators ignored virtually all their law-making
duties whilt turning Congress into a forum for the political
battles which followed the Radical Party's schism. Within
less than two years of Alvear' s inauguration in October
1922, the split which had threatened to disrupt Radical
ranks during Yrigoyen's term was formalized. On the one
side were the "personalistas" , named for their continued
devotion to Yrigoyen's leadership, and on the other side
were the " antipersonalistas" whose name manifested their
opposition to the alleged personal domination of the UCR by
the aging caudillo. The antipersonalistas adopted President
Alvear as their titular head, but the thrust of their move-
ment was clearly more anti-Yrigoyen than pro-Alvear.
Throughout Alvear 's administration, both groups
trained their political sights on the 1928 presidential
election. The antipersonalistas, led by Vicente Gallo
(Interior) and Tomas Le Breton (Agriculture) from their
Cabinet posts and Leopoldo Melo (Entre Rios) from his
Senate seat, were committed above all else to preventing
Yrigoyen's return to the Casa Rosada. Meanwhile, at his
modest lodgings in Calle Brasil, Yrigoyen resurrected his
incomparable talents for political organization and began
piecing together the coalition he hoped would return himself
and the "cause" to the pinnacle of Argentine political
power.
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In Congress, the UCR split all but paralyzed the
nation's legislative machinery because no one party or
coalition was able to establish a consistent majority. 1 a
right-of-center coalition of Conservatives and antipersonal-
istas dominated the Senate, unthreatened from any quarter
during the Alvear years. In the Chamber, the personalistas
were the most numerous group, but in a partisan fight they
could not muster a winning majority. And while the anti-
personalistas, the Conservatives, and the Socialists shared
an anti-Yrigoyen bias, this common bent was not sufficient
adhesive for errecting an alliance capable of consistently
dominating Chamber activities.
Effectively stymied as a legislating body, the Chamber
spent hours, days, and even months wrangling over essentially
political questions such as the intervention of provincial
governments and the admissibility of the credentials of
newly elected Deputies. The number of laws passed during
the Alvear years indicates the extent to which political
conditions undercut the Lower House's ability to fulfill its
law-making function. In 1924, nine laws were passed. 2 In
1925, ten measures received Congressional approval, including
1A valuable portrayal of politicking in Congress is
provided by the Socialist Deputy (1924-1928) Joaquin Coca
in his E_l contubernio : Memorias de un diputado obrero
(Buenos Aires: Claridad, 1930).
Senadores, Diario, 1924, I, xlv.
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two for constructing monuments, one closing business enter-
prises at 8:00 P.M.
, one declaring a holiday, and one
appropriating funds for the Executive Committee of the Third
National Congress of Medicine. 3 The passage of sixty laws
in 1926 indicated that matters were improving, but in 1927
Congress reverted to form and produced merely seventeen new
laws. 4
While Congress delayed its decision on petroleum legis-
lation, a sense of forward movement was maintained through
a series of Chamber requests to the Executive branch for
information on petroleum-related matters, through petroleum
bills presented by various Deputies, and through the
studies, hearings, and trips undertaken by the Chamber Com-
mittee on Industries and Commerce prior to its drafting of
an oil bill. Between January 1923 and September 1926, the
Chamber requested from President Alvear and his subordinates
data on the state petroleum agency prior to October 1922 and
on the results of Mosconi's investigations subsequent to his
takeover of YPF,^ on the financing of the La Plata
3Ibid.
,
1925, II, xliii.
4 Ibid.
,
1926, II, liii-liv; 1927, lvii. By comparison,
the 1920 legislative period yielded 115 laws, and that of
1928 produced 136 laws. Ibid . , 1920, II, xxxvi-xxxvii
;
1928, liii.
5Diputados, Diario
,
1922, V, 596-599, 612; VI, 128-
129; VII, 175-176, 441, 598? 1923, VI, 187-189, 322-323,
472; VII, 393.
197
refinery, 6 on the activities of foreign-owned oil
companies operating in Argentina, 7 and on the correspondence
which passea between Mosconi and the Governors of Salta and
Jujuy concerning oil matters in those Provinces. 8 This
process of accumulating information was a poor substitute
for the passage of necessary legislation, but it did serve
to remind the legislators periodically of the petroleum
problem and to keep them abreast of the most recent develop-
ments in oil circles.
As for new oil bills, the administration's 1923 measures
were joined by major proposals from two Conservative Party
Deputies representing Buenos Aires Province, Rodolfo Moreno
Jr. and Matias G. Sanchez Sorondo. Moreno, a 44-year-old
lawyer-University Professor, submitted a bill to the Chamber
on June 1, 1923 which dealt exclusively with state exploita-
tion. ^ in defense of the limited scope of his proposal,
Moreno suggested that while a comprehensive oil statute
would require extensive study and debate, the question of
state exploitation could be settled quickly because there
6 Ibid.
,
1925, IV, 320; V, 862-865.
7Ibid
. ,
1926, II, 753-756; III 575-579.
Slbid
. ,
1926, V, 298-300; VI, 199, 213-236, 654,
704-739.
9 Ibid.
,
1923, II, 232-281. These pages include a long
introductory statement from Moreno which is valuable for the
summary it provides of state exploitation prior to 1923.
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existed general agreement in all quarters on what should be
done. Emphasizing the need to learn from past failures in
the state industry, Moreno urged passage of a law which
would lead to "an orderly administration, free from
political interference, and endowed with ample powers, full
responsibility and effective controls." 10 Such a law, he
contended, would lend a permanence and stability to state
exploitation which could not be obtained while YPF's legal
footing consisted of Executive Decrees and articles in the
annual budget law.
There was nothing innovative about the bill itself.
Its passage simply would have provided a statutory basis
for what already existed in fact - YPF and state petroleum
exploitation. The provisions of the bill would have
produced no major changes in the structure or operations of
YPF as it was then functioning. Nonetheless, only after
four years and considerable Committee alteration would
Moreno's bill come before the Chamber for discussion. 1 ^"
Sanchez Sorondo's bill, introduced on September 6,
1923, represented an attempt to gain Congressional approval
for his well-known "open doors" policy toward private
10 Ibid. , 234.
^In 1925 when the time limit on Moreno's bill expired
and Congress had not discussed it, Moreno reintroduced it.
Ibid.
,
1925, I, 83.
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investment in Argentina's oil industry. 12 The salient
, ,
part of the bill proposed the addition of a section to the
Mining Code specifically designed to govern oil exploration
and exploitation. The new section featured, among other
things, extremely liberal oil grants in terms of size and
duration, and contractual arrangements to protect the
rights of concessionaires. The inclusion of stiff penalties
for the failure to work exploration lots, requirements for
royalty payments on crude oil production, and the assertion
of government control over both the transfer of oil rights
and the exportation of oil provided evidence that Sanchez
Sorondo was not ignoring the nation's stake in its oil
reserves. Still, the bill bore the unmistakable impress of
his conviction that substantial private investment was man-
datory if Argentina's oil industry was to fulfill its
alleged potential.
From 1923 to 1927, the Chamber's most active group in
oil matters was the Committee on Industries and Commerce
whose members labored diligently to draft a bill for con-
sideration on the floor. During the 1923 sessions, the
12Ib:d
. ,
1923, V, 492-495. Sanchez Sorondo, like
Moreno, found it necessary to reintroduce his bill in
1925. Ibid
. ,
1925, II, 546-549.
13For a summary of the Committee's work during
these years, see Ibid . , 1926, IV, 736-737.
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Committee studied Moreno's proposal and despatched it to
the floor only to have it ignored by the Deputies.
14 The
following year in July, the Committee renewed its delibera-
tions, hearing testimony from the Ministers of Agriculture,
Public Works, and Navy, and journeying to Comodoro Rivadavia
and Plaza Huincul on fact-finding missions. On September
9, 1925, the Committee members completed their task by
forwarding a bill to the Chamber which was placed on the
agenda as Order of the Day 95, 1925 (OD 95, 1925)
.
15
Moreno's 1923 proposal scarcely was discernible in the
bill which constituted the Committee's majority report.
16
The attempt to provide YPF and state exploitation
with a
legislative basis which had been Moreno's sole objective now
14 Ibid ., 1923, V, 680.
15Ibid., 1925, IV, 188. For a copy of the
bill, see
Diputado^7~Comisi6n de Industrias y Comercio, Anexo a
la
orden del dxa No . 66 , 13-22.
16The majority report was signed by the Committee's
Federal, Partido Socialists) is cited « ££
l 9
K Radical) submitted a minority report.
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became the starting point for a more extensive measure.
Among the appended sections were a set of regulations to
govern oil concessions, and articles calling for both the
federalization of all deposits of oil and gaseous hydro-
carbons and a government monopoly over the transportation
of oil and oil by-products. The proposed regulations for
private oil concessions were particularly restrictive, even
more so than those in Alvear's 1923 bill which had drawn
such strong criticism from private oil investors. 18 Also
sure to draw fire from private interests was Article 31 of
the Committee's bill which empowered YPF to oversee private
exploration. Had the Committee conceived of YPF as a govern
ment agency created solely to supply the government's oil
needs, this provision might have been acceptable, but it
was not justifiable when YPF was projected as a publicly-
financed competitor of private oil firms.
The Committee's two Yrigoyenist Deputies, Bias Goni and
Jose Luis Alvarez, submitted a minority report to the
''The transportation monopoly was to be exercised
directly by the government in the Comodoro Rivadavia region
In other oil districts, it was to be exercised directly by
the government or through contracts with private firms.
Ibid.
, 20.
18Under the proposed regulations, exploration conces-
sions were to be made through public auction. All bidding
companies had to be domiciled in the Federal Capital, prove
their capacity to undertake petroleum exploration, and
deposit 5,000 pesos in the National Bank as a quarantee
that they would carry out their obligations. Grants were
to consist of 500 hectares for three years providing work
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Chamber, offering a series of substitute articles for the
sections of the majority's bill which dealt with federali-
zation, the regulation of private concessions, and the
transportation monopoly. 19 If the designated provisions of
the majority's bill had been eliminated and the substitute
articles adopted, the result would have been essentially
Moreno's 1923 bill, a proposal to legalize state exploita-
tion under YPF and empower national and provincial authori-
ties to create oil reserves.
The dissent of Goni and Alvarez
,
particularly from the
provision on federalization, is somewhat surprising in
light of their party's strong support for federalization at
was begun within the first year. In the event oil was dis-
covered, the concessionaire was entitled to exploitation
rights over 250 hectares for a non-renewable term of 50
years. The remaining 250 hectares were to become part of
the government 1 s oil reserves . Exploitation concessionaires
were obliged to pay taxes of 20 pesos per hectare
annually, 10% of all crude oil production, and 50% of all
profits in excess of 20% of their invested capital • The
provinces were to share in these revenues if the oil
deposits were located in their territorial jurisdictions.
Exploitation activity could not be interrupted for more
than six months at any one time, and no one person or
company would hold more than five exploration and/or
exploitation grants at one time. Finally, companies were
prohibited from associating for commercial purposes, and
the transfer of private oil rights was prohibited without
the approval of the Executive Power. ( Ibid . , 17-20.)
Ibid. , 21-22.
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the time and its increasingly strident, nationalistic oil
policy. While their action suggests a lack of party disci-
pline on the oil issue in 1925, they later justified their
dissent on the grounds that changes in the Mining Code were
the province of the Committee on General Legislation rather
than the Committee on Industries and Commerce. 20
Again the Chamber ignored the Committee's work, partly
because it was ignoring most of its legislative duties, and
partly because the bill was submitted late during the 1925
sessions. When Congress also proved unresponsive to the
President's request that petroleum legislation be considered
during the 1925-1926 Extraordinary Sessions, 21 OD 95 (1925)
appeared slated for the legislative oblivion shared by all
previous oil bills. That it would not become Argentina's
long anticipated oil law, however, was decided by petroleum
developments in the Northern Provinces rather than by
Congressional apathy.
When the Committee met in 1926, the members decided
that events in the North warranted their study before they
20Diputados, Diario
, 1927, II, 525 (Alvarez), III,
185 (Goni)
.
21Ibid
. ,
1925, IV, 12,
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sent another oil bill to the floor. 22 Late in July, they
began collecting statistical data, hearing expert testi-
mony, and eliciting written reports from government
agencies and private oil firms, and in mid-September, some
of the members traveled to Salta and Jujuy to observe con-
ditions firsthand and interview provincial authorities and
representatives of Standard Oil. 23
Chief among the experts heard by the Committee was
General Mosconi. On August 6, he offered his analysis of
the nation's oil situation as well as his recommendations
for oil legislation. 24 Emphasizing the necessity for an
oil law to facilitate YPF's work in particular and to
provide guidelines for the oil industry in general, Mosconi
pointed to Salta and Jujuy as the primary trouble spots.
He presented his version of developments in those provinces
since 1924 and warned the Committee that SONJ was fashion-
ing a monopoly there which threatened to remove the North's
"^ Ibid
. ,
1926, IV, 736. The Committee's membership
had changed somewhat. Romero Day, Lloveras and Alvarez
were replaced by Julio C. Raffo de la Reta (Mendoza,
Partido Liberal) , a conservative, Jorge Calle (Menodza,
UCR Lencinista) and Clorindo Mendieta (Santa Fe, UCR
Unificada) , both antipersonalistas , and Juan Garralda
(B.A. Prov. , UCR) , a personalista. As a result, the Com-
mittee's political balance stood at two Conservatives, two
antipersonalistas, two personalistas , and one Socialist.
23For reports on the journey to Salta and^ Jujuy, see
La Prensa, September 15, 1926, p. 18; La Nacion, September
T5, 1926, p. 7.
24Diputados, Comision de Industrias y Comercio, Anexo
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oil deposits from Argentine control. His specific recom-
mendations included federalization of all oil deposits,
exploitation through mixed companies based on the Anglo-
Persian model, continued private exploitation under strict
government control, and assessment of a royalty on private
oil production as a means of financing a national agency
responsible for enforcing mineral laws.
Four privately owned oil firms responded to the Com-
mittee^ invitation to submit written critiques of OD 95
(1925). 25 All four advised against including the struc-
turing of YPF and the regulation of private exploitation
in the same bill, and all criticized specific articles of
the bill such as that which empowered YPF to control
private exploration. However, the oil companies' primary
concern was the set of regulations proposed for governing
private operations. Unanimously, they predicted that the
bill's provisions were so restrictive that passage would
chase all private investors from the oil industry, effective
ly creating a state oil monopoly. Standard Oil's brief
a la orden del dia no . 66
,
49-60.
IbjL—• ' 29-46. The four responding companies were
SONJ (29-34) , Astira (34-42) , the Compania Industrial y
Comercial de Petroleo (42-45) , and the Compania Diadema
Argentina (45-46) . Astra and the Compania Industrial y
Comercial de Petroleo were among the nation's leading
private producers in 1926, while Diadema was a Royal Dutch
affiliate with interests in the Comodoro Rivadavia region
which had just begun yielding crude oil in 1925.
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summarized their preferences in this matter:
It is necessary to protect the explorer
,
to give him time so he may study the
geography and geology of th3 lands he
intends to explore, so he may transport
his equipment and construct extremely
expensive roads through completely un-
explored forest and mountain regions, so
he may position exploratory wells with
some probability of success, and, finally,
once petroleum is discovered, it is abso-
lutely essential to grant the explorer
irrevocable rights over an area sufficient
to provide a return on the capital invested, 26
Only on the question of federalization did any significant
difference emerge in the four statements, with SONJ alone
objecting to it as unconstitutional. While on the surface
it might seem surprising that the other three failed even
to mention federalization, it should be pointed out that
Standard alone held provincial interests (Salta and Jujuy)
which would have been affected by federalization. The other
three were operating in regions already within the juris-
diction of the national government.
On September 21, 1926, the Committee forwarded the
results of its studies to the Chamber, its despatch becoming
Order of the Day 66, 1926 (OD 66, 1926)
.
27 The bill which
26Ibid
.
, 33.
27Diputados, Diario , 1926, VI, 9. For a copy of the
Committee's despatch, see Ibid . , 1927, III, 211-217. The
bill which represented the Committee's majority report
carried the signatures of the two antipersonalista and the
two Conservative members of the group. Castellanos, the
Socialist member, registered his dissent from the provisio
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constituted the Committee's majority report varied signifi-
cantly from OD 95 (1925), clearly displaying the impress of
recommendations and information gathered by the Committee.
Apparently accepting the advice of the private firms to
make state and private oil exploitation the subjects of
separate bills, the Committee excluded from OD 66 (1926)
any regulations for private concessions. Instead, it
proposed in its bill a series of temporary taxes on private
concessions which were to continue in force until passage
of a law regulating private activity. 28 The protestations
of the private concerns were accomodated also on the ques-
tion of YPF's control over private exploration. This latter
duty was not among YPF's obligations according to OD 66,
(1926) .
The other major alteration of the Committee's 1925
position was embodied in Art. 30 of OD 66 (1926) which em-
powered the national Executive to create mixed petroleum
companies. Undoubtedly influenced by Mosconi's testimony,
the Committee recommended firms in which the government
would hold 51% of the stock, and appoint the President and
one-third of the Board of Directors. The remainder of the
stock and the Board positions were to be left to private
of the bill which would have empowered YPF to make use of
credit operations. The two personalista members submitted
a minority report which will be discussed below.
28While staying in Cordoba on his return from a trip
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investors, but the government representatives were to hold
veto power over decisions involving changes in the company's
statutes, the sale or leasing of oil deposits, the exporting
of the firm's products, and the "paramount interests of
the State."
In all other matters, OD 66 (1926) was nearly a copy
of OD 95 (1925)
. Small changes in wording and detail left
essentially unaltered the sections on YPF's structure and
functions, federalization, the creation of federal oil
reserves, and the state monopoly over the land transport of
oil and oil by-products.
Similarly unchanged in 192 6 was the dissenting opinion
of the Committee's two Yrigoyenist Deputies, now Bias Goni
and Juan Garralda. 29 As in 1925, their proposed revisions
would have stripped the majority report of all but those
matters covered in Moreno's 1923 bill. Goni would later
explain, as he did in connection with OD 95 (1925) , that
matters like federalization which involved changes in the
Mining Code were beyond the jurisdiction of the Committee
to the Northern oil districts, the Chairman of the Committee,
Julio C. Raffo de la Reta, made it plain in newspaper inter-
views that the ^Committee favored continued private exploita-
tion. La Nacion, September 15, 1926, p. 7; La Prensa,
September 15, 1926, p. 18.
29Diputados, Diario, 1927, III, 216-217.
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on Industries and Commerce. 30 Still, it is difficult to
understand why a personalista Deputy would have cited a
procedural technicality to justify dissent from federaliza-
tion when it was receiving strong support from his party
in 1926, and when it would become nothing less than the
touchstone of party loyalty in less than a year.
Two other explanations are v/orth considering. On the
one hand, as suggested before, it may have resulted from
a lack of party discipline on this issue. With no petroleum
debate apparently in the offing, personalista ranks may not
have been sufficiently closed on the question of federali-
zation to prevent the seeming inconsistency in Goni's and
Garralda's dissent. On the other hand, the personalistas
may have decided by mid-19 26 to make a major political
issue of federalization. In that case, they may have been
seeking a separate bill covering only federalization since
that would have afforded them the maximum opportunity to
showcase the issue and their policy.
30 Ibid
. ,
1927, III, 326. Technically, Goni appears to
have been correct. Petroleum bills which proposed specific
changes in the Mining Code, such as those of President
Alvear and Sanchez Sorondo, were sent to the Committee on
General Legislation. Those like Moreno's which were
essentially administrative measures were directed to the
Committee on Industries and Commerce, At best, though, the
distinction was hazy and unsatisfactory, for Moreno's bill
on YPF and state exploitation involved a basic alteration in
the 1886 Mining Code since that code prohibited state
mineral exploitation.
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some indication that the latter strategy may have
prevailed in personalista councils came on September 1,
1926 when personalista Deputy Diego Luis Molinari, a member
of Yrigoyen's inner circle of party leaders, reproduced a
bill originally submitted to the Chamber in 1918 by the
V
Committee on Legislation. 31 As presented, the bill would
have authorized state mineral exploitation, federalized all
deposits of oil, iron ore and coal, and prevented retro-
active application of the law to concessions of the three
minerals made prior to September 1, 1926. In short, all
details were avoided in a bill which emphasized the two
principles basic to the oil nationalists' case, federaliza-
tion and state exploitation.
Two weeks later, the brilliant young Socialist Deputy,
Antonio de Tomaso, followed Molinari* s lead by reproducing
the same bill with one important change. He omitted the
article which would have blocked retroactive enforcement of
the measure. De Tomaso, who was a member of the Committee
of Legislation in 1918 and who had acted as the Committee's
spokesman for the bill on the Chamber floor, did not
31Ibid
. ,
1926, IV, 805-806. Molinari changed one date
in the 1913 bill to make it current in 1926. Otherwise,
he left it unaltered. See Chapter II, 65-70, for the
Chamber's discussion of the bill in 1918.
32lbid.
, 1926, V, 616.
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specify why he now wanted to change the proposal.
Both bills went to the Committee on General Legislation
which wasted no time in its deliberations. On September
28
,
it despatched its report to the floor where it became
Order of the Day 77, 1926 (OD 77, 1926). 33 The bill which
was signed by the Committee's majority contained but a
single article. It called for the federalization of oil,
iron ore and coal deposits and authorized their exploita-
tion through state agencies. Since both these principles
were included in the Committee on Industries and Commerce's
bill, OD 77 presented an alternative to OD 66 only insofar
as its approach to oil legislation was concerned.
Congress ended its regular sessions on September 30
without discussing an oil law, and the legislators again
ignored a presidential request to consider one in the
Extraordinary Sessions which opened on December 2. 34
3 3 Ibid.
, 1926, VI, 326. For a copy of the Committee's
report, see Ibid
. ,
1927, II, 489-501. The bill which con-
stituted the Committee's majority report carried the signa-
tures of the Socialist Enrique Dickmann (Capital Federal)
and two personalistas , Eduardo F. Giuffa and Guillermo R.
Fonrouge who were both members of the UCR representing the
Federal Capital. Conservative Deputy Jose Heriberto
Martinez (Cordoba, Partido Demo'crata) submitted a minority
report which differed from the majority's in that his bill
included an extensive set of regulations for governing
private oil concessions.
34Alvear did not include oil legislation among the
tasks originally selected for treatment during the Extra-
ordinary Sessions, but he later added it in a note sent to
Congress on January 25, 1927. Ibid . , 1927, I, 23.
2Nonetheless, during the months prior to the opening of
Congress's 1927 meetings, there were more positive indica-
tions that ever that an oil debate was imminent. First,
the Chamber's committees had completed their labors and
presented their definitive proposals. Second, in October
1926, a group of Deputies and Senators who anticipated a
major petroleum discussion in the Chamber undertook a
fact-finding trip to Comodoro Rivadavia where they were
shepherded about the state and private installations by
General Mosconi himself. 35 The following February, Presi-
dent Alvear made a similar journey accompanied by Mosconi
and a retinue of high administration officials. 36 Few
would contend such jaunts could have yielded anything be-
yond superficial impressions of conditions in Comodoro
Rivadavia, particularly when the President spent about six
hours ashore and most of those socializing. Yet they were
evidence of the quickening concern about petroleum matters
Third, neither the events in Salta and Jujuy nor the
mounting public pressure for passage of oil legislation
35La Nacion , October 8, 1926, p. 7, October 16, 1926,
p. l f October 17, 1926, p. 7; La Prensa , October 12, 1926,
p, 9, October 17, 1926, p. 7,
36La Nacion
,
February 8, 1927, p. 7, February 11, 1927
p. 7, February 12, 1927, p. 7, February 13, 1927, p. 7,
February 15, 1927, p. 7; La Prensa , February 10, 1927, p. 2
February 14, 1927, p. 17, February 15, 1927, p. 14,
February 16, 1927, p. 13, February 17, 1927, p. 13.
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could have been ignored much longer. Unless the Congress
contemplated an open declaration of its bankruptcy as a
representative institution responsive to the needs and
wishes of its constituents, an oil debate was almost a
necessity. And finally, the weight of public demands for
Congressional action was magnified by the rapidly approach
ing national elections scheduled for April 1928.
As the Chamber organized for its 1927 sessions, it
was still without a majority party. Yrigoyen's faithful
filled 59 of the Lower House's 158 seats, with 29 in the
hands of antipersonalistas
, and 4 4 occupied by Conserva-
tives. The Socialist deputation fell victim to a party
schism in 1927. Early in July, eleven Independent Social-
ists, the splinter group led by de Tomaso, requested and
received recognition in the Chamber as a separate party.
The parent organization led by Repetto and now referred to
as the Orthodox Socialist Party was left with just eight
seats.
3
7 Thus, in a strictly partisan struggle, no party
3
^The figures presented here total 151 rather than
158 because the 1927 Chamber rejected the credentials of
four men elected in the 1926 Congressional contests, and
three other seats were vacant.
The following scheme of abbreviations will be used in
the text to identify the party affiliation of the Deputies.
The party names listed are those v/hich appeared on the
election ballots. To distinguish between personalistas and
antipersonalistas in the several Radical Party factions, a
w
p
w for personalista or "a" for antipersonalista will
follow the abbreviation cited below. Thus UCRp would indi-
cate a personalista member of the Union Civica Radical,
while UCRBa would indicate an antipersonalista member of
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could bend the will of the Chamber to its own.
On June 24, 1927, Deputy Juan F. Fiorillo (UCRUa, S.
Fe) moved that discussion on a petroleum law begin during
the Chamber's next meeting and continue until a bill was
passed. A brief discussion led instead to the choice of
July 15 as the starting date. 3 8 At this time some incon-
clusive debate arose over whether OD 77 (1926) from the
Committee on General Legislation or OD 66 (1926) from the
Committee on Industries and Commerce would be the basis for
the Chamber's deliberations. When it was argued that OD 66
could not be debated because it had not been despatched
during the 19 27 sessions, Enrique Dickmann (PS, Capt. Fed.)
the Unio'n Civica Radical Bloquista.
Radicals,
Union Civica Radical UCR
Partido Radical
Unificada PRU
UCR Bloquista UCRB
UCR Unificada UCRU
UCR Lencinista UCRL
UCR Antipersonalista UCRA
Conservatives
Partido Con^ervador PC
Partido Democrata PD
Partido Democrata
Progresista PDP
Union Provincial UP
Concentracio'n Civica ConC
Socialists
Partido Socialista
PS Independiente
PS
PSI
Concentracion Popular ConP
Partidos Liberal y
Autonomista PLA
Partido Liberal,
Tucuman PLTuc
Partido Liberal,
Mendoza PLMen
38Diputados, Diario, 1927, II, 68-70.
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reintroduced Moreno's 1923 bill, 39 and the Committee
reacted swiftly, sending OD 66 back to the floor. Now it
became Order of the Day 95, 1927 (OD 95, 1927)
.
40
When the Chamber failed to meet on July 15, debate on
petroleum legislation was delayed until July 20. On that
day discussion about which Committee bill would be debated
began in earnest. Led by Diego Luis Molinari and Eduardo
Giuffra (UCRp, Capt. Fed.), the personalistas pressed for
prior consideration of OD 77 (1926) on the grounds that
the paramount question of federalization would be settled
immediately. With this done, the Chamber could proceed
logically to the technical aspects of organizing the
nation's oil industry. 4 ^
The antipersonalistas and Orthodox Socialists argued
the case for OD 95 (1927). Jorge Calle (UCRa, Mend.) and
Jose Luis Pena (PS, Capt. Fed.) contended that it too
posed the theoretical question of federalization while also
raising important practical problems such as the legal
framework for exploitation. Pena further argued that
39Ibid
. ,
1927, II, 69. No indication was given during
the debate as to why the same objection did not apply to
OD 77 (1926)
.
40 Ibid., 1927, II, 183. For a copy of the Committee's
despatch7~see Ibid . , 1927, III, 211-216. OD 95 (1927) dif-
fered from OD 66 (1926) in that the order of its articles
was revised slightly, but there were no substantive changes.
41Ibid., 1927, II, 515-517, 522-523.
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OD 95 (1927) involved only petroleum while OD 77 (1926)
included iron and coal resources as well. 42
No decision on which bill would be debated was
reached on July 20, and the matter was reopened on July 28.
Suddenly, an unexpected element was added. Taking the
floor shortly after the debate began, Molinari defiantly
announced that the personalista Deputies would abide by
two principles on the question of petroleum:
The first is that petroleum deposits
are the property of the Nation; the
second is that the national govern-
ment will directly exploit its oil
deposits to the exclusion of all other
parties. 43
So closely interrelated were these principles, asserted
the personalista leader, that his party would not vote for
any bill which did not contain both. Should the Chamber
reject either proposition, he promised that the personalis-
tas would absent themselves from the Chamber. 44
Given Molinari* s uncompromising and impassioned
statement of party policy, it is easy to understand why the
personalistas favored OD 77 over OD 95. Discussion of the
shorter bill would have brought the two principles acclaimed
by Molinari immediately to the fore, while federalization
42Ibid.
,
1927, II, 521.
43Ibid
. ,
1927, III, 184.
44 Ibid., 1927, III, 184-185.
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did not appear in OD 95 until Article 27. Jorge R.
Rodriguez (PRUp, S, Fe) spoke shortly after Molinari and
summarized the personalistas ' position by stating,
From the outset, we want each party to
accept the responsibility of facing
squarely the central issue - the federa-
lization of oil and its exclusive exploi-
tation by the State. 45
Many supporters of OD 9 5 were more offended than
daunted by Molinari' s battle cry. Antipersonalista Deputy
Agustin Araya (UCRUa, S. Fe) criticized the dogmatic tone
of Molinari' s remarks and demanded for his party "our
right to be independent and formulate our own opinions, our
right to express ourselves and act with complete freedom,..
..
m46 Nicolas Repetto (PS, Capt. Fed.) likewise counselled
against doctrinaire proclamations while discussing a
question as complicated as petroleum. 47
Persisting in their support of OD 95, the antipersonal-
istas, Conservatives, and Orthodox Socialists were joined
on July 28 by the Independent Socialists. When the vote
was registered on Enrique Dickraann's motion to accord
OD 95 preference, personalista opposition was overcome by a
count of 6 6 to 50. 4 8 The vote indicated the degree to
45Ibid
. ,
1927,
4
6
Ibid
. ,
1927,
47Ibid.
,
1927,
48Ibid., 1927,
III, 205-206.
Ill, 193-195.
Ill, 196-198.
Ill, 207-208.
218
which, even at this early juncture, the debate had become
"politicized", i.e., the degree to which it had become one
in which party affiliation was the dominant consideration
in vote casting. With one exception in each case, every
personalista Deputy voted negatively, and every anti-
personalista, Conservative and Socialist voted affirmative-
ly.
Upset by their defeat, the personalistas immediately
retired from the Chamber, leaving it without a quorum.
Their absence was shortlived, however, and by August 4
the Yrigoyenists were back in their seats in the center of
the Chamber waging the battle for federalization and a
state oil monopoly. Throughout August, Chamber business
was dominated by the general debate on OD 95. 49 Though the
bill encompassed nearly all aspects of the petroleum ques-
tion, discussion centered almost exclusively on federaliza-
tion and monopolization. These two principles were the
crux of the problem, because any action on specifics such
as transportation and royalty payments depended upon who
owned Argentina's oil and who would be permitted to exploit
it.
Federalization proved to be the less controversial of
49The term "general debate" is used to denote the
discussion of a bill which preceded its acceptance or
rejection in principle.
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the two issues. Deputies of every political stripe
favored handing over all petroleum deposits to the federal
government, while opposition was limited to a few Conser-
vatives and antipersonalistas. Constitutional arguments
dominated the floor exchanges over federalization. Advo-
cates sought to prove the federal government's sovereign
right to assume control over petroleum deposits, while
opponents upheld provincial autonomy. Participants on
both sides delved into colonial and early nineteenth-century
Argentine history, resurrecting appropriate witnesses and
legal codes and offering interpretations which buttressed
their cases. Because the speeches were often more con-
spicuous for their length than for their lucidity, Nicolas
Repetto suggested that the Chamber, at times, resembled
"a veritable museum of legal or constitutional paleontol-
h50ogy."
Though the details of this Constitutional squabble
need not detain us, the positions of both sides can be
stated quickly. Those favoring federalization argued that
the national government replaced Spain as the sovereign
entity in Argentina after independence and inherited from
the Spanish crown property rights over all mineral re-
sources. More formidable, however, was their contention
50Diputados, Diario , 1927, III, 621.
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that Congress could do as it pleased with Argentina's
mines because the Constitution of 1853 granted to the
federal government the right to draft a mining code. 51
Opponents countered with the assertion that the Provinces
existed before the Argentine nation and, therefore, had
prior claim to sovereignty over mineral resources within
their boundaries. Since the federal pact of 1853 did not
specifically grant the national government the power to
federalize petroleum deposits, it would be unconstitutional
for Congress to do so. 52 Thus, the case for provincial
autonomy rested on an extremely narrow interpretation of
the Argentine Constitution.
Interspersed among the constitutional briefs were
supplementary arguments mustered by both sides. Protection
of the nation's oil from the ravages of foreign imperial-
ists was the leitmotif of the advocates of federalization.
Socialists, Conservatives, personalistas and antipersonal-
istas alike condemned the activities of the foreign oil
"trusts", particularly those of SONJ, Their case rested on
the two premises already popularized by the oil nationalists
one, that Argentina's oil was essential to the nation's
51Ibid
. ,
1927, III, 283, 313-315, 321, 396-397, 419,
439-455; IV, 321.
52Ibid
., 1927, III, 378-390, 407-409, 594-610, 800,
832-833; IV, 77-79, 323-325.
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economic development and military defense, and two, that
British and North American oil interests were engaged in a
death struggle for control over the world's oil resources,
and small oil possessing nations often became incidental
victims in that commercial war. 53 There was actually a
third premise to the anti-imperialist argument to the
effect that the provinces either could not or would not
resist the machinations of the "trusts". This premise went
unstated. A few Deputies emphasized the anti-imperialist
argument to the exclusion of constitutional considerations.
Enrique I. Caceres (UCRp, S. del Estero) contended that
since national welfare dictated the need for federalization,
the constitutionality of the measure was immaterial. 54
Assuming that their opponents were motivated, at least
in part, by financial considerations, advocates of federal
ownership also stressed that OD 95 (1927) guaranteed a
share of the profits from petroleum exploitation to the
province within which the oil was located. 5 ^ There is
little evidence, however, to indicate that opposition was
dictated by the location of oil deposits. Representatives
from Salta and Jujuy, provinces with known petroleum
5
3
Ibid.
,
1927, III, 378-390, 407-409, 594-610, 800,
832-833; IV, 77-79, 323-325.
54 Ibid
. , 1927, III, 494-497.
55Ibid., 1927, III, 250-252, 340-341; IV, 321-322.
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resources, did oppose the federal takeover, but so did
Deputies from Buenos Aires, Entre Rios, Santa Fe, and
Corrientes where no oil exploitation was in progress. 56
More crucial for the anti-federalization faction was a
sincere concern for maintaining provincial autonomy and a
deeply rooted anxiety over the concentration of national
control and wealth in the federal government and in the
Federal Capital. Francisco V. Martinez (ConP, E. Rios)
summed up this feeling when he implored,
We must not persist in the differential
policy followed to date with regard to
ports, river dredgings, railroads,
tariffs, and even with respect to the im-
migration that comes to us from abroad,
and we must try to defend ourselves and
stop expanding, until it smothers us,
this enormous Argentine capital. 5 ?
While the issue of federalization cut across party
lines, discussion on a state monopoly brought a rapid
closing of ranks. Without exception, the personalistas and
Independent Socialists stood for monopolization, while the
antipersonalistas
,
Conservatives, and Orthodox Socialists
presented a solid front for mixed companies along with
continued private exploitation.
56 Ibid
. ,
1927, III, 421-424 (A. Usandivaras, UP,
Salta) ; IV," 77-79 (M. Ramon Alvarado, UP, Salta) , 41 (F.
Calvetti, UCRp, Jujuy) ; III, 342 (M. Juarez Celmai^, PC,
B.A. Prov.); IV, 203-209 (F. Martinez, ConP, E. Rios); III,
594-610 (A. Araya, UCRUa, S. Fe) , 407-414 (R. Meabe, PLA,
Corr.)
.
57ibid.
, 1927, IV, 209.
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Independent Socialist support for a state monopoly
took the Chamber by surprise. As late as July 28, 1927,
Antonio de Tomaso proclaimed his group's backing for public
and private exploitation and mixed companies. 58 Then on
August 11, Jorge R. Rodriguez (PRUp, S. Fe) notified the
Chamber that he had information indicating the Independent
Socialists would support all points of the personalista
program except the expropriation of private concessions. 59
One week later, on August 18, de Tomaso confirmed
Rodriguez's statement. He explained that the Independent
Socialists hesitated at first to back a state monopoly, but
after discussing the matter in two long party meetings,
they had decided it was best. Their objective, however,
was not the state monopoly itself, but "socialization" of
the petroleum industry. As defined by de Tomaso, "sociali-
zation" involved removing the monopoly from political en-
tanglements by placing it under the control of a board
composed of representatives from all social segments
interested in oil: workers, employers, consumers, etc. By
such means the Independent Socialists hoped to guarantee
58ibid. f 1927, III, 206.
59 Ibid., 1927, III, 667,
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that the result of a state monopoly would be social improve-
ment rather than monetary profit and pure "statism"
.
60
Expropriation of private concessions was rejected by
the Independent Socialists as expensive and impractical.
De Tomaso insisted that a state monopoly over exploitation,
land transportation and oil pipelines, along with tight
export controls were sufficient insurance against mal-
practice by private concerns. 61
Buttressed by Independent Socialist support, the per-
sonalistas fought for monopolization with all the uncom-
promising zeal which had marked the UCR's early years. On
August 3, shortly after the general debate on OD 95 opened,
Eduardo Giuffra introduced a substitute article for Article
1 of the Committee's bill. It was signed by ten personalis-
tas and contained the basic proposals of their party;
federalization, a state monopoly over both the exploitation
and transportation of oil, expropriation of private
holdings, and a prohibition against the exportation of crude
oil or its derivatives." The anti-monopoly coalition
agreed on the need for a transportation monopoly and tight
ow Ibid„, 1927, III, 850-856.
6lIbid
. , 1927, III, 863.
6
2
Ibid.
,
1927, III, 406. After mid-August when the In
dependent Socialists came to the aid of the personalistas
,
expropriation of private holdings was dropped from the
personalista program because the Independent Socialists
export controls. 63 However, they considered these measures
combined with mixed corporations as adequate to protect
national interests in petroleum development. For the
personalistas, transportation and export controls were
subsidiary to the prime safeguard - exclusive state exploi-
tation.
Personalista speeches favoring monopolization were
laden with anti-imperialist rhetoric. Personalista
Deputies had no monopoly on decrying foreign capital, but
no other group matched their virulence. Jorge B. Rodriguez
set the tone with an address on August 11. After citing
Royal Dutch Shell, Anglo-Persian, and SONJ as particularly
undesirable interests, he severely criticized the latter
and its founder, J.D. Rockefeller. SONJ was especially
dangerous, alleged Rodriguez, because its own immense
power was augmented by that of the United States government
To substantiate his remarks and dramatize Argentina's
impending fate, he cited Mexico's unfortunate experience
64
with the "trusts".
The personalistas and Independent Socialists refused
refused to vote for it,
63ibid
. ,
1927, III, 237, 290-294, 629; IV, 203
64 Ibid.
,
1927, III, 670-682.
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to see any efficacy in mixed companies for warding off the
foreign menace. Once private capital was allowed to par-
ticipate in petroleum exploitation, warned A, Gonzalez
Zimmermann (UCRp, S. Fe) , it would demonstrate a "subtle
capacity" for weaking the nation's defenses. 65 He failed
to elaborate on exactly what this process entailed.
Allegations that the state was incapable of adminis-
tering an oil monopoly drew strong rebuttals from the pro-
monopolists. 66 The state railways, the post office, and
the Banco Hipotecario were cited as proof of the state's
administrative ability. 7 J.R. Rodriguez and De Tomaso
pointed to YPF as a model of administrative efficiency, but
6 8
strangely enough, they were to only ones to do so. It is
odd that the personalistas did not take advantage of
perhaps the government's best run agency. Maybe they did
not wish to call attention to one of the outstanding
accomplishments of Alvear's antipersonalista administration.
Another criticism raised against a state monopoly
65Ibid.
,
1927, IV, 185.
66Skepticism about the state's capacity to administer
an industrial enterprise was long standing. It was founded
principally on the notion that petty political considera-
tions would interfere with industrial efficiency. Ibid .
,
1927, IV, 25-26, 42.
67lbid
., 1927, III, 689; IV, 184.
68Ibid., 1927, III, 685, 856-857.
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involved its financing. Where, asked anti-monopoly
Deputies, was the national government to get the funds for
such an operation? Working in Comodoro Rivadavia where
easy transportation was readily available was one thing.
Exploring and exploiting all the oilfields of the Republic
was quite another. 69 The probable expense of a monopoly
prompted Repetto to remark acidly,
It is ridiculous for someone to
come here and speak of a state
oil monopoly in a country that
has to borrow money to errect
public monuments in the plazas
of the large cities. 70
Seemingly unconcerned about such practical questions, the
personalistas completely avoided the issue of financing
their proposal.
Monetary .objections to a state monopoly were related
to the general anti-monopolists' contention that the whole
idea was impractical. Deputy Pascual Herraiz (PLMen. Mend.)
pointed out that no government in the world exercised a
monopoly over oil production, and that the only nation to
attempt it, Russia, had failed. A Enrique Dickmann
69 Ibid.
,
1927, IV, 71-72, 81, 199-200.
70lbid
. ,
1927, III, 627-628.
71 Ibid.
,
1927, IV, 200.
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suggested that the proposal for a monopoly was not only
impractical but improvised. He emphasized the personalis-
tas' failure to support federalization during Yrigoyen's
presidency and claimed that they had displayed no strong
attachment to federalization or a state monopoly since. 72
Deputies Araya and Repetto carried Dickmann's allegations
one step further and strongly intimated that the personali-
stas' policy was politically motivated. Repetto character-
ized their position as "an opportunistic attitude that
tends to conciliate or serve a passing interest rather than
to defend an important public aim." 73
While attacking the principle of monopolization, the
anti-monopoly coalition also stressed the benefits of mixed
companies. Given federalization plus a transportation
monopoly and export controls to protect national interests,
they contended that private capital could make valuable
contributions toward increasing Argentina's petroleum
T A
production. Mixed corporations, in their estimation,
would have permitted the state to benefit from the capital
and technical resources of private oil firms while
72 Ibid.
,
1927, IV, 15-20.
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,
1927, III, 632. For Araya's comments, see
Ibid.
,
1927, III, 600.
74 Ibid.
,
1927, II, 244-245.
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maintaining control over exploitation. 75 Early in the
general debate, the anti-monopolists' cause was boosted
when, on July 29, Minister of Agriculture Emilio Mihura
spoke in the Chamber in favor of OD 95 (1927) and mixed
companies. Although the administration considered the
government capable of operating a monopoly, declared
Mihura, mixed exploitation was preferrable because it would
accomodate both public and private interests. 76 It was
also well known that Mosconi and YPF's Directors favored
mixed companies, and that Mosconi had recommended the
creation of such enterprises to the Committee on Industries
and Commerce. The General's expertise, however, carried no
weight in personalista circles.
As August passed into September, it was evident that
extending the debate would facilitate repetition rather
than enlightenment. On September 1, OD 9 5 (19 27) was
approved in principle, and the Chamber turned to voting on
its specific articles. Parliamentary manipulation now
assumed an important role in deciding the final form of the
oil bill. Jorge Calle, a member of the Committee on
Industries and Commerce, introduced, and the Chamber
approved, a motion to split OD 95 into three separate bills.
75ibid
. ,
1927, IV, 34, 85, 96, 322.
76 Ibid.
,
1927, III, 326-333.
230
Bill number one consisted only of Article 27 on federali-
zation; bill number two included Articles 1-22 on the
structuring of YPF; and bill number three contained the
remainder of the original bill including the provisions on
mixed companies. 77 The motion was supported by all
parties but for differing reasons. From the beginning of
the debate, the personalis tas had urged treating the
questions of federalization and monopolization before
all else. Half this objective was attained when the
first bill dealt solely with federalization. On the
other hand, the antipersonalistas
,
Conservatives, and
Orthodox Socialists hoped that splitting the original
bill would isolate federalization and monopolization in
separate bills. They reasoned that federalization alone
might pass the - Senate, but to couple it with a state oil
monopoly was to ensure its rejection.
After OD 95 (1927) was broken down, the single-
article measure on federalization was immediately approved
in principle and became the center of debate. Quickly,
the personalistas gave notice that they had not abandoned
their plan to sanction federalization and monopolization in
a sigle bill. Deputies Guillermo Fonrouge (UCRp, Capt.
Ibid.
,
1927, IV, 334-336.
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Fed.) and Eduardo Giuffra requested that Giuffra's substi-
tute motion of August 3, calling for a state monopoly over
exploitation and transportation and a prohibition against
exportation, be added to the bill. 78 When anti-monopoly
Deputies protested that the Senate would reject federaliza-
tion if it were combined with a state monopoly, 79 Molinari
issued his party's stock reply,
We must repeat now as yesterday, and as
we will repeat tomorrow, that for us
national ownership of the deposits is
indissolubly linked to their direct ex-
ploitation by the national government.
The sacrifice of the one will mean the
sacrifice of the other. 80
When the Committee on Industries and Commerce refused to
accept any addition to the federalization bill, the person-
alistas simply maintained their proposal as an amendment
to be considered after the bill itself was voted upon.
There was never any doubt about the outcome of the
balloting on federalization, and it passed by an overwhelming
majority, 88 to 17. Deputies from every political sector
voted for the bill, while a combination of Conservatives
81
and antipersonalistas opposed it.
78Ibid.
,
1927, IV, 340.
79 Ibid
. ,
1927, IV, 341, 343-349.
80 Ibid., 1927, IV, 351.
81Ibid., 1927, IV, 362-363.
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Debate then turned to the personalista amendment.
After listening to Jose7 Luis Pena reiterate the anti-
monopolists' objections, the personalistas pressed for a
quick vote. 82 To their dismay
^ ^ opposition forceg
countered by leaving the Chamber and breaking the quorum.
On September 2 and September 7, the antipersonalistas and
Conservatives again prevented a quorum by refusing to
participate. 83
Obstructionist tactics were a last futile effort at
resistance. When the absent members returned to the Chamber
on September 8, the Independent Socialist-personalista
coalition pushed through their amendment to the federaliza-
84tion bill. The balloting on a state monopoly followed
party lines almost exclusively. With one exception, all
65 affirmative votes were cast by personalistas or
Independent Socialists, and all 55 negative ballots came
82 Ibid.
, 1927, IV, 63-67.
83The Orthodox Socialists remained outside the Chamber
on September 2, but they retook their seats on September 1.
04°* Ibid
. ,
1927, IV, 478-503. The additional provisions
were tacked onto Article 1 of the bill, rather than being
made new articles. One new ingredient appeared in these
additions at the behest of de Tomaso. Since private con-
cessions were not to be expropriated, he recommended a
state monopoly over all petroleum pipelines in the Republic
which lay outside the limits of private concessions. De
Tomaso' s proposal was almost an exact reproduction of
Articles 25 and 26 of OD 95 (1927)
.
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from the Conservative-antipersonalista-Orthodox Socialist
85
coalition. The hours and days of debate paled to insigni-
ficance as the partisan vote reflected the seat count of
the contending coalitions rather than the merits of the
issue.
With their basic demands ratified, the final stage of
the personalista-Independent Socialist strategy emerged
with Antonio de Tomaso's motion to drop the three-bill
approach and add any other provision desired by the Chamber
to the bill already approved. The anti-monopolists again
warned against inviting Senate rejection of an omnibus
bill, but they lacked the voting strength to make their
p "7
opposition effective. Once more they vacated their seats,
breaking the quorum. They repeated this action on
September 12, -but it served only to highlight their own
impotence in the face of the votes the personalistas and
Each paragraph of the amendment was voted upon
separately, and only on the question of monopolization does
the Diario record the vote by number and name. The 6 5
affirmative votes came from 53 personalistas, 11 Independent
Socialists, and 1 Conservative. Of the 55 negative votes,
19 were from antipersonalistas , 28 from Conservatives, and
8 from Orthodox Socialists. Ibid
. ,
1927, IV, 478.
86 Ibid
. ,
1927, IV, 506-507.
87 Ibid.
,
1927, IV, 509.
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Independent Socialists commanded.
On September 22 and 28, the personalistas
, directed by
Guillermo Fonrouge, and the Independent Socialists, led by
de Tomaso, fashioned a bill of some twenty-seven articles.
Generally, the procedure was simply to adopt the provisions
of OD 95 (1927) with the alterations made necessary by the
inclusion of a state monopoly in Article l. 88
The single substantial change in OD 95 involved Article
13 which prescribed the destination of profits realized
from state oil exploitation. According to the Committee's
bill, 65% would have gone for expanding the state industry,
and the remainder would have been split up among workers'
benefits, geological exploration, a reserve fund, and the
national treasury. The version approved by the Chamber on
September 28 allocated 60% of the profits for intensifying
state exploitation, and 4 0% for the national treasury.
Both the Orthodox and the Independent Socialists supported
the original article which included workers' profit sharing,
but the personalistas were able to defeat it by the slim
margin of 52 to 50, Deputy Molinari explained that his
party did not feel it was proper for state oil workers to
88For a complete copy of the bill as it was passed by
the Chamber, see Roberto Etchepareborda and Tito Leoni,
eds., Politica emancipadora
, reforma partimonial ; Vol. II,
Petroleo, Vol. XII of Pueblo y_ gobierno , 215-221.
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enjoy benefits not shared by all government employees. 89
Completion of the oil bill on September 2 8 was
followed immediately by the passage of a separate bill on
royalty payments. The personalistas and Independent
Socialists found Article 30 of OD 9 5 (1927) too complicated
and replaced it with a flat levy of 10% on the gross produc-
tion of private concessionaires
.
9 ^
*****
Not since the UCR halted its electoral boycott in 1912
had the party so clearly manifested that intransigence which
was the essence of the Radical spirit. If anyone doubted
that the personalista oil policy was fashioned by Yrigoyen
himself, the uncompromising tenor of personalista conduct
during the debate was unmistakable evidence of the hand of
9
1
the aging master. Demonstrating none of the capacity for
89Diputados, Diario
, 1927, V, 625-630.
90Ibid
. ,
1927, V, 641-646. Article 30 of OD 95 (1927)
outlined a scheme wherein the royalty payments were to vary
with the quality of the petroleum involved and its geo-
graphic location.
9
^Both Frondizi and del Mazo maintain that Yrigoyen
was directly responsible for setting personalista oil
policy in the 19 27 debate. Frondizi notes that divergent
opinions existed within the personalista bloc prior to the
debate, and that Yrigoyen induced uniformity through direct
and precise instructions to his legislators. Frondizi,
Petro'leo y_ politica , 195; Del Mazo, E_l radicalismo , 76.
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compromise which is often necessary to produce effective
legislation, the Yrigoyenist Deputies stood inflexibly
behind their twin principles of federalization and monopoli
zation. As a result, the Chamber sent on to the Senate a
petroleum bill which stood little of no chance of surviving
a guaranteed conservative onslaught.
A search for the why behind the personalistas
'
position in the petroleum debate yields at least three
possible explanations. The first stems from the Radical
Party schism which followed Yrigoyen's presidency. Histori
ans of the Radical movement contend that the party split
liberated the Yrigoyenists from the conservative influence
of the Alvear wing and allowed the development of what
Forndizi has termed "more forthright doctrinal positions...
92
and more distinctly popular Radicals." Gabriel del Mazo
credits the break up with permitting Radicalism to regroup
around Yrigoyen and return to its old banners of "Social
Justice and National Autonomy. As a result of this
reawakening, he argues,
Petroleum became... the chief political
banner of Radicalism. With its oil
policy in the forefront, the Radical
Party moved toward progressively better
92 / /
Frondizi, Petroleo y_ politica , 194-195.
93oel Mazo, El radicalismo
,
63, 77.
defined national and social policies. 94
There is undeniable merit in this interpretation, and
it helps explain the increasingly nationalistic oil policy
of the Yrigoyenist Radicals during Alvear's presidency.
Yet, it falls short as an explanation for personalis ta
conduct in the oil debate, because it fails to account for
the timing of personalis ta support for monopolization. The
party schism was formalized in 1924 and latent a number of
years before that. Why, then, did the Yrigoyen wing wait
until July 1927 to declare its unswerving support for a
state petroleum monopoly?
A second possible explanation for the conduct of the
personalista bloc during the oil debates involves the
conservative complexion of the Senate, and the consequent
likelihood that it would reject a state oil monopoly.
These were hard political facts in 1927, but the personal-
istas may have been contemplating a change in the Senate's
political balance if they could return Yrigoyen to the
Casa Rosada the following year. As President, he would
have been in a position to intervene provincial governments
and thereby break the political stranglehold held over many
9 4 ibid, , 64.
95 In the 1927 Senate, the personalistas held only 4
of the 30 seats. The Orthodox Socialists held 2 seats, the
Conservatives 9, and the antipersonalistas 12. Etchepare-
borda, "Yrigoyen y el Congreso," 64.
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of them by local conservative machines, if enough of the
intervened provinces returned personalista Senators after
being "reorganized", a personalista majority in the Upper
Chamber was not inconceivable.
There is no evidence that Yrigoyen had mapped such a
strategy, but he had a known tendency to view as extra-
legal provincial governments controlled by conservative
groups that had their roots in the pre-1916 era, and he had
not been reticent about intervening such governments during
his first administration. 96 He v/ould intervene only two
provincial administrations after 192 8, but the chaotic
conditions during his second term and its premature demise
nullify it as a test of the hypothesis posed here.
The third and most viable explanation of the person-
alistas 1 oil policy rests on the assumption that they
were looking straight at the 1928 election rather than
beyond it, and that they were using the Chamber as an
^During Yrigoyen's first presidency, 20 provincial
interventions were carried out. Fifteen were the product
of Executive Decrees , while only five resulted from acts of
Congress*t Hector Rodolfo Orlandi and Jorae Rodolfo, La
reparacion institucional
,
Vol. II, La republica federal
(II)
,
Vol. VI of Pueblo £ gobierno , 519. The list of inter
ventions printed in this source actually cites only 19, but
it fails to include the intervention of San Luis Province
(Law 11,172)
.
97 Ibid
.
, 520. Both interventions during Yrigoyen's
second term were the result of Executive Decrees.
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electoral podium during the 1927 oil debate. 98 Nineteen
twenty-seven was an "ano politico" with politicians ready-
ing their forces for the 1928 presidential and congression-
al contests. The presidential election would answer the
question which had given meaning to nearly all political
maneuvering at the national level during Alvear's term.
Would Yrigoyen be returned to the Casa Rosada? Even before
the Chamber petroleum debate opened, the antipersonalistas
had nominated a ticket of Leopoldo Melo and Vicente Gallo
and approved a platform for the election, 99 an(j the
Executive Committee of the Socialist Party had drafted an
election program for submission to their Party Congress. 100
9^The charges of " electioneering" hurled against the
personalis tas during the debate itself have already been
noted. They were repeated by the opposition press, ( La
Nacion, September 5, 1927, p. 4; La Vanguardia , August 11/
12, 1927, p. 1, September 10, 1927, p. 1, September 13,
1927, p. 1, September 30, 1927, p. 1.), by foreign observers,
( RRIAA , Bliss to Kellogg, September 19, 1927, 835.6363/302.),
and by literature wh,ich touched on the debate. Alejandro /
E. Bunge, La economia argentina , 4 Vols. (Buenos Aires: Cia.
Impresora Argentina, 1928-1930), II, 181; Repetto, Mi p_aso
por la politica , de Roc
a
a Yrigoyen , 271-273; Rumbo,
PetrBTeo y_ vasalla je , 56-57.
99 La Accio'n , April 29 , 19 27, p. 2. The party platform
included~a vague reference to the need for petroleum legis-
lation. It stated simply in its last article, "Definitive
petroleum legislation." A more precise statement undoubted-
ly was prevented by disagreement within the party over
such points as federalization.
100La Vanguardia , May 31, 1927, p. 2. In this draft
progranfof 24 points, number 15 called for the federaliza-
tion of oil, coal and iron ore resources.
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The political stakes in 1928 were sufficiently high to
guarantee that any issue raised in the 1927 Congress would
be bent tc the demands of the electoral process. Petroleum
was no exception
.
When the discussion of oil legislation began in the
Lower House, and the personalis tas were forced to move from
an oil policy which featured federalization and nationalist
rhetoric to something more specific, they chose the path
which promised the maximum political advantage. Little
political capital could have been made out of federaliza-
tion because it enjoyed multi-partisan support. By
coupling federalization with a state oil monopoly, however,
the personalistas created a unique and distinguishing
policy which thrust them into the vanguard of the
nationalist movement to protect the nation's oil resources.
Furthermore, by posing as the national oil sentinels, the
personalistas, through implication if not accusation,
could portray their opponents as men willing and eager to
hand over the national patrimony to foreign concerns. And,
finally, a strident nationalist, anti-imperalist stand on
petroleum was the ideal complement for the traditional
Yrigoyenist foreign policy which stressed Argentine
independence and individuality in the world community.
According to Frondizi,
Yrigoyen, displaying good political
sense, understood that a nationalist
241
and popular position on petroleum
would complement his international
policy plank.... 10 !
It was time for producing votes, not oil, and Yrigoyen's
forces were not about to waste an opportunity.
The abrupt fashion in which the personalista faction
shifted to supporting a state oil monopoly was enough to
arouse the suspicion that political opportunism was the
motivating force, and the manner in which the Yrigoyenists
conducted their side of the Chamber debate did nothing to
dispell that impression. They consistently avoided
practical and technical questions while concentrating on
the theoretical and the ideological. The logic of this
strategy was simple and direct. In order to make oil an
effective election issue, the debate had to be staged in a
manner which would expand it beyond the halls of Congress
and involve the electorate. Few voters were likely to
become enthused about a discussion of dry, technical
matters, but they could be reached by nationalist rhetoric
and the specter of foreign imperialist exploitation.
Pricking nationalist sentiments was a powerful instrument
for mobilizing political support.
10 Frondizi, Petr^leo y_ politica , 19 5. Frondizi does
not deny that political opportunism was involved in the
formulation of the personalista oil policy, but he main-
tains that after the election, federalization and
monopolization of Argentina's oil remained central to
Radical doctrine.
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The personalistas did not wait for the election
campaign to publicize the oil issue. Even as the Yrigoyen-
ist Deputies harangued the Chamber in mid-1927, their
cohorts pressed the matter outside Congress. La Epoca
fulfilled its role as the press wing of the movement,
arguing the case for federalization and monopolization as
vehemently as the party's Congressional spokesmen. 102 One
aspect of La Epoca'
s
campaign surpassed the argument pre-
sented by the personalis ta legislators. Not obliged to
observe the decorum appropriate in Congress, La Epoca
openly impugned the motives of the anti-monopoly coalition.
A July 31 editorial denied that mixed companies would
provide protection against the invasion of foreign
capital, characterized that policy as "an enormity", and
suggested
It would be ingenuous to believe that
such an enormity is the result of
sincere convictions. One has a right
to suspect the existence of factors
which are influencing the drafting of
a law openly opposed to the supreme
interests of the Nation,
102For representative examples of La Epoca '
s
offerings,
see July 23, 1927, p. 1, July 25, 1927, p. 1, July 31, 1927,
p, l f August 1, 1927, p. 1, August 11, 1927, p. 1, August 20,
1927, p. 1, September 2, 1927, p. 1, September 17, 1927, p. 1.
103 Ibid.
,
July 31, 1927, p. 1. See also August 11, 1927,
p, 1, September 5, 1926, p. 1, September 17, 1927, p. 1.
The lack of specifics in this type of innuendo did not
mask the effort to identify the personalista oil policy
with patriotism.
An energetic speech-making campaign supplemented La
EP°ca ' s journalistic efforts. The Alianza Continental
shifted its position to accomodate a state oil monopoly
and organized public assemblies to encourage support for
the Yrigoyenist policy. 104 Local precinct committees
sponsored street corner meetings, 105 as did organizations
like the Asociacio'n Nacional de Empleados del Comercio y
de la Industria. 106 The bulk of this type of activity,
however, was conducted under the auspices of the Junta
Nacional Pro Defensa del Petroleo. The Junta was founded
early in August 1927 specifically to propagandize for feder
alization and monopolization, and throughout August its
leaders held outdoor rallies to that end. 107 Leading the
104La Vanguardia
,
July 27, 1927, p. 4. General Baldrich
addressed~~the meeting cited here, but in September the
Minister of War prevented him from addressing an Alianza
gathering on the grounds that the organization was supported
by Russian money. RRIAA , Office of the Naval Attach^ to
Kellog, September 19, 1927, 835.00B/7.
105La Epoca
,
August 12, 1927, p. 3, August 17, 1927,
p. 1.
106
107
Ibid
. ,
August 12, 1927, p. 1.
Ibid., August 5, 1927, p. 1, August 8, 1927, p. 1.
August 10, 1927, p. 1, August 14, 1927, p. 1, August 16,
1927, p. 1, August 19, 1927, p. 1.
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stumping brigade at all these gatherings were the same
personalista Deputies who were directing the Chamber
fight, particularly Leopoldo Bard (UCRp, Capt. Fed.),
Guillermo Fonrouge, Eduardo Giuffra and Diego Luis Molinari.
During the campaign prior to the April 1, 19 28
elections, the personalistas provided more evidence of their
determination to capitalize on their petroleum policy. The
refusal of the personalistas to draft a party platform, the
vague and uninformative manner in which political rallies
were covered in the press, and the paucity of other materials
on the campaign reduce to guesswork the job of estimating
108how heavily Yrigoyen's supporters stressed the oil issue..
Still, it is clear that personalista manifestos and orators
frequently discussed petroleum policy, often framing it in
the anti-imperialist context which had become the hallmark
c , . l_. 109of the party's position.
Post-election comments also indicate that the person-
alistas emphasized the oil issue. La Vanguardia referred
lO^Not only did the personalistas not publish a party
platform, but their convention which formally nominated
Yrigoyen did not meet until one week before the election
itself. By that time, Yrigoyen had halted all personalista
campaigning in the Buenos Aires area because of an outbreak
of violence at a personalista rally. Ibid . , March 18, 1928,
p. 1, March 19, 1928, p, 1.
109 Ibid
. ,
January 15, 1928, p. 1, January 24, 1928, p.
3, February 2, 1928, p. 4, February 23, 1923, p. 12, March
13, 1928, p. 2, March 14, 1928, p. 1, March 19, 1928, p. 8,
March 20, 1929, p. 1, March 25, 1928, p. 12.
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to it as the "battle horse" of the Yrigoyen campaign, U0
while Carlos G. Menica, President of the Junta Central of
the Comite Universitario Radical, interpreted Yrigoyen'
s
victory as
a popular declaration which ratified the
Radical petroleum law, because at every
opportunity party representatives spoke
to the people of the need for a law that
safeguards equally the integrity of the
nation's economy and its sovereignty,.... 111
Personalista use of the petroleum issue to garner
votes in 19 28 is not proof in itself that their policy was
formulated expressly for that purpose. Yet, that con-
clusion is unavoidable when the election campaign is seen
as the culmination of a well planned piece of political
opportunism which had its origins in the 1927 Chamber
debate.
For all their energy and dedication, the personalistas
owed much of their success in the Chamber to the Independent
Socialists. Personalista speeches and writings consistent-
ly ignored the fact, but the eleven Independent Socialist
votes provided the margin of victory for a state petroleum
110La Vanguardia , September 1, 1928, p. 1; see also
January 23, 1930, p. 1.
^^Comite Universitario Radical, Junta Central, El
petroleo argentino (Buenos Aires: Talleres "Capano"
,
1930) , 7-8. Frondizi also cites the petroleum issue as
one o£ the pillars of the personalista campaign. Petroleo
y_ polrtica , 195, 225.
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112monopoly. As we have seen, the policy shift which landed
the Independent Socialists in the pro-monopoly camp was
every bit as abrupt and surprising as that of the personal-
is tas. De Tomaso, in announcing the shift to the Chamber,
did not reveal the nature of the discussions at those two
party meetings where the crucial decision was made, but it
would appear that his group also responded to political
considerations
.
113
The Independent Socialists were a party in need of an
issue. Their separation from the parent organization had
been formalized on the eve of the petroleum debate, and
because the schism resulted from personal rather than
policy differences, the Independent Socialists needed a
policy which would distinguish them from the Orthodox
Socialists. For this purpose, support of a state petroleum
monopoly was ideally suited. An editorial which appeared
in the Independent Socialist publication Critica y_ Accion
shortly after the oil debate closed demonstrated the
direction Independent Socialist propaganda would take.
112gy their own admission, the Independent Socialists
knew that, given personalista solidarity, their votes would
ensure passage of the state oil monopoly provision in the
Chamber. Diputados, Diario, 1927, III, 856; IV, 4 56.
113Several commentaries on the 1927 oil debate have
leveled charges of "electioneering" at the Independent
Socialists. Coca, El contubernio , 92-93; Repetto, Mi paso
por la politica , de Roca a Yrigoyen , 274 ; Rumbo, Petroleo y_
vasallaje
, 57; La Vanguardia , September 20, 1928, p. 1,
July 10, 1928, p. 1.
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Citing "socialization" as the only true socialist position
on the oil question, the editorial labeled Orthodox Social-
ist opposition to it as a violation of Socialist doctrine
and the principles of the Socialist labor movement and
attributed that opposition to nothing more than a personal
hatred for the Independent Socialists. 114 The claim that
they had "outsocialized" the old faction on the petroleum
question would remain a consistent theme of Independent
Socialist political propaganda.
In February 1928, the party's First Annual Congress
drafted a fifteen point electoral platform, and federaliza-
tion of oil deposits and a state monopoly over exploitation
headed the list. 115 When the question of federalization
was being discussed, one delegate suggested that the party
advocate federalizing all mineral deposits. De Tomaso,
while not disagreeing with the principle, questioned the
tactical wisdom of the proposal. As he explained,
The law passed with our support last
September referred only to oil, so if
we were to include federalization of
all mineral resources, we would give
the point an extremely broad and general
scope, and it would not have the immediate
114Critica y_ Accion , October 1, 1927, p. 1. This
editorial was reprinted from La Libertad .
115La Libertad
,
February 9, 1928, p. 2. The Independent
Socialist party was not a national one. Its electoral
efforts were limited to the Deputies contest in the Federal
Capital.
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value we have sought by reducing
it to petroleum deposits alone. 116
In short, why shift the focus away from a politically
marketable policy?
During the campaign, the Independent Socialists con-
centrated on portraying themselves as the legitimate heirs
to the Argentine Socialist tradition, and they frequently
cited their petroleum policy in support of that contention.
Typical of their efforts was an extensive analysis of the
oil issue and of de Tomaso's Chamber discussion of
"socialization" by Roberto J. Noble who concluded,
[de Tomaso properly] interprets not
only the economic doctrine of socialism
in its purest sense, but also the most
vital interests of the nation in which
he labors and whose confidence he has
now won. 11^
La Libertad also ran major articles which emphasized the
threat to Argentina posed by the oil "trusts", the support
for monopolization and "socialization" rendered by the
Independent Socialists, and the ill-advised actions of
H6ibid.
,
January 30, 1928, p. 5.
H7ibid. , March 19, 19 28, p. 6. The problem already
noted of vague newspaper coverage of the campaign also
emerges in the case of La Libertad '
s
accounts of the
Independent Socialist campaign. Nonetheless, there are
frequent references to party orators discussing the oil
issue. See March 11, 1928, pp. 1, 3, March 14, 1928,
pp. 2, 4, March 16, 1928, p. 2, March 19, 1928, p. 6,
March 20, 1928, p. 6, March 21, 1928, p. 6, March 22, 1928,
p. 2, March 23, 1928, p. 2, March 26, 1928, pp. 1, 2,
March 27, 1928, p. 2.
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the "dependent socialists (on senor Nicolas Repetto) in
the Chamber debate. 118
Election day brought an upset victory for the Indepen-
dent Socialists. Outpolling the Orthodox Socialists and
the antipersonalista-Conservative coalition, they finished
second to the personalistas and thereby snared the six
minority-party Deputy seats for the Federal Capital. How
much of their surprising success the Independent Socialists
owed to their petroleum policy is difficult, if not im-
possible to determine. The same is true of trying to
determine whether identifying their petroleum policy with
that of the personalistas produced a significant "coattail"
effect in the wake of the resounding personalista triumph..
But these problems should not conceal the fact that the
Independent Socialist policy was designed with electoral
ends in mind.
Nearly twenty years had elapsed since the Comodoro
Rivadavia discovery before the Chamber Deputies approved a
proposal for a national oil law. However, because the
debate occurred at a time when the clouds of the 1928
political storm were gathering, the debate's results were
not commensurate with the toll exacted on the national
118 Ibid
. ,
February 10, 1928, p. 3, March 8, 1928,
p. 3, March 20, 1928, p. 3.
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petroleum industry by the two decades of delay. The
decision of the personalista Radicals and the Independent
Socialists to turn the petroleum issue into a political
football left Argentina in April 1928 as far from having
viable petroleum legislation as it ever had been.
CHAPTER VI
YRIGOYEN III: AFTERMATH
The euphoria induced in Yrigoyenist circles in April
1928 by the greatest outpouring of popular sentiment in
the nation's political history to that time was soon dis-
sipated. Argentina's voters had elected the dynamic and
tireless founder of the Radical Party, but the man who
entered the Casa Rosada in October 192 8 was an aging and
tired figure. His second term would bring not the culmina-
tion of the w reparacion w but twenty-nine months of im-
passioned and frequently violent political confrontations
followed by crushing defeat on September 6, 1930.
The continuing debate over petroleum legislation which
took place in this political atmosphere was essentially a
heated and noisy anticlimax to the Great Chamber Debate of
1927. Personalista Radicals pressured and propagandized for
a full state oil monopoly, while anti-monopoly forces
attempted to clog the legislative mechanism in the Senate.
Meanwhile, the petroleum nationalists, frustrated by what
they viewed as criminal sabotage in the Upper Chamber, un-
leashed a campaign favoring a state oil monopoly which at
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times exhibited hysterical and even scurrilous overtones.
The first act of the 1928-1930 scenario stemmed from
the magnitude of the personalis ta victory at the polls.
Along with the presidency, Yrigoyen's forces had secured a
controlling majority in the Chamber of Deputies. When
the Lower House convened for its 1928 sessions, personalista
Deputies occupied 87 seats, nearly 20 more than all the
opposition groups combined. 1 Under these circumstances, it
was not surprising that the personalistas resurrected their
proposal to expropriate all privately held petroleum conces-
sions. This measure was part of the original legislative
parcel that the personalistas had tried to push through the
Chamber in 1927, but were forced to discard because the In-
dependent Socialists refused to vote for it. Equipped now
with their own majority, the personalistas could complete
their initial design for a national petroleum law. As
Yrigoyenist Deputy Eduardo Giuffra (Capt. Fed.) commented in
describing expropriation to the Chamber, "it is nothing but
the logical conclusion of the question posed last year...."^
The bill which was intended to eliminate the private
sector of the oil industry was introduced on July 26, 1928
^here were 24 antipersonalistas , 35 Conservatives,
8 Independent Socialists, and 2 Orthodox Socialists. Two
seats were vacant.
2
Diputados, Diario, 1928, IV, 357.
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over the signatures of ten personalis ta Deputies. 3 its
text did not call for the immediate cessation of private
activity. Rather it declared privately-held sources of
petroleum and gaseous hydrocarbons liable to expropriation
and empowered the Executive Branch to procede with the actual
process of taking over according to the relevant laws. Thus,
the bill's phraseology left considerable latitude to the
Executive insofar as the timing of the actions that would
force the various private firms to cease their operations.
Since four of the seven members of the Committee on
General Legislation were personalistas, the Committee's
report to the floor on September 5 recommended passage of
4
the expropriation bill exactly as it had been submitted.
With the bill on the Chamber's agenda, the only obstacle to
passage was a procedural one. Congress's regular sessions
closed at the end of September, and unless preferential
treatment were accorded the expropriation bill, time would
expire before the Chamber could get to it. Bearing this in
mind, opposition Deputies for nearly two weeks after
September 5 broke quorums and employed the tactics of
parliamentary delay to defeat repeated personalista
JIbid ., 1928, II, 575-576.
4Ibid., 1928, III, 694. The three non-personalista
members"oT the Committee did not sign the report, but
neither did they submit a minority report.
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initiatives to gain preferential treatment for the bill.
5
La Epoca's editorial columns blistered the opposition, al-
leging collusion with Standard Oil to defraud Argentina of
her oil and referring to obstructionist maneuvers as crimes
against national interests, 6 Yet the simplest arithmetic
made it obvious that the problem and the solution lay
with the personalistas themselves, for their numbers were
sufficient to ensure a quorum and pass nearly any motion
placed before the Chamber. La Epoca finally acknowledged
this fact, and, in frustration, demanded that the
personalistas assert their numerical superiority:
By themselves they can determine the actions
of the Chamber; by themselves, then, they
should outline their plans and execute
them without hesitation or delay. 7
On September 17, the battle ended when the Yrigoyenist
sector managed to bring the expropriation bill to a debate.
5Ibid. , 1928, III, 802-805; 1928, IV, 30-38, 152-160,
250-256.
6La Epoca , September 11, 1928, p. 1, September 15,
1928, p. 1.
7 Ibid.
,
September 15, 1928, p. 1. This outburst from
La EpocT~suggests that the delay was not intentional on the
p~art of the personalistas. Rather it appears that sickness
travel, overconfidence or other reasons simply prevented
them from getting a sufficient number of their representa-
tives into the Chamber on the same day.
8Diputados, Diario, 1928, IV, 351, 356-398.
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Approval was now only a formality, but the anti-monopoly
coalition of Socialists, Conservatives and antipersonalistas
used the five-hour discussion to place their objections on
record. Expropriation, they argued, was less than an
urgent matter since the Senate had yet to discuss the pe-
troleum bills sanctioned by the Chamber in 1927. And if
those bills became law, they continued, there would be no
need to incur the expense of expropriation, because the
private oil firms would be condemned to a slow death any-
way. Deputies Mariano G. Calvento (UCRA, E.R.) and
Nicola's Repetto even suggested that expropriation would
increase the value of private holdings by guaranteeing
purchase of properties which otherwise were bound to de-
crease in value in the foreseeable future given the legis-
qlation already passed by the Chamber.
Anti-expropriation Deputies also protested the apparent
willingness of the personalistas to deal with an important
and complicated matter in a hurried and casual fashion.
Where was the data necessary to make an intelligent decision
they demanded? How many private concessions would be ex-
propriated? What was the exact procedure to be followed?
How much would it cost, and where would the funds come
from? The absence of such vital information, the opposition
claimed, attested to the simple-minded manner in which the
9 Ibid., 1928, IV, 364, 378.
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question was being approached. Antonio de Tomaso calcula-
ted that expropriation would cost in excess of 500,000,000
pesos and, therefore, would place a crippling financial
burden on the nation. Why not invest those funds in the
existing state oil enterprise and expand production he
suggested? 10 Repetto, in his characteristically sarcastic
way, suggested that the money might be borrowed from
Standard Oil! 11
Personalista arguments favoring expropriation held
nothing new for those familiar with the 1927 petroleum
debates. Argentina's natural resources, its internal peace
and security, and even its political and economic indepen-
dence were seriously menaced by the world's oil trusts,
especially by the machinations of Standard Oil in the
northern provinces. The nation's sole defense lay in an
integrated state oil monopoly. Thus, the legislation
passed by the Chamber in 1927 had to be complemented by the
expropriation of private oil holdings. According to the
personalista Deputies, it was a question of principle, not
of particulars. As for the detailed information demanded
by the opposition, Deputy Giuffra commented that facts and
10 Ibid.
,
1928, IV, 371-376.
1]
-Ibid.
,
1928, IV, 370.
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figures had not posed "a basic question" for his party. 12
On financing expropriation, Gilberto Zavala (UCRp, S.L.)
informed the Chamber that the personalistas did not
consider expropriation to be a business matter:
•
It is another concept, another principle,
another objective that is being pursued
with this law, and that objective has never
been subject to delay, even by the fear
that we might not have sufficient funds
to restore to state ownership all the
concessions and oil works under the
control of private interests.... [Money]
would be a matter for the judges and for
court decisions. ... 13
The voting was a prefunctory exercise with 79 person-
alistas holding sway against 17 non-personalistas •
^
With the return of the personalistas to Government
House on October 12, 1928, the expropriation measure took on
added significance. Coupled with the oil bills approved by
the 1927 Chamber, it provided a clear indication of the
general economic policy the personalistas intended to pursue
12 Ibid. , 1928, IV, 358.
l3Ibid. , 1928, IV, 389.
14Ibid. , 1928, IV, 390. The figures recorded here
representTthe results of the "general" or preliminary vote
on the bill. The vote count on the specific articles was
not recorded. The bill approved by the Chamber varied from,
that which originally had been introduced and subsequently
reported out of Committee in that additions were made to
clarify the fact that expropriation referred to exploration
as well as exploitation concessions, and to the physical
plant of private concessionaires as well as to the oil
deposits themselves. Ibid ., 1928, IV, 394-396.
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during Yrigoyen's second administration. The tendency was
to reject the 19th century liberal economic notion of the
"referee state" in favor of increased government inter-
vention in national economic development. Diego Luis
Molinari, speaking before an Alianza Continental rally on
July 30, 1928, highlighted this tendency when he discussed
the ideological significance of his party's petroleum
policy:
At the bottom of this question lies the
mundane debate over whether it is the
interests of the State or the individual
that must dominate in the economic regula-
tion of the properties which constitute
the collective patrimony. We are inclined
toward the State, and we believe that the
State must control these important
resources.
. .
.
15
La Epoca indicated the same philosophical bent in an
editorial on August 23, 1928:
Obviously, if the government intends to
govern with intelligence and firmness,
it should first direct its thoughts
toward consolidating the country's eco-
nomic organization. ^
It was now time, contended La Epoca
, to abandon the
haphazard pattern of past economic growth and institute
government planning and controls. In the case of petroleum,
15La Epoca
,
July 30, 1928, p. 2.
16 Ibid.
,
August 23, 1928, p. 1.
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a precise policy for implementing the personalis ta economic
philosophy already had been outlined
With respect to the industrial phase of the petroleum
question during Yrigoyen's second term, the President's
first and perhaps most important decision was to retain
Mosconi as YPF's Director General. Although the "petroleum
General's" accomplishments since 1922 seemed to obviate any
doubts about his retention, his refusal to embrace the
personalista version of a state oil minopoly must have
aroused some second thoughts. His reappointment, there-
fore, stands as testimony to his achievements and to his
prestigious position as the undisputed leader of Argentina's
oil nationalists.
Measured statistically, YPF's 1929-1930 performance
fell far short of the spectacular advances recorded between
1923 and 1928. Crude oil production, for instance, only
rose slightly from 860,604 m3 in 1928 to 872,171 m3 in 1929,
and then declined to 828,013 m3 in 1930. Other quantifi-
able facets of the state enterprise displayed a similar
penchant for expanding slowly or stabalizing during 1929 and
19 30. The outstanding exception involved YPF's sales of
17BIP, December 1936, 18, 29, 34. Though the bulk of
state cFude oil production continued to come from
Comodoro
Rivadavia, declining productivity in the central flelds
there sent the percentage below 90 (87.1) for the
first
time in 19 30.
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gasoline which shot up from 100,050,105 liters in 1928 to
189,916,327 liters in 1930. 18 In spite of the slower
growth rate, however, YPF continued to be a profitable
undertaking, as can be seen from the expansion of its
*
capital base from 166,291,826 pesos m/n in 1928 to
228,403,788 pesos m/n in 1930. 19
Internal factors such as the limited capacity of state
refining facilities, the neglect of exploratory activity,
and the declining productivity of the central field in
Comodoro Rivadavia must have had a negative effect on YPF's
growth rate, but the fact that the production curve for the
private sector of the industry mirrored that of YPF suggests
that the generally unstable conditions during Yrigoyen's
second administration, combined with the developing world
economic crisis were at least partially responsible for
YPF's 1929-1930 record* 20
xl5YPF, Desarrollo de la industria , 391. The reasons
for this expansion are discussed below.
19Ibid , f 230.
20Private crude oil production rose from 581,459 m in
1928 to 620,895 m3 in 1929, and then fell off to 603,094 m3
in 1930. While their production curve resembled that of YPF
the private companies were slowly rncreasing their share of
total national crude oil production. Their percentage,
which stood at 40.3 in 1928, inched up to 41.6 in 1929 and
42.1 in 19 30. As with YPF, private production continued to
be concentrated in the Comodoro Rivadavia region (79.0% in
1929, 74.3% in 1930), and as in the past, it was primarily
the work of only a few of the active private companies;
Astra, Cia. Ferrocarrilera de Petroleo, Cia. Industrial y
Comercial de Petro'leo, and Standard Oil of New Jersey.
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While the nation remained dependent upon foreign fuel
sources, 21 YPF provided tangible benefits for Argentina's
consumers by first forcing a reduction in the retail price
for gasoline and other petroleum products, and then estab-
lishing prices which were uniform throughout the country.
Prior to 1929, Argentina's liquid fuels market was controlled
by the nation's largest importer, the West India Oil Company,
2 2a Standard Oil affiliate. Prices for petroleum derivatives
tended to fluctuate rapidly in any given area, and to in-
crease in direct proportion to the linear distance from
centers of production and distribution. 23 As long as YPF
BIP
, December 1936, 19-28, 30-33, 35.
2
^-The continued reliance on foreign fuel suppliers can
be gauged from the following statistics; for every ton of
fuel oil sold by YPF during 1929-19 30, nearly 2 were import-
ed, for each liter of gasoline sold, 2.5 were imported, and
for each liter of YPF kerosene consumed, about 3.75 were
imported. In addition , coal imports remained in excess of
3 million tons a year. Importacion de combustibles ^
lubricantes . ( BIP Reprint), 12, 15, 30; YPF, Desarrollo de
la industria , 391
.
22Mosconi, El petro'leo argentino , 171.
23Between January 1923 and December 1926, the price of
gasoline in the Federal Capital oscillated between 24 and 29
centavos per liter , never stabilizing at any level for more
than five months at a time. (YPF, YPF, 1907 - 1937 (Buenos
Aires: YPF, 1937), 54.) And in July 1929, YPF gasoline wau
selling at eleven different prices ranging from 20 to 34
centavos per. liter in various areas of the nation., YPF,
Desarrollo de la industria , 395; Mosconi, El petrolco
argentino , 2Tl.
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supplied only a small segment of the internal market, its
prices conformed to those set by the private distributors
and retailers.
The foundation of YPF's 1929 move to take control of
the domestic market was laid four years before with the
construction of the large refining complex in La Plata.
State production and sale of petroleum products virtually
mushroomed after 1925. In the case of gasoline, YPF sales
between 1924 and 1929 expanded from 3,690,050 to 126,660,134
liters, with the latter figure amounting to slightly over
15% of all domestic gasoline sales in 1929. 24 It was at
this point that YPF's directors began to consider marketing
their own products and lowering retail prices. 2 ^
With the intent of avoiding a price war, government
representatives contacted private importers and producers
of gasoline with a plan to gradually lower prices and re-
place imported with domestically-produced gasoline. The
private firms were offered a 3 centavos per liter price
reduction along with an arrangement whereby the importation
of gasoline was to be scaled down in accordance with in-
creasing national production. Given agreement on these
conditions, the government spokesmen were prepared to
24ypF / Desarrollo de la industria , 391.
25Mosconi, FA petroleo argentino , 153.
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promise that the process of import substitution would be a
gradual one. If the private companies hesitated, it was
suggested to them that YPF would rush the construction of
another refinery and process crude oil supplied by sources
independent of the international trusts until such time as
domestic production reached the necessary level. In this
case, it was pointed out, the private interests would lose
control of the Argentine market more rapidly.
^
When the attempt to reach an accord with the private
companies failed, YPF took the dramatic step. On May 1,
1929, the state firm took charge of its own sales activity,
and three months later, YPF announced a 2 centavos per liter
price cut for gasoline, effective nationwide. On November
11, a similar reduction was declared, and during January
1930 regional price lowerings were implemented in the
Province of Salta and in the area around Mar del Plata.
Finally, on February 17, 1930, YPF standardized the price of
state-produced gasoline at 20 centavos per liter everywhere
in the country. At each step along the way, private re-
tailers reluctantly lowered their prices to the levels
established by YPF. Official sources estimated that the
combined state and private reductions in the price of
gasoline saved the nation's consumers 52,000,000 pesos m/n
26lbid., 153-154. Mosconi's account is the only one I
have seen of these negotiations.
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during the first year, 27
YPF's assertion of control over the domestic market
was hailed widely, especially by the oil nationalists. La
Epoca echoed the common sentiment when it praised the
price reductions for liberating Argentina from "foreign
economic tutelage" in an area vital to national develop-
ment.^° The only sour note was sounded by La Prensa which
labeled the price reductions a propaganda trick employed by
those who had damaged the national oil industry by dis-
couraging privately-financed exploitation. 2 ^ Mosconi viewed
YPF's success in setting market prices as the capstone of
his career with the state oil agency. Referring to the
August 1, 1929 price reduction, he wrote in 1936,
This constitutes the termination of an
intense eight-year campaign which has
produced substantial moral and material
benefits for the country. . . . 30
27 Ibid
. ,
154-155; YPF, Desarrollo de la industria ,
393-395. The above account has concentrated upon gasoline
because, in terms of YPF's competition with private import-
ers and producers, gasoline was the most significant single
item. However, gasoline price reductions on other by-
products were also forced by YPF, and on February 17, 1930,
uniform prices were established for kerosene (19 centavos
per liter)
,
airplane fuel (26 centavos per liter) , and
agricol, a tractor fuel (16 centavos per liter).
28La Epoca , November 13, 1929, p. 1. See also La
Epoca , December 6, 1929, p. 1, March 2, 1930, p. 4; La
Argentina
,
February 18, 1930, p. 1, April 25, 1930, p. 1.
29La Prensa , December 7, 1929, p. 16.
30Mosconi, El petroleo argentino , 161.
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One of the most interesting questions raised by YPF's
drive to control the internal market involves why the
private interests allowed it to happen. In 1929, YPF was
selling only slightly over 15 out of every 100 liters of
gasoline consumed by Argentines. Just 18 months before
the August 1, 1929 price reduction, the chief administrator
at the La Plata distillery, Enrique Canepa, had stated that
while YPF's production costs would have permitted a reduc-
tion in the price of gasoline, "our limited production
capacity in relation to market demand would obviously make
the attempt to reduce it ineffective." 33- These conditions
evidently convinced the private sector that YPF could not
lower prices, and led the private producers and importers
to frustrate the negotiations on marketing gasoline sought
by the government.
When YPF did take the initiative and cut prices, the
private firms were in a sense trapped with at least three
factors militating against their starting a price war.
First, the oil nationalists' campaign had the private
companies on the defensive, and any action on their part
which could have been construed as exploitation of Argentine
consumers would have been impolitic. Secondly, and more
tangibly, YPF was supplying a relatively small share of
31La Epoca , February 13, 1928, p. 4.
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the market, but its stockpiles were sufficient to expand
3 2that share if private prices remained up. Lastly, YPF
appeared ready to make good on its threat to tap an inde-
pendent fuel source capable of supplying the state firm
with gasoline in sufficient quantities to maintain the new
low prices and eventually to supply the entire domestic
market if necessary. That source was a Russia anxious to
expand its international trading contacts. During 1929-19 30,
negotiations were under way on a government-to-government
trade arrangement with the Russian state monopoly company
for international trade, Iuyamtorg. By August 1930, agree-
ment had been reached on a three-year pact according to
which Argentina would have purchased annually 250,000 tons
of gasoline under advantageous conditions, and Russia would
have used the proceeds from its sales to acquire Argentine
products. 33 The agreement fell victim to the September 6,
1930 overthrow of Yrigoyen, but its near reality undoubtedly
32La Argentina suggested Yrigoyen purposefully waited
for stockpiles to accumulate before lowering prices (Feb-
ruary 18, 1930, p. 1.)/ and the American Ambassador in
Buenos Aires cited YPF's inability to get rid of its mounting
inventory as the sole reason for the price reductions.
(RRIAA, Bliss to Stimson, December 12, 1929, 835.6363/336.)
No exact figures on the extent of YPF's stockpiles are avail-
able, but some indication may be taken from the fact that in
1929 and 1930, the state enterprise sold over 37,000,000 more
liters of gasoline than its refineries turned out. YPF,
Desarrollo de la industria , 339, 343-345, 391.
33For discussions of this agreement, see Frondizi,
Petroleo y politica , 249-252; Del Mazo, El radicalismo,
138-140; Larra, Mosconi , 124-14 7. Under the terms of the
267
*
helped discourage any ideas the private firms had about
fighting YPF's price reductions.
In Salta, YPF's problems with private petroleum
interests, specifically with Standard Oil of New Jersey,
were not so easily resolved. As has been indicated,
Standard's activities in Salta coupled with the manner
in which Joaquin Corvalan's government (1926-1928) was en-
forcing the mineral laws had been a source of constant con-
cern to Mosconi and YPF since 1924. By 19 27, the state
agency was convinced that conditions had deteriorated to
the point where YPF's physical presence was necessary in
Salta to exercise, in Mosconi' s words, "a moderating in-
fluence on the company and on the provincial authorities,
.
..."
34 When Corvalan's administration rebuffed YPF's
efforts to obtain exploration and exploitation rights in
the province, the state company found an alternate
course of entry. On November 3, 1927, YPF concluded an
agreement with Francisco Tobar which ceded to YPF
proposed pact, Argentina had the right to increase or
decrease the amount of gasoline purchased in any one year by
up to 100,000 tons. The price per liter would have been be-
tween 9 and 11 centavos, while the gasoline Argentina
actually imported in 1929 and 19 30 cost almost 22 centavos
per liter.
34-Ei mtransigente" , El petroleo del norte argentine-,,
(prologue by E. Mosconi), xx. See also, YPF, "Acta No.
831," 24.
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3 5the petroleum rights held by Tobar in Salta. During the
early months of 1928, state workmen installed equipment at
the "Republica Argentina" wells. Drilling began in April,
and by September crude oil was being extracted. 36
In the meantime, almost as if it had been planned, a
direct confrontation developed between YPF and Standard Oil
over oil rights in the territory immediately adjacent to the
"Republica Argentina" site. 37 YPF claimed that the rights
it had obtained from Tobar extended to the area surrounding
the wells, and that Corvalan's government had fraudulently
lapsed those rights and made new concessions placing the
area under Standard's control.
From all appearances, YPF faced another frustrating
round in its long battle with Standard Oil. This time,
however, YPF had a new and powerful ally. The personalista
sweep in the 1928 elections had extended to the gubernatori-
al race in Salta and returned Julio Cornejo, an Yrigoyenista,
to office. Assuming power on May 1, 1928, Cornejo immedi-
ately turned to the YPF-Standard conflict. After being
approached by Mosconi with YPF's side of the affair on May 2
35For a copy of the contract, see YPF, Recopilacion ,
I, 262-265.
36YPF, Desarrollo de la industria , 257; Mosconi, El
petr^leo argentino ,
37Frondizi, Petr^leo y_ politica , 236-237; "El
Intransigente", El petrdleo del norte argentino, (prologue
by E. Mosconi) , xl^i-xxvi. botn of these sources present a
and soliciting a reply from Standard Oil, 38 he concluded
that Standard's concessions had been granted illegally by
the Corvalan government. 39 Come jo, therefore, issued a
decree on May 31 which ordered a halt after 90 days to all
operations of both parties in the disputed area until their
permits were legally submitted, processed and granted. It
further provided that within the 9 0-day period the conces-
sionaires could apply to the Salta government for the signing
of an agreement which would be necessary before any grants
would be made relevant to the area around the "Republica
Argentina" wells. ^0 Cornejo, in a letter to Yrigoyen, ex-
plained that the agreement mentioned in the decree would
establish the conditions for exploitation necessary to
safeguard the nation's and Salta' s oil interests.
^
While Cornejo 's actions were in accord with Yrigoyen'
s
personalista interpretation of the Salta conflict, but they
do recount the sequence of events accurately.
38RRIAA , Bliss to Kellogg, May 24, 1928, 835.6363/314,
Bliss to Kellogg, June 13, 1928, 835.6363/315.
39Cornejo to Yrigoyen, June 19, 1928, letter printed in
La Epoca , June 26, 1928, p, 1,
40For a copy of the decree, see La Epoca , June 5, 1928,
pp. 1-2.
41Cornejo to Yrigoyen, June 19, 1928, letter printed
in La Epoca , June 26, 1928, p. 1.
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oil policy and won raves from the personalista press, 42
their legality was questioned by other sources. United
States Ambassador Robert W. Bliss described Mosconi's re-
quest to Cornejo that Standard's concessions be annuled as
a demand that the new Government [Cornejo' s]
undo acts conferring property rights performed
by two previous constitutionally constituted
Provincial Governments acting within their
vested authority, to the exclusion of the
Courts of Justice. 4 3
Standard Oil's directors, sharing Bliss's views and knowing
they would receive no redress from Cornejo 's administration,
went before the Supreme Court of the nation to request that
the Salta decree of May 31, 1928 be declared unconstitution-
al and that Standard's concessions be restored. Standard's
case was prepared by the offices of Romulo S. Nao'n, with
the consultation of two eminent conservative experts,
«
Matias G. Sanchez Sorondo and Manuel Agusto Montes de Oca. 44
Salta* s defense was prepared by the legal studios of
Silvio Bonardi, a lawyer specifically recommended to
42Ibid. , June 3, 1928, p. 1, June 29, 1928, p. 1,
July 1, 192 8, p. 1,
43RRIAA, Bliss to Kellogg, May 24, 1928, 835.6363/314.
Bliss interpreted events in Salta as simply an extension of
the personalista campaign to federalize Argentine oil.
4
4
Romulo S. Naon, Inviolabilidad de l£ propiedad
minera (Buenos Aires: Editorial Muro, 1928) . The Chief
Justice of the Court was Jose Figueroa Alcorta, the man who
was President in 19 07 when the Comodoro Rivadavia discovery
was made.
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Governor Come jo by Yrigoyen. 45
The legal technicalities of this case, which was not
decided until March 19 32, 46 need not detain us, but the
briefs presented by the contestants are instructive because
they reflected the differing approaches of the two sides in
the debate over petroleum development. Naon's presentation
was rigidly legal in scope, cataloguing laws and shorn of
ideological overtones. In this respect, it mirrored the
tendency of private oil interests and political conserva-
tives to discuss petroleum in legal and economic terms and
discourage the intrusion of ideological concerns. 47
Bonardi's brief, on the other hand, provided the
requisite legal arguments, but it also bristled with the
anti-imperialist rhetoric which characterized the campaign
of the oil nationalists. Bonardi, himself, highlighted the
differences in approach when he accused Standard's lawyers
of attempting to present as M a civil dispute" what was
45Silvio E. Bonardi, En defensa de la rigueza nacional
del petroleo , ante la suprema corte de la nacion (Buenos
Aires : Rmaldi Hnos., 1928) .
46For a copy of the Court's decision, see BIP, No. 91
(March 1932) , 165-20 8. Standard received substantially
what it requested from the Court.
47For examples of this tendency, see Alejandro Bunge,
"El problema economico del petroleo," Revista de Economic
Argentina , No. 144 (June 1930), 401-436; "Astra", Compania
Argentina de Petroleo, et. al. , Las companias inaustriales
de petroleo ante el honorable senado de la nacion (Buenos
Aires: Casa Editora "Coni" , 1928).
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actually a much more fundamental issue. 48 in his opinion,
the Court was faced with deciding
whether Argentina's subsoil riches belong
to Argentines, or whether, on the contrary,
this incalculable wealth must be surrendered
to monopolization and the foreign "trusts"
so they can drain every deposit and then
return the sterile land after their dividends
will have extracted from us the entire
Argentine patrimony. 49
In short, while representing the Province of Salta, Bonardi
carried the banner of oil nationalism to the nation's
highest court.
An informative sidelight to the Salta dispute emerged
when opponents of petroleum federalization accused the per-
sonal is tas of failing to defend provincial autonomy. La
Epoca 1 s response came remarkably close to a rejection of the
traditional Argentine concept of federalism. In a July 1,
1928 editorial, the personalista paper declared that pro-
vincial autonomy had been used during the "regimen" era as
a shield for dishonest provincial governments that sought
to fleece Argentines of their rights and riches. For the
UCR, claimed La Epoca
,
autonomies are for the people and not
for governments that seek to wrap them-
selves in the banner of autonomy in
order to legitimize the impunity of
4 8Bonardi, En defensa de la rigueza nacional , 8-9.
49 ibid., 142.
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their excesses and extralegal actions. 0
The following day, La Epoca returned to the same theme:
Provincial autonomies.
. .are wheels in a
single mechanism which is dedicated to
the fulfillment of the supreme and
organic objective of the Argentine
people - the creation of a great home-
land, ... [and] nowhere is it stated nor
can one logically imagine that the
national interest must be subordinated
to regional interests 51
In their support for petroleum federalization, La Epoca
and the personalistas were indulging in an interpretation
of federalism which threatened to destroy what limited sub-
stance the system had had in the past. 52 Yet their inter-
pretation was a logical corollary to the personalista drive
to expand the national government's role in economic
development.
At the national level during Yrigoyen's second term,
the scene of battle shifted from the Chamber of Deputies to
the Senate. The petroleum bills fashioned by the person-
alistas in the Chamber faced an imposing obstacle in the
more conservative Senate, particularly given the personalistas'
50La Epoca , July 1, 1928, p. 1.
51Ibid.
,
July 2, 1928, p. 1.
52So harshly did the personalistas treat provincial
autonomy, that the most eminent of Radical historians,
Gabriel del Mazo, would later assert that their attempt
federalize oil was based on a mistaken understanding of
Argentine federalism. Del Mazo, El radicalismo, 72-78.
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lack of voting power in the Upper Chamber. From 1928 to
,
1930, seven personalista Senators faced one Socialist
(Orthodox) and eighteen Conservatives and antiperson-
alistas. 53
Senators Delfor del Valle (B.A. Prov.) and Diego Luis
Molinari (Capt. Fed.) led the personalista struggle to
hasten Senate consideration of the proposals on petroleum
federalization, monopolization and expropriation, but it
was a futile exercise as the bills remained mired in
Committee. 54 Each time the two Yrigoyenist stalwarts
raised the question, the scene was the same. Personalista
Senators emphasized the urgency of passing oil legislation
and sketched the devastating consequences of failing to
do so. Opposition spokesmen blamed the personalistas for
the delay, warned against discussing such complicated
matters without painstaking study, and maintained that the
Executive decrees creating oil reserves and halting the
issuance of new oil concessions were sufficient checks on
55
private interests until a law was completed.
53Etchepareborda, "Yrigoyen y el Congreso," 64.
54The bills were being considered jointly by the
Committee on Legislation and the c°^"f« °"^^;tive.
Understandably, both committees worked with
Conserva
antipersonalista majorities.
55Senadores , Diario , 1928, 279-280, 282-289,
535-537,
687-695; 1929, II, 448-453, 637-649.
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Only on September 27, 19 29, three days before the
close of Congress's annual sessions, was an apparent step
forward taken when the Senate created a special five-man
Committee to draft a bill. The Committee was to meet during
Congress's recess (September-May) with the understanding
that if the President called for Extraordinary Sessions,
the Committee's report might be submitted during those
meetings
.
The obvious intent of the anti-government majority to
bottle up petroleum legislation in Committee was facilitated
by the irregular pattern of Senate activity during these
years. Never was that body prepared to function on the
constitutionally designated opening date of May 1. And
when the Senate was ready for work, sessions frequently
were wasted either for the lack of a quorum or through
prolonged and sterile political discussions.
5
6
Ibid.
,
1929, II, 637-649. The motion to create a
Special Oil Committee was made by Conservative Senator
Juan Vidal (Corr.). On the grounds that five Senate
Committees had an interest in the framing of an oil law,
he proposed that the Special Committee be composed of the
Chairmen of the Committees of Legislation, Codes, Constitu-
tional Matters, Treasury, and Agriculture. As a result, the
membership included four Conservatives and one Orthodox
Socialist; Alejandro Ruzo (Catam.), Luis Etchevehere (E.R.),
Carlos Serray (Salta) , Mario Bravo (PS, Capt. Fed.),
Hector de la Fuente (L.R.). Serrey chaired no Committee,
but Bravo chaired two and Serrey was a member of both.
Thus, Serrey apparently was selected to represent one of
those committees on the Special Oil Committee.
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Yrigoyen, in October 1929, decreed the anticipated
extra sessions for the legislators, and, at the same time,
he designated petroleum legislation as one of the matters
to be considered. 57 On four subsequent occasions during
the Extraordinary Sessions, Yrigoyen and his Minister of
Agriculture, Juan B. Fleitas, sent the Upper Chamber re-
minders of the pressing nature of the petroleum question
and of the need to sanction the bills forwarded from the
Chamber. 58 The President's note of December 7, 1929
predicted that conversion of those measures into law
will preserve the country from the
disruptions experienced by all
peoples, while, at the same time,
reserving for the inhabitants of
the Republic the incalculable
wealth deposited in its soil....
Unconvinced by such assurances, the Senate continued to
delay.
The Special Oil Committee proved as ineffective as
the President's pleas at expediting Senate action. Rather
57ibid. f 1929, II, 733,
58 Ibid
. ,
1929, II, 733-735 (October 22, 1929), 735
(November 19, 1929); 1929, III, 131 (December 7, 1929),
202-204 (January 17, 1930). The dates given here are those
which appeared on the Executive's notes. Fleitas was a
Corrientes lawyer who had been President of the Radical
Party in his native province before joining Yrigoyen 's
second administration.
59 Ibid.
,
1929, III, 131.
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its work became the center of new controversy. During
seventeen meetings in October and November, the Committee
heard testimony from Minister Fleitas and General Mosconi,
from ex-employees of YPF, and from representatives of
private oil investors and consumers. Written reports from
oil experts were also collected, along with data on YPF's
operations. As of the end of November, however, the
committeemen had received no reply from government officials
to some pointed questions concerning the cost of expropria-
tion, the relationship between national production and
consumption of petroleum products, and the expense of
operating a state monopoly over the exploration, exploita-
tion, transport, and sale of petroleum. ^° These were the
kinds of questions that personalista Deputies had con-
sistently tried to avoid during the Chamber debates.
After two months of intense work, the Committee
interrupted the main business of drafting a petroleum bill
to request investigatory powers from the Senate. In
defending the Committee's petition, Senator Ruzo explained
that the group's labors had revealed two points which
needed clarification. First was the matter of allegations
that certain unspecified Senators were working for Standard
60For an outline report of the Special Oil Committee's
work during October and November 1929, see Ibid., 1929, III,
70-71. In addition to the points noted above, the list of
matters on which the Committee had requested information
from the Minister of Agriculture and YPF included YPF s
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Oil. Citing evidence of such charges from La Epoca'
s
pages and from propaganda posters and speeches, Ruzo
expressed the Committee's desire to determine which, if
any, Senators were involved and to what extent. The second
subject needing investigation, according to the Committee,
was YPF. Ruzo reported that information presented by
sources he described as "world renowned technicians" made
it advisable "to dig a little" into the financial and
technical phases of the state enterprise. Over the unanimous
opposition of the personalista Senators, the Committee's
request for expanded powers was granted.
6 ^"
The nationalist press scoffed at the Special Oil
Committee's proposed investigations and presented them as
simply another trick to delay passage of an oil law. In
the words of La Accion , they were
gold dust thrown in the eyes of the
gullible, ... [and] , in reality, they
are pretexts for dragging the matter
out and keeping it in committee....
advertising and price-setting policies, the extent of
private exploration and exploitation, and the activity of
privately owned refineries.
61ibid ,, 1929, III, 23-29. Ruzo specifically referred
to La Epoca 's issues of November 11, 20, and 25, 1929.
62La Accion, December 20, 1929, p. 1. La Accion, the
semi-official press arm of the Alvear administration,
changed hands in August 1928. I have been unable to
identify the new directors, but they threw the paper
s
weight solidly behind Yrigoyen's petroleum policy.
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The La Epoca articles cited by Ruzo on the Senate
floor consisted of two reports on Alianza Continental
rallies held to build support for the personalista oil
policy, and the transcript of a radio address delivered to
the same end by an engineer, Eduardo Eiriz Maglione, under
the auspices of the Comite Universitario Radical. 63 Among
the passages which probably aroused the concern of the
Senate Committee was Maglione' s contention that
several national Senators are intimately
tied to oil firms. The Senate of the
Nation, therefore, constitutes no
guarantee. 6 4
Similar statements were reported to have been made at the
Alianza Continental gatherings by General Alonso Baldrich
and by Alianza President Arturo Orzabal Quintana.
In an effort to justify the mass character assassina-
tion in which some of its speakers had indulged, the Alianza
published a three-part proclamation in successive issues of
La Argentina . 65 Since no further evidence was published,
the first of the three installments contained what must be
63La Epoca , November 11, 1929, p. 3, November 20, 1929,
p. 5, November 25, 1929, p. 1.
64Ibid. , November 20, 1929, p. 5.
65La Argentina , December 22, 1929, p. 3, December 23,
1929, P7"3, December 24, 1929, p. 3. Three days
prior to
the first installment, General Baldrich took over the
editorship of La Argentina . His newspaper career is
discussed below.
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assumed to have been all the specific information that
organization had at its disposal concerning "Standard Oil's
Senators". Attention was focused on Rudecindo S. Campos
of Jujuy. The material presented indicated that before
Campos entered the Senate in 1927, he had acted as a legal
representative for Standard Oil, and that he had helped
Standard to acquire oil concessions in Jujuy, Selections
from the 1927 Senate debate on Campos 1 s credentials also
were printed to suggest that his election could be traced
to the financial influence of Standard Oil and the sugar
interests in Jujuy 1 s legislature.
Saltenos Luis Linares and Carlos Serrey were the only
other Senators named in the proclamation. In their cases,
a brief and tenuous attempt was made to link their political
party, the Union Provincial, with Standard Oil money. In
none of the three cases did the Alianza Continental document
present any evidence that, while the three men named were
serving as Senators, they had entered into collusion to
advance the interests of Standard Oil in the halls of
Congress. This does not prove that collusion did not exist,
but the point remains that on the basis of the evidence
presented, the accusations made wera little short of
libelous.
Without attempting to defend the making of irresponsible
charges against public figures, it should be noted that the
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Senate doubly exacerbated the circumstances which produced
those charges. In the first place, by November 1929, it
had postponed discussion of the Chamber's oil bills for
over tv;o years. Parliamentary delay was a legitimate
tactic for opposing unwanted legislation, but with a con-
toversial issue like petroleum, the Senate might better
have drafted and defended a petroleum bill to its own
liking. Such forthright action would have left the motives
of the Senators who opposed the government's policy less
open to suspicion. Secondly, when the rectitude of some
Senate members was publicly questioned, and the Special
Oil Committee empowered to investigate, the Committee should
have acted swiftly and published its findings. The failure
to do so opened the door to more reckless speculation and
unfounded accusations.
As for the Committee's investigation of YPF, that too
was greeted by oil nationalists as a ruse, and as evidence
of the Committee's predisposition in favor of private pe-
troleum interests. La Epoca charged that the Committee was
intent upon discrediting state oil development, and that
the information which prompted the investigation was
supplied by spokesmen for private oil interests and by
former employees of YPF who had been discharged for
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incompetence and undesirable qualities. 66 The records of
the Committee's hearings are not available to test La
Epoca*
s
allegations, but one Standard Oil official reported
to the United States Ambassador that representatives of his
firm who went before the Special Oil Committee found the
atmosphere "distinctly friendly", and that generally private
oil men were questioned in a manner which tended to reveal
6 7irregularities or incompetence on the part of YPF.
The Committee pursued its investigations and studies
through the early months of 1930, with its members making
the by now ritualistic junkets to the Salta oil fields and
to YPF's refinery in La Plata. 68 Nonetheless, reports in
April that the group was finally going to issue its report
proved mistaken. 6 ^
As the prospects for Senate action waned, the
stridency and irresponsibility of the nationalists' attacks
on the Upper Chamber, and especially on the Special Oil
835.6363/335.
68La Vanguardia, April 18, 1930, p. 2, April 30, 1930,
pp. 1-27-LrA^clQnTApril 22, 1930, p. 1; La
Argentina,
April 10,T930, p." lr April 23, 1930, p. 1.
69 La vanguardia , April 18, 1930, p. 2; La
Ac^n,
April 47-1930, P. H April 23, 1930, p. U La Argentina,
March 28, 1930, p. 1.
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Committee, mounted. The impatience and frustration of the
nationalist press was apparent in outbursts like the
following from La Argentina ;
The continuance of things as they have
developed until now would justify what-
ever popular pressure that might be
applied, because the community does not
have to tolerate the Argentine Parlia-
ment acting like a dependency of Standard
Oil, serving its purposes and seconding
its commitment to enslave; our sovereignty.
Rash, unfounded accusations against Senators and other
public figures who in some way could be connected with
Standard Oil became the common coin of the pro-personalista
press. La Epoca stuck to general denunciations, probably
because its director, Delfor del Valle, was himself a
Senator, but La Argentina and La Accion exercised no such
restraint. Senators Serrey and Campos were the chief
targets for this type of invective, 71 but also included on
the list of alleged "friends, partners, partisans,
servants, straw men or employees" of Standard were
Senators Mario Bravo (Capt. Fed.), Alfredo Guzman (Tuc),
Luis Etchevehere (E.R.), Leopoldo Melo (E.R.),
70 La Argentina , March 26, 1930, p. 1.
71La Accion, January 7, 1930, p. 1, January 8, 1930,
p. 1, April 22, "1930 , p. 1; La Argentina,
December 21,
1929 p. 1, January 5, 1930, pp. 1, 3.
January 15, 1930 ,
p. 1, January 20, 1930, p. 2, January
24, 1930, p. 1,
February 18, 1930, p. 1.
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Teofilo Sanchez de Bustamente (Jujuy) , Juan Vidal (Corr.),
and Luis Linares (Salta)
,
along with several former provin-
cial officials from Salta and Jujuy. 72
When it appeared that nothing would shake the Upper
Chamber's lethargy with respect to petroleum legislation,
nationalist newspapers intimated that the answer lay in
abolishing the Senate. La Accion warned the Senators of
a public weariness that now awaits the
slightest cause to manifest itself in
an intense and demanding fashion. 73
Three weeks later, La Epoca '
s
message was more direct:
Located. .. like a stumbling block in the
path of the [national] regeneration and
of the country, the Senate's lot ought
to be that which fatally and necessarily
falls to everything that is dead weight
and retrogressive.... The Senate must
disappear so the country can proceed. 74
This suggestion may have been divorced from reality, but
in February 1930, it did appear to be the only way that the
Chamber-approved oil bills would become laws.
While the nationalist press alternately ridiculed and
threatened the Senate, sympathizers carried the campaign
to the nation's street corners, plazas, theaters, lecture
halls and air waves. Mosconi maintained his stance in
72La Argentina , February 18, 1930, p. 1, February 20,
1930, p. 1, February 23, 1930, p. 1.
73La Accion , January 18, 1930, p. 1.
74La Epoca , February 10, 1930, p. 1.
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the forefront of the movement, despite his known reserva-
tions about the personalis ta Radical's concept of a state
oil monopoly. Speaking at the University of Mexico in
February 1928, he suggested that the 1927 monopoly bill
had been passed by an "excessively cautious" Chamber, and
criticized its basic idea as a
formula which must fail because it not
only establishes a monopoly in the
least profitable facets of the entire
industry [exploration and production]
,
but it also creates a system which
does not enjoy public acceptance. 7 ^
He then ticked off the standard list of complaints against
state industrial monopolies; the lack of initiative, un-
necessary administrative employees, bureaucratic slowness,
and inflated production costs. If to all this, concluded
Mosconi, one added the possibility of political interference
in the industry's development, the results could be
calamitous. 76
On the questions of federalization and expropriation,
Mosconi also found himself at odds with the government's
policy. In the case of federalization, he disagreed with
the method of implementation, not the principle. Given the
assertion of national jurisdiction, Mosconi felt that the
provinces were entitled to share the profits resulting
75Mosconi, Dichos y_ hechos , 165.
76Ibid.
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from oil exploited within their borders. The failure of
the Chamber of Deputies to recognize that right, he con-
tended, stirred legitimate opposition to federalization in
provinces with proven or suspected oil reserves. 77
As for expropriation, YPF's Director was in complete
disagreement with the personalista policy. Mosconi
believed that the purchase of private oil concessions would
have placed a heavy financial drain on the national trea-
sury in some cases, and, in other, it would have required
funds "which would be beyond the present financial capacity
of the nation." Furthermore, he warned that expropriation
might occasion foreign reprisals in the form of tariff
barriers against Argentine products. If the goal of ex-
propriation was a state oil monopoly, Mosconi maintained
that three measures would produce the same results
gradually: 1) prohibit any expansion of present private
holdings, 2) place reasonable levies on private production
of crude oil, 3) expand the state industry so it could
establish market prices, thus limiting the profits of
private investors. When denied the profits they always
77Ricardo Oneto, El petro'leo argentino y_ la soberania
nacional (prologue by E. Mosconi) (Buenos Aires: Ferrari
Hnos., 1929) , vi. Mosconi may have been right on provin-
cial concern over profit sharing, but the point was not a
major one in the 1927 Chamber debates, nor was it in the
brief Senate exchanges on oil legislation between 1928 and
1930.
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pursued, predicted Mosconi, private companies would
diminish and probably abandon their activities. 78
If federalization were executed along the lines he
recommended, Mosconi believed that the answer to the ex-
ploitation problem lay in a monopoly mixed company in which
private investment would be limited exclusively to
Argentines. By his own account, it was during a 1928
journey through other oil-producing nations in Latin
America that he rejected his former preference for combining
continued private exploitation with a series of mixed
companies involving limited amounts of foreign private
capital. 79 He had become convinced, he wrote in July 1928,
that while private companies existed in Argentina, they
would be involved in a commercial battle with state-
financed exploitation, and that
in oil matters, [the battle] can produce
a serious threat to the economic develop-
ment and political peace of the country. 80
78 Ibid., xv. For Mosconi' s analysis of the technical
problems involved in setting equitable prices for private
holdings if they were to be expropriated, see Ibid .
,
xii-xv.
79,, E1 Intransigente", El petroleo del norte
argentino, (prologue by E. Mosconi), xxx; Mosconi, El
petroleo argentine? , 182. For an account of Mosconi s trip,
see Ibid
.
7 213-230.
80,, E1 Intransigente", El petroleo del notre
argentino, (prologue by E. Mosconi) , xxxi.
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Mosconi was so adament about exluding foreign capital
from the oil industry that while sufficient domestic
capital could not be found to finance his preferred system,
he favored a total state monopoly to leaving the industry
81
open to foreign investment.
Specifically, Mosconi envisioned his mixed company as
an integrated monopoly covering all phases of the oil
industry with the capital divided 51-4 9% between government
and private investors respectively. He wanted an autonomous
organization in which the private investors would elect a
majority of the directors and control the firm's administra-
tive and technical development, while the government repre-
sentatives in the directorate would exercise a veto power
over major policy decisions. It was Mosconi' s contention
that such a mixed monopoly would have constituted
an organization of limitless advantages
for the country, one whose management
would be perfectly systematized and
controlled through the reciprocal actions
of the two participating forces; political
interference stemming from state involve-
ment would be resisted by the majority of
81Ibid., xxx. Whenever Mosconi criticized foreign
investors, it was usually Standard Oil which received
specific mention, but his antipathv extended equally to the
British trusts. Once when he was asked whether he pre-
ferred Standard Oil or Royal Dutch Shell, Mosconi described
the former as a cord of hemp and the latter as a cord of
silk and commented,
if the two cords, one rough and the
other smooth, must be used to hang us,
it would appear to me the most
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the directorate which would represent
private capital, and the tendencies of
the latter toward excessive profits
would be resisted through the veto
power of the government representatives
,
Fundamentally, both Mosconi' s position and the govern-
ment's oil policy were nationalist and anti-imperialist in
character. The differences in detail reflected the fact
that the personalista politicians gave priority to establish-
ing a sharply defined ideological position, while Mosconi,
an experienced oil man, sought a solution which would
accomodate his nationalist sentiments and still provide
domestic consumers with a cheap and dependable supply of
petroleum products,
Mosconi was accompanied in his search for a nationalist
solution to the country's oil problem by such familiar and
83
prestigious figures as Ricardo Oneto and General Alonso
intelligent course would be to
reject both,
Mosconi, Dichos £ hechos, 171.
820neto, El petro'leo argentino , (prologue by E. Mosconi),
xvi. See also, Mosconi, Dichos y hechos , 166-168; Mosconi,
El petroleo argentine , 181-182; ^El Intransigente
,
" El
petroleo del norte argentino , (prologue by E. MosconU,
xxx-xxxii.
830neto supported federalization and a state oil
monopoly but not expropriation. Oneto, El centinela ,
210-213; Oneto, El petroleo argentino , (prologue by E.
Mosconi) , 188.
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Baldrich, Mosconi's military companion. Mosconi's
biographer, Raul Larra, asserts that Mosconi and Baldrich
operated as a team with the former planning and organizing
the nationalist campaign while Baldrich, unencumbered by a
government post, acted as "the street agitator, the
theater and radio speaker, [and] the public critic of
Standard Oil." 84 Larra was correct about the close rela-
tionship between the two men and about Baldrich' s relative
lack of restraint in his public comments. However,
Baldrich was not simply Mosconi's mouthpiece, as evidenced
by the fact that he supported the personalista petroleum
policy rather than Mosconi's mixed company monopoly.
Much of Baldrich *s propagandizing was conducted under
the auspices of the Alianza Continental which accorded him
the title of "honorary councilor". Delivering radio
address, and speaking frequently at Alianza meetings in
and about Buenos Aires and in interior cities like Rosario
and Cordoba, Baldrich warned unceasingly of the imperialist
threat to Argentina's oil, attacked mercilessly the alleged
crimes of Standard Oil and its allies, and demanded passage
O C
of the petroleum bills awaiting Senate attention."
84Larra, Mosconi, 108-109.
85La Epoca reported regularly on Alianza activities.
The folISwlSTHitations include reports on meetings
where
Baldrich spoke and announcements of me^
n
^V 1 Oc^er
was scheduled to speak; September 24, 1928, p. 1,
ctober
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On December 19 , 1929 r Baldrich began disseminating his
views through the pages of La Argentina , a newspaper over
which he exercised editorial control until May 4, 19 30
•
86
Prior to Baldrich 1 s takeover , La Argentina had supported
Yrigoyen's petroleum policies
,
echoing the nationalist
line, 8 ^ but under the General, petroleum was elevated to
the priority news item, and the paper's nationalism in
oil matters assumed a rabid intensity.
>
The unsupported attacks on Senators which have been
noted, constituted one of the two central themes of
Baldrich 1 s editorship. The other was a vicious campaign
against Standard Oil for its alleged corrupt and criminal
practices in Argentina and other nations. One series of
articles began on December 30, 1929 and lasted through a
dozen installments under the headline "STANDARD OIL EX-
POSED FOR THE INTRIGUES IT IS CONDUCTING IN THE COUNTRY."
88
4. 1928. P. If November 19, 1928, p. 4, December 1, 1928
p 2, January 7, 1929, p. 1, August 8, 1929, p. 2,
October
19, 1929, p. lr November 11, 1929, p. 3, November 25,
1929,
p. 1, July 3, 1930, p. 1, July 31, 1930, p.
3.
86
The circumstances which placed control of La
Araentina in Baldrich' s hands are unclear, as are the
reasons tor his leaving the paper in May 1930. It
may be
significant, however, that Baldrich «s tenure encompassed
tne
monSs surrounding the March 19 30 Congressional elections.
87La Arqentina , November 29, 1929, p. 1, December 1,
1929, p7~l, December 8, 1929, p. 1, December 12, 1929, p.
1.
88Ibid., December 30, 1929, p. 1, December 31, 1929,
pp. l-27"Ta"nuary 2, 1930, p. 3, January 3, 1930 , p.
1,
January 4, 1930, p. 3, January 5, 1930, p. 3,
January 6,
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With Baldrich's departure from the editor's chair,
La Argentina's character again changed abruptly. Petroleum
news was accorded low key coverage. The personal attacks
on Senators ceased. Standard Oil received only occasional
notices, and by July 19 3o, soccer was front page news in
La Argentina
.
At the level of organized propaganda activity, no
group did more to cultivate popular support for Yrigoyen's
oil policy than the Alianza Continental. Devoting its
talents, energies, and funds exclusively to this cause, the
Alianza supplied batteries of speakers for rallies in the
Federal Capital and in the major provincial urban centers.
On several occasions in Buenos Aires, demonstrations were
organized at four or five of the main plazas simultaneously
with each gathering hearing a half dozen Alianza orators.
Two series of radio addresses sponsored by the Alianza
carried the organization's message to late evening audiences
in Buenos Aires. Besides President Orzabal Quintana and
other members of the group, the speakers at Alianza meetings
included Baldrich, Senator Diego Bui's Molinari, National
Deputy Victor Guillot (UCRp, Capt. Fed.), YPF counsel
Julio Aguirre Celiz, and the former YPF administrator in
1930, p. 1, January 9, 1930, p. 3, January 10, 1930, p. 3,
January 11, 1930, p. 3, January 12, 1930, p. 3, January 13,
1930, p. 3.
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Comodoro Rivadavia, Naval Captain Felipe Fliess. 89
Mosconi's relations with the Alianza Continental
present something of an anomaly. Despite the disparity
between his solution on oil legislation and the Alianza'
s
support for the personalista-style state monopoly,
Orzabal Quintana has been quoted to the effect that the
Alianza
was, in reality, the instrument which we
most willingly placed at Mosconi's dis-
posal in order to propagandize for his
patriotic purposes. 90
Furthermore, it is known that Mosconi helped Orzabal
Quintana organize part of the Alianza' s activities in
mid-1929, and that Mosconi and the members of YPF's
Directorate financed out of their own pockets the program
which was mapped out. 91 Finally, in Mosconi's 1936 book,
he listed himself among those who spoke at Alianza
89 The various activities of the Alianza Continental
during Yrigoyen's second term may be followed in the pages
of La Epoca , and, to a lesser extent, in La Vanguardia and
La Prensa. However, since many of the newspaper reports
on Alianza meetings are quite brief, a convenient summary
of the organization's position on petroleum legislation
may be found in memorials it sent to the Senate in
September 1928 and September 1929. Senadores, Diario,
1928, 539-541; 1929, II, 706-707.
90Quoted in Larra, Mosconi , 109. Larra attributed this
quote to a letter he had received from Orzabal Quintana.
91Mosconi, El petroleo argentino, 235-236. Larra
claims Mosconi contributed 200 pesos a month to the
Alianza' s treasury. Larra, Mosconi , 110-111.
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92Continental rallies.
Any attempt to explain the contradiction between
Mosconi's stated views and his support of the Alianza
Continental must be conjectural, but it probably can be
accounted for by the nationalist orientation which Mosconi
and the Alianza shared. It would appear that Mosconi valued
the dissemination of the Alianza' s ideological viewpoint
highly enough to overlook disagreements on the details of
petroleum legislation.
University students under the banner of the Comite
Universitario Radical provided a second major source of
organized publicity in favor of the government's oil
policy. 93 While the University group sponsored a limited
number of public assemblies in support of the personalistas
'
petroleum proposals, 94 its main contribution consisted of a
92Mosconi, El petroleo argentino , 235. Though there
is no reason to suspect Mosconi deliberately misstated
the
facts here, I have been unable to verify his statement. On
separate occasions La Spoca (July 19, 1928, p. 1) and La
Prensa (September 107 T92S7 p. 8) noted that Mosconi was
scheduled to participate in Alianza programs, but I have
seen no reports on meetings at which he actually did
take
part.
^Organizations which sponsored less extensive activity
along the same lines included the Liga Nacional
Universi-
far^ H~ ia n C R. (La Epoca, September 16, p.
S^tLbL^S^^^/pT Ar-and the Ateneo Popular Mariano
Moreno de la U.C.R. Ibid ., October 2, 1929, p. 1,
October
18, 1929, p. 2.
94 La Epoca , June 11, 1929, p. 2, June 19,
1929,
p. 2.
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series of speeches broadcast over LR 7, Radio Buenos Aires,
the radio station of La Epoca . The addresses were
delivered between September and November 1929, and, with
the exception of three presented by personalista Deputies,
they were made by student representatives from the various
University faculties. Their topics ran the gamut of the
nationalist spectrum, from world oil imperialism, to
Standard Oil's crimes in Salta, to the urgency for Senate
9 5
action on oil legislation.
The intense propaganda campaign undertaken by the
personalista Radicals and their supporters did not provoke
a commensurate response from the opponents of oil federaliza-
tion and monopolization, or from the private oil investors.
The private companies were probably secure in the belief
that the Chamber bills could not escape either sweeping
revision or slow death in the Senate. They, therefore,
limited their public activity to the presentation of a
memorial to the Senate in September 19 28. Submitted by
eleven oil firms, it was nothing more than a rehash of the
anti-monopoly petition which many of the same companies
96
had sent to the Chamber of Deputies the year before.
The
95Most of the speeches were reprinted in La
Epoca, but
thev are available more conveniently in a
compilation pub-
Ushed in 1930, Comite Universitario Radical, El petroleo
argentine
96
"Astra M , Compania Argentina de Petro'leo,
et. al. ,
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literature of the period provides only the infrequent
coherent defense of foreign private oil investment, and
while the anti-government press displayed no fondness for
the personalista monopoly concept, it did not focus on the
9 8
oil issue as much as the pro-Yrigoyenist papers did.
The absence of a strong counterof fensive to the
nationalists' thrust can be traced in part to the fact that
the anti-government forces were more interested in removing
Yrigoyen from office than they were in combatting his
petroleum policy. The 1930 Congressional elections in the
Federal Capital demonstrated that oil policy was neither
a matter of immediate concern to Yrigoyen 's opponents,
nor the vote-swaying issue it had been in 1928. While
personalista campaigners referred to the government's oil
policy again and again in an effort to garner support,"
Las compan'ias industriales de petroleo ante el honorable
iinado . For a~discussion of the 19 27 memorial, see
Chapt. IV, 181-184.
97For an excellent example, see Bunge, "El problema
economico del petroleo."
98La Nacio'n , September 27, 1928, p. 6, October 6 ,
1928,
p. 8, October 24, 1929, p. 10; La Prensa,
June 27, 1929,
p. 15.
99 La Epoca's daily reports on the election
campaign
from the~end of
"
January to March 1, 19 30 show that
olrsonalilta speakers referred to petroleum policy
more
frequently thafduring the 1928 election For
examples,
see January 25, 1930, p. 3, January 27 1930, p.
3,
February 2, 1930, p. 3, February 3, 1930, p. 4,
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the Independent Socialists won the contest convincingly
with a " throw-the-rascals-out" approach that even promised
impeachment proceedings against Yrigoyen.
Some observers, mostly personalista sympathizers and
partisans, have maintained that the oil companies were the
source of more substantial opposition to the government's
policy than the above discussion indicates. They allege,
in fact, that those companies actively conspired in
support of the coup which ended Yrigoyen' s second term on
September 6, 1930.
100
While this thesis has long been an article of faith
among Radicals and nationalists, any attempt to evaluate
it reveals that no evidence has been produced to support it
It rests entirely upon the assumption that the private
oil interests' felt so threatened by the prospect of a
state oil monopoly that they were willing to help overthrow
February 7, 1930, p. 3, February 8, 1930, p. 4, February 12,
1930, p. 4, February 16, 1930, p. 4, February 19, 1930,
p. 5, Februarv 22, 1930, pp. 4, 5, February 25, 1930, p.
4.
Personalista propaganda also featured a film strip on oil
exploitation in Comodoro Rivadavia. (La Epoca, January 30,
1930, p. 5, February 2, 1930, p. 3, February 4, 1930, p. 4,
February 13, 1930, p. 3.) La Argentina , displaying typical
restraint, accused Standard Oil of financing anti-government
candidates, and suggested that a vote for Yrigoyen (person-
alista candidates) was a vote for Argentina while a vote
against him was a vote for Standard. La Argentina,
February 21, 1930, p. 1, February 25, 1930, p. 1.
100Frondizi
,
Petrileo y_ pol/tica, 268-277; Del Mazo
El radicalismo , 140-144; Luna, Yrigoyen, 348-351,
356 357,
LlTrra, Mosconi , 127; Ricardo M. Ortiz, "El
aspecto
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the government to prevent it. While this might follow as
a logical conclusion to the version of contemporary events
that emerges from the nationalist rhetoric, it does not
make sense when one considers that any adequately informed
observer knev; there was almost no chance the Senate would
approve a state oil monopoly. In apparent recognition of
this fact, some proponents of the conspiracy thesis have
maintained that the threat of Senate passage was real be-
cause provincial elections scheduled for early September
19 30 in San Juan and Mendoza promised to return four
personalista Senators and therewith a personalista majority
in the Senate. 101 This, however, was not the case. Four
additional personalista Senators would have given that
party eleven seats in the Upper Chamber, still five short
of a majority. Undoubtedly, the private oil interests did
not mourn Yrigoyen's fall, but there is yet no evidence
that they were responsible in a direct way for its occurrence*****
The events of Yrigoyen's second term demonstrated that
the promise which emerged from the great 19 28 electoral
triumph was illusory. Certainly this was true insofar as
econo'mico-social de la crisis de 1930," Revista de
historia, No. 3 (1958), 60, 70-72.
10
350-351
de 1930," 60.
lDel Mazo, El radicalismo 141; Luna, Yrigoyen,
; Ortiz, "El aspecto economico-social de
la crisi
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the prospects for the passage of oil legislation was
concerned. Personalista hopes were elevated by their 19 27
Chamber victories and by their tendency to view the 1928
election as a referendum on the petroleum issue. The
problem was, of course, that in spite of that election,
conservative forces continued to dominate the Senate, the
one remaining hurdle to a personalista-dictated oil law.
In large part, the doom of the 1927 Chamber bills had
been sealed by the personalista decision to settle for
nothing less than a full measure of their own policy.
With the road to compromise blocked, the opposition was
faced with either being bullied into accepting a state oil
monopoly or delaying petroleum legislation by all means
possible. No one could have doubted which alternative the
Senate would choose.
Thus, with the petroleum issue, as with so much
else, Yrigoyen's second term brought not the ultimate
"reparacion" but burning frustration. An ironic footnote
to the energetic personalista drive for oil legislation
was added in 19 32 and 19 35 when Argentina's long-awaited
laws were sanctioned by a Congress which contained no
,
102
personalista Radicals.
102Law 11,668 (1932) provided a statutory basis for
YPF, while Law 12,161 prescribed the general conditions
for Argentine oil exploitation. The 1932 measure left
YPF's existing structure almost unchanged. Minor altera-
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tions specifically empowered YPF to use credit operations
and provided that 10% of the firm's profits would go to
the national treasury and 5% would be distributed among
YPF's employees.
In passing the general oil law", Congress rejected
both federalization and monopolization in favor of separate
and concurrent state and private oil development along with
mixed companies. The conditions for private exploration
and exploitation were more liberal than those demanded by
nationalists in the early 1920' s, but more restrictive
than those demanded by conservatives like Matias G. Sanchez
So^rondo. Frondi,zi, Petroleo y_ politica , 333-342; Pigretti,
Codigo de mineria
,
372-386 (Law 12,161); YPF, Recopilacion
,
I, 585-588 (Law 11,668).
CHAPTER VII
THE POLITICS OF PETROLEUM IN PERSPECTIVE
When viewed in the context of Argentine development
since 1916, the forgoing analysis of the petroleum issue
justifies some general observations on the nature of the
Radical Period and its political participants, and on the
significance of that period for Argentina's subsequent
development. Because our knowledge of the 1916-19 30 era
remains incomplete, the intent here is not to offer a
definitive synthesis of the Radical Period, but to suggest
some of the guidelines within which that synthesis must
be constructed.
The consistent efforts of the Yrigoyenist Radicals to
develop a popular rather than a practical petroleum policy
constituted a clear case of political opportunism. In the
haste to accuse the Radicals of electioneering though, it
is easy to forget that the need for courting public ap-
proval for governmental policies was something new in
Argentine politics. Governments during the "Regimen" era
had displayed at best a patronizing disregard for public
301
302
opinion while relying on the politics of "acuerdos" (agre-
ements) and electoral fraud to maintain their monopoly
over national and provincial political power. The 1912
electoral reform law, however, determined that the legit-
imacy of future national administrations would stem more
from decisions rendered at the polls and less from their
ability to protect the interests of the estanciero class.
When the Radicals assumed power in 1916, they were obliged
not only to govern effectively, but also to maintain wide-
spread popular support for their policies.
While they faced this novel task, the Radicals'
ability to govern was impaired by the continued strength
of the traditional Conservative forces and by internal
deficiencies in the Radical Party itself. The economic
power of the estanciero class remained undiminished after
Yrigoyen's 1916 victory, and politically, the Conserva-
tives continued to dominate the National Senate and most
of the provinces. Even the excessive number of provincial
interventions initiated by Yrigoyen failed to liquidate
the Conservative majority in the Senate by 1930.
Internal factors which weakened the Radical Party as
a governing agent included: inexperience in the practical
business of running a national administration; Yrigoyen's
oppressive domination of the Party and his refusal to
delegate power to capable subordinates; the heterogeneous
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and potentially contradictory character of the groups
gathered beneath the Radical banner; and the lack of pre-
cise programs for social and economic reform. In fact,
the Radical Party was not really a political party at all.
It was a movement dominated by a single personality and
supported by a variety of interests whose only common aim
was to break the oligarchy's monopoly on political power.
The characteristics cited above may have contributed to
the Party's growth and appeal during its conspiratorial
days, but after 1916, as we have seen in the case of pe-
troleum, they seriously inhibited effective government
action.
When viewed against this political backdrop, the de-
cision to seek mass electoral support through a national-
istic oil policy emerges as a logical outgrowth of the
Radicals' task of reconciling the need to maintain popular
support with conditions which all but prohibited doing so
through positive action and accomplishment.
The advantages of adopting a nationalistic oil policy
were considerable. The rhetoric of the nationalists re-
fined and simplified the complex petroleum question until
it became a choice between "patrio'.s" and "traitors" and,
therefore, admirably suited for mass consumption. Further-
more, the logical corollary of the Radicals' nationalist
stance was that the opposition, through ignorance
or de-
X
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sign
,
was advocating an anti-national or anti-Argentine
policy. If the Radicals could convey this impression,
they could claim a monopoly on Argentine nationalism, iden-
tify the Radical Party with the Argentine State, and, there-
by, create the strongest possible source of legitimacy for
their exercise of national power.
The effectiveness with which the Yrigoyenists manipu-
lated the petroleum issue in particular and the concept of
economic nationalism in general served as an object lesson
in how to mobilize mass support which was not lost on fu-
ture Argentine politicians. Both Peron and Frondizi ben-
efited from the same kind of appeal. Perb'n, in particular,
improved on the Radical model by developing techniques
and instruments for institutionalizing the support that
could be evoked through a nationalist program. The con-
trolled labor unions, the government subsidized charities
run by Eva Peron, the Peronist education system, and the
Justicialist Party all provided avenues for solidifying
the identification between Peronismo and Argentine nation-
alism. It was a more sophisticated apparatus than that at
Yrigoyen's disposal, but Peron operated with fewer re-
strictions on his power and with a model from which to
work.
In terms of state-directed economic development, a
corollary of 20th century economic nationalism in Argen-
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tina, the governments of Yrigoyen and Alvear set the prec-
_
edent with YPF. The state oil industry along with the
abortive 19 29 government-to-government oil deal with Rus-
sia were not parts of a coherent industrialization program,
but they involved a novel degree of government interference
in the economic sphere which would be accentuated in the
post-1930 period. The link, for instance, between
Yrigoyen' s oil policy and Peron's IAPI (Argentine Institute
for the Promotion of Trade) and his five-year plans is un-
mistakable.
If the Radicals exposed the political potential of a
nationalist oil policy, Yrigoyen' s second term demonstrated
that such a policy had its limitations as a prop for an
ineffective and/or unpopular government. In the March
1930 Congressional elections, the personalistas lost in
the Federal Capital despite a campaign which emphasized
their oil policy. In addition, Yrigoyen 's premature de-
parture from office may have saved him from suffering the
effects of a politically even more serious limitation of
a nationalist, anti-imperialist oil policy - its inability
to ensure a sufficient oil supply in the marketplace. Pe-
troleum is a high risk, capital intensive industry which
demands sophisticated technical skills, and Argentina
simply lacked the capital and the technological resources
to attain fuel autonomy without foreign investment.
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Yrigoyen was not forced to acknowledge these facts, but
both Peron and Frondizi found themselves compelled to re-
treat from their nationalist positions and seek the aid
of foreign oil capital. Because the image of internation-
al oil firms as incorrigible imperialistic criminals
proved easier to create than to destroy, their policy re-
versals cost both men heavily in terms of popular support.
One final observation concerning the Yrigoyenist
Radicals is justified by their record on the petroleum
issue. Yrigoyen' s lack of a concrete policy in 1916, the
inept manner in which his first administration handled the
state oil industry, and the attempts to win votes through an
exaggerated nationalist policy all suggest that petroleum
development and industrialization were not as critical to
the Radicals as their propaganda indicated. Instead, the
record confirms the picture of Radicalism as a movement
more interested in political reform than in promoting fun-
damental social and economic changes. As a political
force, in short, Radicalism proved much more effective at
mobilizing the disaffected elements in Argentine society
than at drafting social and economic programs that might
have satisfied the aspirations of tiose groups. *
The absence of a strong commitment to basic change
continued to characterize the Radical Party after 1930 and
was evident during the 19 46 presidential campaign conducted
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by Jose Tamborini, the UCR (and Union Democratica) can-
didate who ran against Peron. With the latter promising
sweeping social and economic reforms, Tamborini could offer
only the traditional, and by then suspect, shibboleths about
democracy and civil liberties. Tamborini' s efforts were
futile, but they were well grounded in the Radical Party
tradition.
Insofar as the Socialists were concerned, the consis-
tency with which the small Buenos Aires based party sup-
ported a moderately nationalist oil policy buttressed its
claim to being Argentina's only "non-criollo" party. Its
members prided themselves on their rejection of personality
cults and political opportunism, and emphasized the party's
attachment to principles and explicit party platforms, its
democratic and disciplined internal organization, and its
scientific approach to lawmaking. The Socialists apparent-
ly failed to realize, however, that these traits were not
assets in a political system where personalities were more
important than issues. It would take more than ideological
consistency and well drafted legislative proposals to close
the gap between the middle class professionals who ran the
Socialist Party and the laborers whom the party claimed to
represent. The splinter faction of Independent Socialists
demonstrated their understanding of this fact when they
employed "criollo" techniques to score their victory
in
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the 1928 elections.
The refusal of the Senate Conservatives (including
the antipersonalistas after 1924) to cooperate in the ef-
fort to pass oil legislation was a manifestation of their
determination to hinder effective Radical rule in every
way possible. Furthermore, the blind negativism which
characterized their obstructionist tactics revealed the
Conservative's unwillingness to accept the changes in the
nation's political system introduced by the 1912 electoral
reform statute. By ignoring the consensus demand for
some kind of oil legislation, the Conservatives were, in
effect, denying they owed any responsibility to the nation's
electorate. It was simply another expression of the
skepticism about the popular masses which was at the heart
of oligarchic liberalism.
The persistence of this attitude meant that the Con-
cordancia of the 1930 *s would be accompanied by a return
to the Conservative's pre-1916 political practices, and by
the continued exclusion of the lower classes from meaning-
ful participation in the political process. The benefic-
iary of this situation was Peron whose social and economic
policies were attuned to the psychological needs of the
nation's masses. Those policies fostered a sense of dig-
nity and a feeling of legitimate membership in the nation-
al community which was as crucial to their success as the
309
material benefits they brought to the lower classes.
Thus, the failure of Argentina's leaders to provide
adequate petroleum legislation during the Radical Period
was part of the larger failure of Argentina's political
institutions, and particularly the Radical Party, to
provide channels for the entrance of new groups into
Argentina's political system. With the Radicals disap-
pointing performance followed by the return to the politics
of fraud and deceit under the Concordancia, many Argen-
tines, including important sectors of the military, be-
gan to openly doubt the virtues of liberal democratic
institutions. They came to view politics as a senseless
game in which national decency, honor, and development
were being gambled away for personal aggrandizement and
the perquisites of office. Respect for the democratic
process reached a nadir unmatched since the time of Rosas,
and the road was open for another experiment with the
authoritarian alternative.
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PRIMARY SOURCES
Unpublished Materials
Complaints about the inaccessibility of government
documents and private papers are standard fare in studies
which deal with twentieth-century Argentine history, and
rightfully so. Except in extraordinary cases, researchers
find official files tightly sealed, and they discover that
the papers of significant figures are in the hands of heirs
or friends whose sense of responsibility to the public
reputation of the individual involved is too often imper-
meable to pleas about setting the historical record
straight.
For the present study, a case in point are the YPF
archives which are located along with the YPF laboratories
in the town of Florencio Varela, south of the Federal Capi-
tal. To my knowledge, they have not been opened to any
scholar, and I was informed by YPF's Director of Publica-
tions that the archives were for the exclusive use of govern
ment personnel.
Unconfirmed reports suggest that a good deal of materi-
al was lost in the transfer of the archives from the YPF
building in Buenos Aires to the present site in Florencio
Varela during the Peron era. Whether this is true or not,
the location of the single unpublished YPF document used in
the present study suggests that, at best, the Florencio
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Varela collection is incomplete. By accident, I found the
Administrative Commission's "Acta No. 831 M (October 9,
1928) among the holdings of the Centro de Estudios Na-
cionales in Buenos Aires. It presents a helpful 51-page
summary of YPF's activities from 1922 to 1928.
The most valuable body of unpublished material used
in preparing this study is the U.S. State Department Deci-
mal File 835, the pertinent section of which is available
<
on National Archives microfilm under the title "Records
Relating to the Internal Affairs of Argentina, 1910-1929"
(Microcopy 514, 44 rolls). Particularly valuable are the
rolls (835.6363 series) which deal specifically with petro-
leum matters. They provide the single richest source on
the private sector of Argentina's oil industry during the
Radical Period, and especially on the attitudes and activ-
ities of American firms. Other rolls contain information
on general economic and political developments in Argentina
which, although helpful, is not always accurate and must be
handled with care.
Printed Documents
Laws, Decrees, and Resolutions
Pigretti, Eduardo A. , comentador. Co'digg de
minen'a
y legislacion de hidrocarburos . Buenos
Aires:
Cooperadora de~Derecho y Ciencias Sociales, 196
4.
Remorino, Jero'nimo, ed. Anales de legislacion
argenti
na . complemente anpsTIIl?-±211 • buenos Aires:
Editorial La Ley, 1954.
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a f/ Ministerio de Agricultura, Yaci-
mientos Petroliferos Fiscales. Recopilacion de
ley_es, decretos y y resoluciones sobre materia
petrolera
.
Vol. I ( 1907- 1933 ) . Buenos Aires:
L.J. Rosso, 1938.
Convenient and comprehensive compilation of oil
laws, decrees, and resolutions which includes
many provincial as well as national government
measures.
Legislative Debates
Republica Argentina, Congreso Nacional, Camara de Di-
putados. Diario de sesiones
, anos 1907-1930
.
Buenos Aires: Imprenta del Congreso de la Nacion,
1907-1930.
Indispensable, not only for debates and copies
of legislative proposals, but for supplementary
documents often published in Diario
.
Republica Argentina, Congreso Nacional, Camara de
Senadores. Diario de sesiones , anos 1907-1930 .
Buenos Aires: L.J. Rosso, 1907-1930.
Of limited use until 192 8 when Senate first began
discussing petroleum legislation.
Reports and Publications of Executive and Legis-
lative Bodies
Republica Argentina, Congreso Nacional, Camara de Di-
putados. Yacimientos petroliferos fiscales;
Antecedentes sobre su explotacion , iniciatTvas
parlamentarias , 3 Vols. Buenos Aires: Camara de
Diputados, 1924.
Contains pre-1924 legislative proposals on petro-
leum, but more important for the reports on the
pre-192 3 history and condition of state petroleum
exploitation by Mosconi and others which appear
in Vol. I.
,
comision de Industrias y Comercio. Anexo
a la orden del dia N° 66; Antecedentes de la
Comfsion de~TndusTrTas~y comercio en el proyecto
de ley organica del petroled 3uenos~Aires
:
Camara de Diputados, 19 26.
Provides testimony of Mosconi and opinions of
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private oil firms on the Committee's 1925 billalong with a copy of the bill itself.
'
Sesiones ordinarias
, 1926; Orden deldia^nura. 66. Buenos Aires: CamlFa de~5Tp"utados
,
Important because there is no copy of this bill
in Chamber's Diario
.
Republica Argentina, Congreso Nacional, Camara de
Diputados, Division Informacion Parlamentaria,
Petroleo ; Antecedentes legislatives
. Buenos
Aires: Congreso de la Nacion, 1958.
Helpful index to all occasions on which the
Chamber and the Senate discussed petroleum
matters between 1907 and July 1958.
Republica Argentina, Direccion de Comercio e Indus tria,
Direccion General de Estad^stica. Anuario de la
direccion general de estadistica , correspondiente
al affo 1907
. Vol. I." Buenos Aires: Compahia
Sudamericana de Billetes de Banco, 190 8.
Statistics on trade.
.
.
Anuario.
. . 190 8 . Vol. I. Buenos Aires:
Compania Sudamericana de Billetes de Banco, 1909.
.
^
Anuario. . . 1909 . Vol. I. Buenos Aires:
Compania Sudamericana de Billetes de Banco, 1911.
•
Anuario.
. . 1914 . Buenos Aires: Compania
Sudamericana de Billetes de Banco, 1915.
.
Anuario. . . 1916 . Buenos Aires: L.J. Rosso,
1918.
Repilblica Argentina, Ministerio de Agricultura. Anales
del ministerio de, agricultiira , secci^n de geo-
logia
,
mineralogia y_ mineria , Vol. VII, 2,
Memoria de la division de minas , geologia e
hidrologia correspondiente al ano 19 10 . Buenos
Aires: Oficina Meteorologica Argentina, 1912.
Contains best official account of the 1907 oil
discovery in Comodoro Rivadavia, a copy of Law
7,059, and some comments on its application, and
a copy of the memorandum which led to the Decern-
315
ber 24, 1910 creation of the Administrative Com-mission to direct state developments in ComodoroRivadavia.
.
Memoria presentada al congreso de la
naci6n, 1917
. Buenos Aires: Minis terio~de~Aqri-
cultura, 1920.
Some comments from E
. Hermitte on 1917 oil strike
and on need for oil legislation.
•
Memoria.
. .1918
. Buenos Aires: Ministerio
de Agricultura, 1920.
•
Memoria.
. . 1919
. Buenos Aires: Ministerio
de Agricultura, 1920.
r Direccion General de Explotacion del Petro-
leo de Comodoro Rivadavia. Informe de la direc-
cion a S.E. el senor ministro de agricultura de
la naciOn
, febrero de 1916 . Buenos Aires: Impren-
ta de Gmo. Kraft, 1916.
Summarizes condition of state oil industry just
before Yrigoyen became President. Comments on
Administrative Commission's work from 1911 to
1916, on need for money, and on positive role
private companies could play in nation's oil
industry.
j Memoria^ de la direccion general de explo-tacion de petroleo de Comodoro Rivadavia corres-
pondiente a los alios 19 12 / 19T3 ." Buenos Aires:
CompaKia Sudamericana de Billetes de Banco, 1914
Body's first Memoria . Account of progress since
1911. Encourages private exploitation, but
critical of alleged efforts of private capital
to monopolize oil lands.
.
Nota fundando su pedido de 2 .000 .000
$m/n para proseguir los trabajos. Buenos Aires:
Oficina Meteorologica Argentina, 1911.
Petro'leo de Comodoro Rivadavia; Direccion
general de la explotacio'n ael~"petr6'leo' de Comor
doro RivacTavTa; Acta del~2H~cTe"llinio ae~T9TTT~
Buenos Aires: lmprenta~*rt)e Su Conrianza", iyl3.
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Petroleo de Comodoro Rivadavia ; Memoran-
dum
]
j.e la direccion" general relativo a la explo-
tacion futura de los yacimientos de petroleo de
Comodoro Rivadavia con prograiaa de traaajos y
presupuesto de gastos
, del acta del 8 de abril de
19L3. Buenos Aires: Imprenta "De Su Confianza"
,
T913.
Plea for funding of program to raise oil produc-
tion and eliminate need for imported coal.
Criticism of private investors for attempting to
monopolize oil districts,
Republica Argentina, Ministerio de Agricultura, Direc-
cion General de Minas, Geologia e Hidrologia.
Boletm N° 12 , Serie A (Minas ) , Instrucciones
para la presentacion y_ tramitacion de solicitudes
mmeras . Buenos Aires: Ministro de Agricultura,
1919.
Helpful guide for understanding processes indica-
ted in title.
Memoria de ^a direccion general de^minas ,
aia e hidroloqia correspondiente al ano 19 11.geolog g
Buenos Aires: Oficina Meteorologica Argentina,
1913.
Contains legislative recommendations from the
Mining Bureau, along with comments on activity of
private companies and on state drilling in Salta.
.
Memoria. . .1912 . Buenos Aires: Ministerio
de Agricultura, 1914.
Contains comments on petroleum legislation and
copy of important October 18, 1912 Ministerial
Resolution on granting of petroleum rights.
.
Memoria. . .1923 . Buenos Aires: Ministerio
de Agricultura, 192b.
Statistics on granting of petroleum exploration
rights, 1910-1923.
.
Produccio
;
n de petroleo en la republica
"iT^elTtina durante el ano 1926 y_ otros dates mi-
neros . Buenos Aire^: Direcc
Geologia e Hidrologia, 1927.
General de Minas
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Hi* *
Production figures (1924-1926) for both private
and state companies, plus statistics indicating
effect of Alvear's January 1924 decrees in cut-
ting down on speculation in oil rights.
Republica Argentina, Ministerio de Agricult
cion General de Yacimientos Petrolifer
Desarrollo de
1907-1932.
la
ura, Direc-
^ os Fiscales.
industria potrolifera fiscal,
Buenos Aires: Jacobo Peuser, 1932.
One of most valuable sources on development of
the state industry to 1932, providing year by
year narrative of progress in all areas where state
was active, along with statistical summaries of
all facets of state activity. Sanitized and self-
congratulatory, but a convenient resumed.
.
Memoria de la^ explotacion del petroleo de
Coiaodoro RivadavTa corrcspondien te al ano 1921 «"
Buenos Aires: Ferrari linos., 1923.
As a group, YPF's Memorias provide basically
technical, statistical information on the firm^s
growths There is little on the political side of
the petroleum question.
Memori^ de la direccion general de yaci-
atfo 1922 . Buenos Aires
:
Ferrari . linos. , 1924.
• Memoria.
.
.1923. Buenos Aires
:
Ferrari
linos 1924.
• Memoria. .1924. Buenos Aires Ferrari
Hnos • 9 1925.
.
Memoria. .1925. Buenos Aires Ferrari
linos • 9 1926.
.
Memoria. .1926. Buenos Aires Ferrari
Hnos • 9 1927.
•
Memoria. .1927. Buenos Aires: Ferrari
Hnos • 9 1578.
• Memoria.
.
.1928. Buenos Aires: Ferrari
Hnos • 9 1929.
Contains extensive summary of YPF's 1922-1928
activities.
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Memoria.
. .1929
. Buenos Aires: Minis teride Agricultura, 19 30.
• Memoria. . . 19 30 . Buenos Aires: N.p..
1932. F '
YPF, 1907-1937
. Buenos Aires: Yacimientos
Petroliferos Fiscales, 1937.
Pamphlet published to commemorate opening of new
YPF building in Buenos Aires. Outstanding col-
lection of photographs of YPF installations in
Comodoro Rivadavia and elsewhere. Provides use-
ful information on price of gasoline in Federal
Capital, 1920-1935.
Republica Argentina, Ministerio de Agricultura, Explo-
tacion Nacional del Petrdleo de Comodoro Rivada-
via. Memoria de la explotacion nacional del pe-
troleo de Comodoro Rivadavia corrcspondiente al
afto 1918 . Buenos Aires: Ministerio de Agricul-
tura, 1919.
.
Memoria. . . 1919 . Buenos Aires: Ministerio
de Agricultura, 1920.
.
Memoria. . . 1920 . Buenos Aires: Ministerio
de Agricultura, 1921.
Helpful information on problems with labor and
with purchasing machinery which state industry
faced during war years.
Republica Argentina, Ministerio de Comercio e Indus-
tria, Direccion Nacional de Mineria. Las fuentes
del petroleo argentino , 1907 - 13 diciembre -
1957 - cmcuentenario del descubrimien to. de Com-
odoro Rivadavia . Buenos Aires: Direccidn Na-
cional de Mineria, 1957.
Most of the pamphlet deals with pre-1920 period
and particularly with work of National Bureau of
Mines in early development of petroleum resources.
Filled with excellent pictures and illustrations.
Republica Argentina, Ministerio del Interior, Subsec-
retaria de Informaciones . Las fuer^as armadas
restituyen el imperio de la. sobcrania popular .
Tomo I. Buenos Aires: Imprenta de la Camara de
Diputados, 19 46.
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Part II presents national election results for
1912-19 30. Names of candidates and parties pro-
vided, making this source invaluable for identi-
fying political affiliation of members of the
Chamber of Deputies.
Republica Argentina, Presidencia. Presidencia Alvear
,
1922-1928
. Compilacion de mensajes
,
leyes , de-
cretos y_ reglamentaciones . 9 Vols. Buenos Aires:
Pesce, 1928.
Collection of limited value for this study, con-
taining only a few documents related to YPF in
Vol. III.
Contemporary Publications on Petroleum Matters
"La Alianza Continental," Revista Juridica y_ de Cien-
cias Sociales , ano XLIV (May 1927) , 84-91.
This article and the one which follows outline
the purpose and ideological orientation of the
Alianza Continental.
"Alianza Continental: A los pueblos de sur y centro
ame'rica, me'xico y las antillas," Revista Juridica
y_ de Ciencias Sociales , ano XLIV (Nov. 1926 - May
1927), 43-50.
Arguero, Carlos. Petroleos argentinos . Buenos Aires:
N.p., 1916.
Superficial survey of Argentine oil industry in
1916. Focuses on how to increase productivity and
argues for mixed companies.
"Astra", Compania Argentina de Petroleo, et. al. Las
companias industriales
;
de petroleo ante el honor-
able senado de la nacion. Buenos Aires: Casa
EdTtoria "Coni" , 1928.
Private companies argue against concept of state
oil monopoly, emphasizing need for private ex-
ploitation to increase domestic oil production.
Baldrich, Alonso. El petroleo ; Su importancia comer-
cial, industriaT y militar ; Legislacion petrolera.
B"uenos Aires: Im'prenta "i^l Misionero" , N.d.
Reprint of speech delivered at Centro Naval in
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February 1927. Fine example of the pre-1927 oildebate nationalist argument.
Beninson, Manuel. "Utilizacion del combustible na-
cional y su importancia. Conferencia dada en el
centro naval el 12 de octubre de 1913," Boletindel Centro Naval. XXXI (Nov.
-Dec. 1913), 489-501
.
Encouragement for the use of domestic petroleum
to replace expensive imported fuels.
Bonardi, Silvio. En defensa de la riqueza nacional
del petroleo
, ante la suprema cortc de la nacion.
Buenos Aires: Rinaldi Hnos., 1928.
Bonardi' s brief in the 19 2 8 Supreme Court case of
Standard Oil of New Jersey vs. the Province of
Salta, and a forceful statement of the nation-
alist position.
"La nacionalizacio'n de las minas," Revista
Juridica y_ de Ciencias Sociales , ano XXXVII (May-
Aug. 1920) , 95-99.
Brief statement of the case for federalization at
a relatively early date.
Bunge, Alejandro E. "El problema economico del petro-
leo," Revista de Economia Argentina
, XXIV (June
1930) , 401-436Y7
One of the most coherent and cogent statements of
the argument for continued private exploitation
and against a state oil monopoly. Bunge favored
a "constitutional" federalization of oil resources
which is not spelled out clearly.
La legislacion del petroleo, bases ju-
ridicas y economicas," Revista de Economia Argen-
tina, XXI (Oct. 1928), 289.
Catalano, Miguel H. Codigo de mineria . Fomen
y_
petroleo . Buenos Aires: N. Spinelli, 1
to minero
929.
Pamphlet by the Secretary of the National Bureau
of Mines which urges general reform of the Mining
Code. Generally anti-imperialist in tone, it
calls for closer government control of all mining
activity and a state oil monopoly.
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Colombo, Luis. El petroleo argentino y_ la necesidadde su legislacion
. Buenos Aires: Caracciolo y
Plantie, 1927.
Reprint of speech by President of Union Industrial
Argentina. Colombo supported federalization and
mixed companies.
Confederacion Argentina del Comercio de la Indus tria yde la Produccion, Bolsa de Comercio. Antepro-
yecto de ley de minas de petroleo
. Buenos Aires:
Imprenta Muro, 1927.
Drafters included A.E. Bunge, E. Hermitte and
Carlos Velarde. Proposal for organic oil law
which rejects federalization and monopolization
while allowing mixed companies.
Fliess, Felipe. "El petroleo y Comodoro Rivadavia,"
Boletin del Centro Naval , XXXX (Nov. -Dec. 1922)
421-446.
Contains Fliess 1 s evaluation of his work as Chief
Administrator in Comodoro Rivadavia along with a
five-year development plan which he submitted in
1919.
Gonella, Eduardo M. . "La economia del petroleo nacional
y su legislacion
,
M Revista de Ciencias Econcrtucas ,
ano XV (Sept. 1927), 1009-1032.
Presents a moderately nationalist analysis of oil
situation in Argentina and the world. Supports
federalization, but rejects state oil monopoly in
favor of closely controlled private exploitation.
.
La explotacion oficial del petroleo ; Su
evolucion economica y_ financiera . Buenos Aires:
Imprenta de la Universidad de Buenos Aires, 19 27.
Concentrates on the economic and financial evolu-
tion of YPF with brief comments on the need for
oil legislation. Recommends continued private
exploitation under tight controls along with mix-
ed companies.
Guaresti, Juan J v (hijo) . "El petroleo; Su importancia
y legislacion," Revista de Ciencias Economicas,
ano XVI (Dec. 1928) , 2581-2606, ano XVII (Jan.
1929) , 21-50.
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Two-part article by a University student which
argues for federalization and creation of monopo-
ly mixed company. State would also continue oper-
ations on its own to supply Armed Forces. The
content, organization and analysis of Guaresti's
work make this article a near perfect prototype of
the nationalist approach to the oil question.
•
Petroleo
, importancia economica y_ militar .
lucna P°r su posesidn , conferencia . Buenos
Aires: Imprenta de la Universidad de Buenos Aires.
1927.
Hermitte, Enrique M. Cuestiones relacionadas con el
aprovechamiento de los yacimientos de petroleo de
la reptiolica argentina y_ en particular del de
Comodoro Rivadavia
. Buenos Aires: Congreso Na-
cional de Ingenieria, 1916.
Optimistic survey of past development and future
possibilities of Argentine oil industry despite
public apathy and even hostility. Emphasizes
need for oil law and outlines his recommendations
for continued state exploitation along with regu-
lations on private exploitation which would at-
tract foreign capital.
.
El estado de la cuestion petroleo procedi-
do por " El estudio de las cuestiones relacionadas
con el aprovechamiento de los yacimientos de pe-
trJleo de la repablica argentina y_ en particular
del de Comodoro Rivadavia. Buenos Aires: N.p.,
1921.
Reprint of Hermitte 1 s 1916 work along with some
new observations. Maintains no significant ad-
vances in national oil industry made since 1916
and recommends autonomous agency to direct state
exploitation. Legislative recommendations same
as in 1916.
Hileman, Guillermo. Sobre legislacion del petroleo en
la republica argentina , conferencia , julio ]_ de
1927. Buenos Aires: Imprenta La Aurora, 1927.
Argument against concept of state oil exploita-
tion and for leaving the industry to private cap-
ital.
"El Intransigente". El petroleo del norte argentino:
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Comentarios del diario "El Intransigente " de la
ciudad de Salta. Prologue by E. Mosconi. Salta:
Imprenta C. Velarde, 1928.
Collection of newspaper articles on the oil situ-
ation in Salta preceded by Mosconi* s analysis of
that situation and his recommendations for oil
legislation. A valuable source for Mosconi'
s
ideas.
Lagos, M. J. La politica del petroleo ; Contribucion
al estudio . Buenos Aires : L.J. Rosso, 1922.
Analyzes the world oil scene, petroleum legisla-
tion in the Americas, and Argentina's need for an
oil law. Support for federalization combined
with advantageous conditions for private exploita-
tion to increase production.
Mendez, Jose M. EJL petroleo en la republica argentina .
Buenos Aires: N.p., 1916.
Highly critical of 1907-1915 state exploitation.
Emphasizes need for exploration and argues for
federalization, mixed companies, and liberal con-
ditions for private investors.
Moreno, Evaristo V. "Explotacion de nuestros yacimi-
entos petroliferos , " La Ingenieria , ano XXI (Feb.
1, 1927) , 98-118.
Survey of nation's oil industry combined with
recommendations for continued state exploitation
in Comodoro Rivadavia and reform of the Mining
Code to promote private exploitation.
Mosconi, Enrique. El petroleo argentino 1922 - 1930 y_
la ruptura de los trusts petroliferos ingles y_
norteamericano el lu de agosto de 1929 . Buenos
Aires: Ferrari Hnos., 1936.
Mosconi 's own account of the development of YPF
under his direction. Cohering the political as
well as the economic and technical developments,
it is laudatory but, nonetheless, indispensable.
. La batalla del petroleo; YPF y_ las empre-
ilTTxtr^jeras: Buenos Aires: Ediciones Proole-
— i * i i a rtw«»
w-»- j
mas Nacionales, 1957.
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A collection of Mosconi «s writings and speeches
which highlight his contribution to national oildevelopment and his nationalist stance. A use-
ful source because its reproductions are, for
tne most part, accurate.
Naon, Romulo S. Inviolabilidad de la propiedad minera.
Buenos Aires: Editorial Muro, 1928.
Naon's brief prepared for Standard Oil of New
Jersey in the Supreme Court case of Standard vs.
the Province of Salta.
Newberry, Jorge and Justino C. Thierry. El petroleo .
Buenos Aires: Vaccaro, 1910.
Superficial study of the petroleum industry and
the state's Comodoro Rivadavia exploitation, but
interesting for a report on an early experiment
using Comodoro Rivadavia crude oil in a locomotive.
Oneto, Ricardo. El centinela . Una campana de veinti-
cinco anos en defeqsa del petroleo argentino y_ de
yacimientos pe troliferos fiscales
, 1915- 1941 .
Buenos Aires : Ferrari Hnos. , 1941.
Collection of primarily newspaper articles writ-
ten by Oneto on petroleum question. He estab-
lished early and maintained a moderate national-
ist position.
. El petroleo argentino y_ la soberania na-
cional . Prologue by E. Mosconi." Buenos Aires:
Ferrari Hnos., 1929.
Copies of many of the same articles by Oneto
which appear in El centinela . Prologue by Mosconi
is especially valuable since it contains the most
lucid statement of his post-1927 position on
petroleum policy.
Petroleo de Comodoro Rivadavia . Explo-
tacion industrial de la zona reservada al estado .
Buenos Aires: Imprenta y* Li togratia La Buenos
Aires", 1918.
Another collection of Oneto' s writings, again pri-
marily newspaper articles. This group emphasizes
his support of Deputy Tomas de Veyga's 1914 leg-
islative proposal.
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Orzabal Quintana, Arturo. ^Nuestro nacionalismo con-
tinental," Revista Juridica y de Ciencias Soci-
ales, ano XLIV (Nov. 1926-May 1927) , £1-5 8~.
Discussion of purpose and ideological orientation
of the Alianza Continental by its Argentine
President.
Provincia de Jujuy. El petroleo y_ la constitucion na-
cional
. Jujuy: Talleres Graficos del Estado,
1926.
Presentation of the anti- federalization argument
which features comments by Governor B. Villafane
accompanied by supportive selections from several
of the nation's leading conservative lawyers.
Ramos, Eduardo A. El petroleo en la republica argen-
tina ; Su legislation . Buenos Aires: Valerio
Abeledo - Libreria Juridica, 1927.
Extensive study of petroleum question in world
setting followed by specific recommendations on
Argentine situation. Argues for federalization
combined with exclusion of foreign capital.
Sanchez Sorondo, Matias G. La palabra de un patriota
sobre el problema de _la legislacion del petroleo
con un e studio-pro logo sobro los derechos ae las
provincias por" Benjamin Villafane . Buenos Aires:
Imprenta V. Dommguez, 1927.
Statement of Sanchez Sorondo' s support for pri-
vate oil exploitation in the context of a savage
attack on oil bill passed by 19 27 Chamber of
Deputies.
.
Politica del petroleo ; La legislacion .
Buenos Aires: Agencia General de Libreria, 1923.
Reprint of a speech delivered by Sanchez Sorondo.
Presents the most comprehensive statement of nis
"open doors" policy toward foreign capital.
Velarde, Carlos. "Fomento de la explotacion de], yaci-
miento de Comodoro Rivadavia," La Ingenieria , ano
XVIII (July 16, 1914), 223-228.
Comments on geological formations and crude oil
production in Comodoro Rivadavia. Partisan of
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private investment to expand production.
•
Las roinas de petro'leo en la legislacion
argentina
. Buenos Aires: Casa Editora "Coni"
.
1922.
Velarde had held positions as a mining authority
with governments of Peru and Argentina. Most
valuable section of this work for the present
study is an extensive and lucid discussion of the
procedures for obtaining petroleum exploration
and exploitation rights.
Zucal, Manuel. "La explotacion fiscal de Comodoro Ri-
vadavia," La Ingenierra , ano XXVII (Jan. 1923)
,
16-21.
Discussion of some of the administrative and
labor problems which hindered state industry's
development during Yrigoyen's first term. Writ-
ten by man who had worked in Comodoro Rivadavia.
"Legislacion petrolifera, " La Ingenieria
,
afio XXV (Oct. 1. 1921), 308-317.
Emphasizes need for an oil law and rejects both
mixed companies and a state monopoly in favor of
continued state and private exploitation, each on
their own.
Memoirs
Coca, Joaquin. El contubernio ; Memorias de un diputa-
do obrero. Buenos Aires: Claridad, 1930.
Coca, an Orthodox Socialist, served in Chamber,
1924-1928. His memoirs are informative on the
inner workings of the Socialist Party and on the
general line up of pro and anti-Yrigoyen forces
in the Chamber.
Columba, Ramon. El congreso que yo he visto. 2 Vols.
Buenos Aires: N.p., 1948-1949.
Vol. I deals with years 1914-1933. There is noth-
ing specifically on petroleum matters, but Colum-
ba 1 s remarks aid in understanding the figures who
served in Congress. The numerous cartoons are
delightful.
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Golds traj, Manuel. Anos £ errores. Buenos Aires:Sophos, 19 57.
The first one hundred plus pages present a fairlybalanced picture of Argentina's 1916-1930 politicsby a man who was Alvear's chief political secre-
tary from 1931 to 1941. Deals with strengths and
weaknesses of both Alvear. and Yrigoyen.
Ibarguren, Carlos. La historia que he vivido. Buenos
Aires: Peuser, 1955.
Memoir of a significant public figure and histor-
ian which sometimes treats the Radical Period in
great detail from viewpoint of a conservative
nationalist.
Pinedo, Federico. En tiempos de la republica
. Vol. I.
Buenos Aires: Editorial Mundo Forense, 19 46.
This memoir serves as an introduction to a col-
lection of Pinedo' s writings from the years 1912-
1943. Strongly anti-Yrigoyen, Pinedo' s comments
are more valuable for the study of the Socialist
Party than for this study of petroleum policy.
Repetto, Nicolas. Mi paso por la pol/tica , de Roca a
Yrigoyen . Buenos Aires: Santiago Rueda Editor,
-
1956.
Observations of a man who was not only one of
most capable men in Argentine public life, but
who was also interested in the question of oil
legislation. Repetto' s comments consistently
show an anti-Yrigoyen bias.
Collections of Speeches and Messages
Comite Universitario Radical, Junta Central. El pc-
troleo argentine, Ciclo de conferencias en pro de
su nacionalizacion y_ explotacion por el estado.
Buenos Aires: Talleres '"Capano" , 19 30.
Reprints of a series of more than twenty addresses
delivered, in most cases, by University students
and favoring the Yrigoyenist petroleum policy.
They were originally broadcast over the radio
during late 1928 and early 1929.
Mosconi, Enrique. Dichos y hechos , 1904- 1938 . Buenos
Aires: Libreria "El Ateneo" , l9J8T^
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Collection of Mosconi's speeches, some of whichdeal with petroleum and many of which do not.
This collection must be used carefully because
the selections are not all accurately identifiedm terms of dates and places.
Yrigoyen, Hipolito. Pueblo y gobierno . 2nd. ed. 12
Vols. Buenos Aires: Editorial Raigal, 1956.
These volumes, despite the obvious pro-Yrigoyen
orientation, are an invaluable source of both
primary and secondary material on Yrigoyen and
the Radical Period. The volumes of immediate
importance for the present study include: Vol.
IV which includes Roberto Etchepareborda*
s
Yrigoyen y_ el congreso , a valuable aid for deter-
mining the strength of political parties in Con-
gress from 1916 to 1930; Vol. XI which is Arturo
Frondizi's Petroleo y_ politica (see description
below) ; and Vol. XII which includes a collection
of comments by Yrigoyen on petroleum gathered
from his speeches.
Radical Party Campaign Literature
Amado, Isias R. "Contribucion para la redaccion de un
programa de partido," Revista Argentina de Cien-
cias Politicas , XII (May 1916), 91-110.
Account of Amado' s attempt along with others to
get Radical Party to adopt an explicit platform
for the 1916 election.
Bianco, Jose. La doctrina radical . Buenos Aires:
L. J. Rosso, 1927.
This selection along with those which follow are
of little direct value for the study of the oil
issue. Rather they present evidence of the Yrigo-
yenist Radicals tendency to avoid concrete issue
statements at election time and glorify Yrigoyen.
Etkin, Alberto M. Bosque jo de una historia y_ doctrine
de la union civica radical . Buenos Aires: El
Ateneo, 1928.
Flotta, M.S. El hombre de manana . Buenos Aires:
Pagano Hnos., N.d.
Giordano, Gabriel. El hombre cumbre y_ su obra de g_o-
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bierno. Buenos Aires: Edi tores M. Rocca y aa.,
1928.
Mendoza Dumas, Ricardo. Docencia democr^tica del Dr.
Hipolito Yrigoyen
. Buenos Aires: Imprenta Lopez,
19 28*
This selection does deal with petroleum in the
final chapter where the author praises the con-
cepts of federalization and monopolization.
Oyhanarte, Horacio B. El hombre ; Hipolito Yrigoyen t
apostle de la democracia . 20 til ed. Buenos Aires
Claridad, 1945.
Originally published as a campaign biography in
1916.
SECONDARY SOURCES
General Studies
Acaderaia Nacional de Historia. Historia argentina
contempora'nea , 1862-1930 . 3 Vols. Buenos Aires:
El Ateneo, 1963-1966.
These three volumes follow the pattern of the
Academy's major multivolume work in that the var-
ious contributions are uneven in their quality.
Section in Vol. Ill on mining and petroleum by
Jose A. Craviotto is one of the best in this
study on economic history. His account is detail-
ed and complete though almost strictly narrative.
Alexander, Robert. The Peron Era . New York: Columbia
Univ. Press, 1951.
Still a valuable account of the early Peron years.
. An Introduction to Argentina . New York:
" Praeger,T969.
A useful introduction to contemporary Argentine
history which emphasizes the political causes for
economic stagnation and the military's interven-
tion in politics.
Blanksten, George I. Peron 's Argentina. Chicago:
Univ
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of Chicago Press, 1953.
An admirably objective account of Peron's rise topower written by a political scientist.
Ferns, Henry S. Argentina
. New York: Praeger, 1969.
An adequate synthesis which is weak on the colon-
ial period and concentrates on the twentieth cen-
tury. Highly critical of Argentina's "mindless"
performance in the 19 20's and of the Radicals
whom he views as political "outs" who wanted in.
Palacio, Ernesto. Historia de la argentina. 3rd ed.
2 Vols. Buenos Aires: A. Pena Lillo, 1960.
A Rosista synthesis which simply reinterprets old
rather than supplies new evidence. Weak on the
Radical Period to which he devotes less than 35
pages in Vol. II.
Pendle, George. Argentina . 3rd ed. New York: Oxford
Univ. Press, 1963.
A sound, conventional, political-economic survey
accompanied by a series of useful statistical
appendices.
Ramos, Jorge Abelardo. Revolucion y_ contrarevolucion
en la argentina. 3rd ed. 2 Vols. Buenos Aires:
Plus Ultra, 1965.
Challenging Marxist interpretation, perhaps the
best of its genre. Ramos accords the Radical
Period major and sympathetic treatment in his
second volume.
Rennie, Ysabel. The Argentine Republic . New York:
Macmillan, 19 45.
While not recent, Rennie' s account of 19th century
development and the rise of Peron remains a pro-
vocative and highly readable study.
Romero, Jose Luis. A History of Argentine Political
Thought. Intro7 and trans. t»y inomas r. ncbann.
Stanford: Stanford Univ. Press, 1963.
A basic and important interpretive essay which
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covers the major political and economic themes in
Argentine development.
Scobie, James R. Argentina ; A City and a Nation
. 2nd
ed. New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 197X
The best one-volume synthesis in existence.
Scobie concentrates on social and economic themes
with a subordinated political narrative. The text
is heavily weighted toward the nineteenth century
and is followed by a detailed political chronol-
ogy, a superb bibliographic essay, and some help-
ful statistical material.
Whitaker, Arthur P. Argentina
.
Englewood Cliffs, N.
J.: Prentice-Hall, 1964.
Essentially a narrative political survey in which
economic developments are not forgotten. Major
emphasis placed on the twentie^ century and on
themes of nationalism and Peron. Whitaker'
s
selected and annotated bibliography is useful.
Publications Relating to Petroleum
Abeijon, Asencio. "Las primeras huelgas petroleras ,"
in Medio siglo de petroleo arqentino. Comodoro
Rivadavia: Editorial "El Rivadavia", 1957, 41-43.
Discussion of the causes and development of the
1917 petroleum strike in the Comodoro Rivadavia
fields by a long-time resident of the area.
Bunge, Agusto. La guerra del petroleo en la argen-
tina. Buenos Aires: "La Grafica" , 1933."
Polemic which arose out of contracts signed be-
tween Standard Oil of New Jersey and the Province
of Salta in early 1933. Bunge' s attack on Stan-
dard and certain provincial authorities carries
him back into Salta oil disputes of the 1920 's.
"50 anos de petroleo argentine" Revista del Club YPF
No. XXII (Oct. -Dec. 1957, Edicidn extraordinaria,
Bodas de Oro) , 23-59.
Uneven and superficial survey of oil developments
from 1907 to 1930, but useful for a detailed de-
scription of the 190 7 discovery in Comodoro Riva-
davia and for a list of all members of all the
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administrative bodies which directed state oil
exploitation from 1907 to 1957.
Diaz Araujo, Enrique. "La explotacion del petroleo en
iMendoza en el,siglo XIX," Revista de la Junta de
Estudios Historicos de Mendoza, 2nd eVoca, No.T
(1968), 121-154.
Examines early history of oil development in An-
dean area of Argentina, focusing on the Compania
Mendocina de Petroleo which was created with
Argentine capital in 1886.
Diaz Goitia, Jose J. La riqueza petrolffera argentina
en peligro
. Buenos Aires: Editorial Tor, 19 36.
A detailed examination of Argentine petroleum de-
velopment from 190 7 to 1934 which consists mostly
of long quotes and statistics drawn from govern-
ment publications. Glorifies YPF's accomplish-
ments under Mosconi and warns that in 1931-1934
period the state industry was retrogressing while
private exploitation was spurting ahead.
Frondizi, Arturo. Petroleo y_ politica . Vol. XI of
Pueblo y_ gobierno, Hip6lito Yrrgoyen. 2nd ed.
12 Vols. Buenos Aires: Editorial Raigal, 1956.
Frondizi presents the classic nationalist inter-
pretation of Argentina's petroleum history, em-
phasizing the need for state exploitation and
warning against the dangers of foreign oil capi-
tal. Even with this bias, Frondizi' s account is
the best available secondary account of Argentine
oil development. It is comprehensive, readable,
and supplemented by a wealth of statistics.
.
Petroleo y_ nacion . Buenos Aires: Tran-
sicioh, 1963.
Frondizi 1 s attempt to justify the fact that his
oil policy as President did not concur with his
position as outlined in Petroleo y_ politica .
Gonzalez, Carlos EmeVito. Energia y soberania; Intro-
duccion al estudio econ6niicorjuridico de las
fuentes naturales~"de energia . Buenos Aires:
Gure, 19BIT
Work deals principally with petroleum in the
1950' s and the author strongly supports Frondizi 's
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pre-presidential policy. Interesting for this
study because the author's comments on issues like
federalization and foreign investment are carbon
copies of the nationalist position in the 1920's.
Gonzalez, Julio V. Nacionalizacion del petroleo.
Buenos Aires: "El Ateneo" , 19 47.
Gonzalez was a Socialist Deputy in the 1930's,
and his work deals with contracts signed between
YPF and private firms in 1936-19 37. He presents
a nationalist interpretation in a brief histor-
ical survey of the Argentine petroleum industry.
Importacion de combustibles y_ lubricantes . Nafta y_ ea-
rnings ." Reimpresion del No~I 160, BoTetm de In-"
formaciones Petroleras . Buenos Aires: R. Canals,
1938.
The best compilation of statistics on fuel impor-
tation for the years 1918-1936.
Kaplan, Marcos. Economia y_ politica del petroleo
argentine- ( 1939-1956 ) . Buenos Aires : Praxis
,
1957.
Primarily concerned with Peron's "failure" with
oil development, Kaplan provides brief background
survey on the period from 190 7 to 19 39. Polemical
and superficial, his comments illuminate the posi-
tion of the self-styled revolutionary left in the
late 1950' s.
Krause, Emma y Amalia. La casualidad y_ el petroleo de
Comodoro Rivadavia ; Contnbucion al estudio del
descubrimiento del petroleo fiscal , segun con-
stancias oticiales . Buenos Aires: N.p., 1943.
Pamphlet written by two children of the man who
was in charge of the division of the National
Bureau of Mines which was responsible for the
drilling that struck oil in 1907. Presents uncon-
vincing argument that discovery was result of
scientific exploration and not accident, but does
include copies of telegrams exchanged between
Comodoro Rivadavia and Buenos Aires immediately
after the discovery.
.
un fundador para YPF . Buenos Aires:
Guillermo Kraft, 1958.
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Reiteration of thesis described above, along
with discussion of their father's (Julio Krause)
contributions to national oil development.
Lopez Zavaleta, P. Javier. El petroleo argentine
Consideraciones re ferentes a una adecuada legis-
lacion
. Buenos Aires: L.J. Rosso, 1931.
Argues that federalization as passed by the 1927
Chamber was unconstitutional and suggests it
should be accomplished by provinces voluntarily
handing over their oil deposits to national gov-
ernment, and presents case for mixed companies
over a state monopoly.
Morixe, Horacio. Regimen legal del petroleo
. Buenos
Aires: Editorial "La Facultad"", 1934.
A compilation of lectures by an expert in mining
law, this work presents a fairly balanced and
judicious review of the world and Argentine oil
scene in the mid-19 30' s. Touching on all phases
of the petroleum industry, the author analyzes
the past legislative proposals on oil as well as
those before Congress in 19 33.
Mozo, Sadi H. E_l petroleo argenti.no en el
.
siglo XIX .
Bahia Blanca: Martinez, Rodriquez y cia. , 1950.
A worthwhile account of petroleum developments in
nineteenth century that concentrates on Salta
and Jujuy.
Mozo, Sadi H. and Jayne Bermejo. Argentina petrolera ,
1943 ; Legis lacion , te'cnica , estadistica . Buenos
Aires: "Cultura" , 19 43.
With Bermejo writing the technical sections and
Mozo those relating to legal aspects of oil, the
two present a useful handbook on the Argentine
petroleum industry. The uninitiated will find
the technical material explained and illustrated
in an easily understood manner.
Rumbo, Eduardo I. Petroleo y vasallaje ; Cayrne de
vaca y carnero contra "carbon Mas petroleo .
Buenos" Aires: Hecnos e Ideas, l'35Tl
A National Deputy during the Peronist period,
Rumbo is highly critical of the government's
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handling of Argentina's oil resources from 190 7to 19 30. In the fifth of his text which he de-
votes to these years, Rumbo places heavy emphasis
upon the conflict between American and British
interests in Argentina, but, unfortunately, his
comments rely on logic rather than evidence.
Silenzi de Stagni, Adolfo. El petr<4>leo argentine
2nd. ed. Buenos Aires: Coleccion Problemas
Nacionales, 1955.
This is the printed version of the famous history
class conducted by Silenzi de Stagni in May 1955
when he ^criticized Peron's oil policy, maintain-
ing Peron had seriously weakened YPF and strength
ened the position of foreign companies. The
first two editions of this work were published
clandes tine ly
.
Politics, Economics, Labor and Foreign Relations
Baily, Samuel L. Labor
,
Nationalism , and Politics in
Argentina . New Brunswick, N. J. : Rutgers Univ.
Press, 1967.
While he focuses on the post-19 30 period, Baily
analyzes Yrigoyen's relations with labor and the
struggles within the labor movement during the
Radical Period.
Bosch, Mariano G. Historia del partido radical , la
UCR , 1891-1930 . Buenos Aires: L.J. Rosso, 19 31.
An anti-Yrigoyen diatribe which concentrates al-
most exclusively on pre-1916 period. Argues un-
convincingly that passage of Saenz PeHa law was
accompanied by a tacit understanding with Yrigo-
yen that he would not seek the presidency in
1916.
Bunge, Alejandro E. La economia argentina . 4 Vols.
Buenos Aires: Cia. Impresora Argentina, 1928-
1930. v
Economic history and analysis in the nineteenth
century liberal tradition. Bunge analyzes Argen-
tina's contemporary economic problems and pro-
vides a mountain of statistics which were a
product, in part, of his one-time position as the
Director of the National Bureau of Statistics.
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Canton, Dario. El parlamento argentino en epocas de
4_6. Buenos Aires: Instituto
Torcuato di Telia, 19 66.
A leading Argentine sociologist, Canton provides
a well conceived analysis of the Argentine Con-
gress during three crucial years using question-
aire data on selected characteristics of the
Congressmen. Most interesting chapter analyzes
why the increasing democratization of politics
and economic expansion have failed to produce po-
litical stability.
Castagno, Antonio. Los partidos politicos argentinos ;
Analisis de los antecedentes de regimen legal
.
Buenos Aires: Roque Depalma, 19 59.
Political science study of relationship between
political parties and democracy with bulk of the
text consisting of projects for reforming the law
on political parties which had been made since
1922. Author emphasizes role of schools and po-
litical parties in developing civic responsibility
in Argentina.
Diaz Alejandro, Carlos F. Essay on the Economic History
of the Argentine Republic . New Haven: Yale Univ.
Press, 1970.
Perhaps the most important work on Argentine eco-
nomic history published in recent years. The
author offers two general essays analyzing econom-
ic development since 1860 with the dividing line
at 1930, and fiye essays on specific facets of
the subject. Diaz Alejandro is primarily concern-
ed with the modern period, but he makes valuable
contributions to the understanding of the pre-
1930 period as well, particularly concerning the
absence of industrial development.
Dorfman, Adolfo. Evolucion de la economia industrial
argentina . Buenos Aires: Editorial "Radio Re-
vista", 1939.
A textbook style account of Argentine industrial
development which has long remained standard due
to lack of material on the history of industry in
Argentina.
Ferrer, Aldo. The Argentine Economy . Trans, by Mar-
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jory M. Urquidi. Berkeley: Univ. of Calif.
Press, 1967.
Historical analysis of the Argentine economy
tracing its evolution through four stages oegin-
ning in the sixteenth century, placing heavy em-
phasis on the post- 19 30 period. A good starting
point for the study of Argentine economic
history.
Galletti, Alfredo. La politica y_ los partidos .
Buenos Aires and Mexico City: Fondo de Cultura
Economica, 1961.
One of the best of the many attempts to analyze
Argentina's chronic political instability.
Galletti, a moderate socialist, argues old liberal
structure must be completely shed in favor of a
"humanistic socialism" which would combine person-
al liberty, social justice and state planning.
McGann, Thomas F. Argentina , the United States , and
the Inter-American System , 1880-1914 . Cam-
bridge: Harvard Univ. Press, 1957.
Of value for the present study for McGann' s open-
ing chapters provide one of the best descriptions
of the "Generation of 1880" available anywhere.
Mazo, Gabriel del. Breve historia del radicalismo .
Buenos Aires: Coepla, 19 64.
Brief and superficial, but with the advantage of
presenting del Mazo's ideas on the entire sweep
of Radicalism in one volume.
.
El radicalismo ; Ensayo sob re su historia
doctrina . Tomo I. Desde los origines nasta
a conqui"sta de la republica representativa y_
primer gobierno radical . Buenos Aires: Ediciones
Gure, 1957.
Covers Yrigoyen's first presidency as well as thu
background of Radicalism. A sympathetic treatment
by the most influential of Radical historians, it
is indispensable for the study of any facet of the
Radical Period, but must be treated as a defense
of Radicalism and Yrigoyen rather than as pure
history.
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T £i radicalising ; Notas sobre su historia vdoctrina, 1922-1952
. Buenos Aires: Editorial
—
Raigal, 1955.
Of Del Mazo's many works, this is the most val-
uable for the present study. Despite the dates
in title, it covers Yrigoyen's first term as well.
Valuable not only for the Radical interpretation
of these years, but for the detail the author
supplies, particularly in terms of personal iden-
tifications.
Melo, Carlos. Los partidos politicos argentinos
. 3rd
ed. Cordoba: Univ. Nacional de Cordoba, 1964.
Helpful as an introductory survey covering span
from early national period through the Frondizi
years, but too brief. Covers the Radical Period
in less than three pages.
Ortiz, Ricardo M. "El aspecto economico-social de la
crisis de 1930," Revista de Historia
, No. 3 (ler
trimestre, 1958), 41-72.
Analysis of the economic factors involved in the
1930 overthrow of Yrigoyen, emphasizing the al-
leged cooperation between imperialist interests
and domestic sectors tied to the imperialists.
•
Historia economica de la argentina , 1850 -
1930 . 2 Vols. Buenos Aires: Editorial Raigal,
1955.
The standard Marxist interpretation of pre-19 30
economic development.
Peterson, Harold F. Argentina and the United States ,
1910-1960 . New York: University Publishers, 196 4.
Author's treatment of petroleum in the 1920' s is
cursory and concentrates on the American reaction
to the threat of petroleum federalization.
Peterson's extensive bibliography is valuable for
any Argentine topic.
Portnoy, Leopoldo. Ana'lisis critico de la economia .
Buenos Aires and Mexico City: FondVcTe Cultura
Economica, 1961.
Study concentrates on the post-19 30 period and
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searches for the reasons behind Argentina's post-1945 economic stagnation. Author argues the in-dustrial interests of the Littoral area are link-ed to the agricultural and cattle sectors of theeconomy, and all pursue economic policies that
aggrevate Argentina's economic dependence. An-swer, he maintains, lies in basic structural
changes
.
POtaS
?Q,R°?o5c
A
; ^SSBL and Politics in Argentina,1928-1945
;
Yrigoyen to PerjnT^tanfoFdY StanfordUniv. Press, 1969.
Study characterized by meticulous research anddetailed narrative. Author rejects theorizing
about the military's role in politics and demon-
strates the importance of personal motivations
and relationships in determining the political
attitudes and actions of the officer corps. An
introductory chapter makes clear Yrigoyen 's par-
tial responsibility for bringing the military
into politics.
Puiggro'sj, Rodolfo. Historia critica de los partidos
politicos argentinos
. "4th ed. Tomo II. £1 Yri-
oyenismo
. 2nd. ed. Buenos Aires: Jorge Alvarez,
963*;
A major and detailed Marxist examination of the
Radical Period characterized by sympathetic treat-
ment of Yrigoyen combined with insightful sug-
gestions about Yrigoyen 's weaknesses and those of
the Radical movement as a whole.
Scobie, James R. Revolution on the Pampas : A Social
History of Argentine Wheat
, 1869- 1910 . Austin:
Univ. of Texas Press, 1964.
One of the few outstanding works on nineteenth
century rural economic and social history. Scobie
argues the agricultural immigrant made possible
the urban middle class political revolution from
which the immigrants, in return, received no
benefits.
Smith, Peter. Politics and Beef in Argentina . New
York: Columbia univTHPress , T9~69~T
Study features use of social science concepts and
methodology to delineate and analyze activity of
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ft5 £ gr°UpS ln ^ beef industry from 1900 to
MnLr
J
r
K
aTn? °f Radical Pe^od sometimeshindered by failure to take into account fullythe split in Radical Party ranks.
Snow, Peter G. Argentine Radicalism i The History andDoctrine of the Radical civic Uni3nT Iowa CityTUniv. of Iowa Press, 1965^ ^
Provides an adequate introduction to the subject,
not definitive. Author's treatment of the1920 s is brief and superficial and not withoutfactual inaccuracies.
Solberg, Carl., Immigration and Nationalism ; Argentina
and Chile
,
1890 - 1914 . Austin: Univ. of Teles'
Press, 19 70.
A comparative study of the relationship between
the immigrant flow and the rise of nationalism inboth countries. Solberg' s research highlighted
by extensive use of literary sources.
Tornquist and Co.
, Ernesto. Business Conditions in
the Argentine
. Report 143 (Dec. 30, 1918).
Provides statistics on coal importation during
the WW I years.
Tulchin, Joseph S. "The Argentine Economy During the
First World War," The Review of the River Plate
,
Vol. CXLVII, No. 3750 (June 19, 1970), 901-903,
No. 3751 (June 30, 1970), 965-967, Vol. CXLVIII,
No. 3752 (July 10, 1970), 44-46.
An examination of why Argentina's WW I experience
produced no basic change in the nation's pattern
of economic development, and, in fact, exacerbated
the nation's dependence on industrialized powers.
Biographical Studies and Reference Works
Abad de Santillan, Diego, ed. Gran enciclopedia ar-
qentina . 8 Vols. Buenos Aires: Ediar, 1956-
1963.
Massive work contains valuable biographical
sketches of many key historical figures.
Galvez, Manuel. Vida de Hipolito Yrigoyen ; El hombre
341
§§i E||te£iQ. 4th ed. Buenos Aires: Editorial
While completely uncritical ,and disturbing for itslack of factual material, Galvez's portrayal ofYrigoyen as an introvert is interesting and some-times enlightening reading.
"General Alonso Baldrich," Estrategia, No. 4 (Nov -
Dec. 1969), 135-136. K '
A brief eulogy which provides biographical data.
Guevara Labal, Carlos. El general ingeniero
, Enrique
Mosconi; Una vida consagrada a la patria
. Buenos
Aires: A. Riera & cia.
, 1941.
El general ingeniero
, Enrique Mosconi;
Una vida consagrada a la patria
, segunda parte
.
Buenos Aires: Juan Ferrotti, 19 46.
These two volumes present admiring portrait of
Mosconi by a man who worked for Mosconi in 1920 's.
Hombres del dia, 1917 : El diccionario biografico argen-
tine)
. Buenos Aires: Casa Editoria Sociedad In-
teligencia Sudamericana, N.d.
Includes living public figures in all fields.
Larra, Raul. Mosconi : General del petroleo . Buenos
Aires: Editorial Futuro, 1957.
While strongly over balanced in Mosconi' s favor
and blatantly anti-imperialist in tone, Larra'
s
is the only attempt at a biography of this lead-
ing petroleum figure. Provides excellent detail
on Mosconi' s background and on his work with YPF
reflecting the fact that Larra had access to at
least some of Mosconi 's papers.
Luna, Felix. Alvear . Buenos Aires: Libros Argentinos,
1958.
The best existing biography of Alvear. Luna en-
joyed use of part of Alvear' s personal papers.
Unfortunately, Luna skims much of Alvear 's pre-
1931 career and concentrates on his subsequent
emergence as the Radical Party's chief spokesman.
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Yrigoyen ; El templario de la libertad.
Buenos Aires: Editorial Raigal,~T954\
Though eulogistic and largely uncritical, this is
the best single account of Yrigoyen' s life. Fea-
tures a superb account of the political atmos-
phere and the developing crisis during Yrigoyen'
s
second term.
Parker, William B. Argentines To-day. 2 Vols. New
York: Hispanic Society of America, 1920.
Helpful biographical sketches of over 400 living
Argentine leaders from all walks of life.
Piccirilli, Ricardo, Francisco L. Romay, and Leoncio
Gianello. Diccionario his torico argentine 6
Vols. Buenos Aires: Ediciones Historical Argen-
tinas, 1954.
Excellent for persons dead by 1954.
Quie'n es guien en la argentina ; Biografias contempor-
aneous, aho 1939 ." Buenos Aires: Kraft, 1939.
Since this source covers only living Argentines,
this early edition is particularly useful for
figures active during the Radical Period.
Rodriguez, Carlos J. Yrigoyen : Su revolucion politica
v_ social . Buenos Aires: La Facultad, 19 43.
Eulogistic account which concentrates heavily on
the pre-1916 period.
Santander, Silvano. Yrigoyen . Buenos Aires: Editor-
ial La Fragua, 1965.
Written by a journalist who interviewed Yrigoyen
after the latter 's fall in 1930, this eulogy
covers selected incidents in Yrigoyen 's life and
provides information on the major issues which
arose during Yrigoyen 's presidencies.
Torres, Arturo. Elpidio Gonzalez : Biografla de una
conducta . Buenos Aires: Editorial Raigal, 19 51.
Superficial and uncritical but still informative
and the only thing available on this leading
Radical politician.
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^iJ|J£^es argentinos. 3 Vols. Buenos Aires:Ediciones A. Fossati, 1960.
The work of over thirty collaborators, this
source presents detailed historical biographies
of 140 prominent Argentines, living and dead.Yrigoyen is not included.
Yaben, Jacinto R. Biografias argentinas y sudamerican-
as. 5 Vols. Buenos Aires: Ediciones Metropolis,1938-1940.
Not the most useful source for the present work
since it concentrates on military and naval
figures and on late nineteenth century personages.
Specialized Bibliographic Aids
Baytich, S.A. Latin America : A Bibliographic Guide to
Economy
, History , Law , Politics , and Society
.
Coral Gables: Univ. of Miami Press, 1961.
"Bibliografia sobre el petrojeo, 1865-1925, " Bole tin
de Informaciones Petroliferas
, Yacimientos e In-
dustrias
, arfo II, No. 12 (Aug. 1925), 1129-1140,
No. 13 (Sept. 1925), 1243-1254, No. 14 (Oct.
1925), 1357-1368, No. 15 (Nov. 1925), 1539-1551.
Compiled on the basis of publications from all
over the world held then by the libraries of the
Ministry of Agriculture, the Bureau of Mines and
YPF. It covers all aspects of the petroleum in-
dustry, but is organized chronologically and,
therefore, is a bit unwieldy.
Harrison, John P. Guide to Materials on Latin America
in the National Archives . Washington: National
Archives , 1961.
Harvard University, Bureau for Economic Research in
Latin America. The Economic Literature of Latin
America . 2 Vols. Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press,
1935-1936.
Union Civica Radical, Comite de la Provinciate Buenos
Aires, Comision de Cultura. Bibliografia para el
estudio del radica^ismo . Buenos Aires: Talleres
Graficos~"del Comite de la Provincia de Buenos
Aires de la Union Civica Radical, 19 52.
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More valuable for the general study of Radicalismthan for the issue of petroleum in particular.
Universida,d de Buenos Aires, Facultad de Ciencias
Economicas. Revista de Ciencias EconoWas
, 1913
19_29_, clasificacion general
, autores-materialesT"
preparado por Carlos E. Daverl^ Buenos Aires:
Imprenta de la Universidad, 19 30.
An author and subject index to this review fromits first appearance in 1913 down to 1929.
NEWSPAPERS AND PERIODICALS
Newspapers
Newspapers provided a particularly rewarding
sources for the preparation of this study, sup-
plying detail on the flow of events and statements
of attitude and policy by all groups interested
in the petroleum issue. All the following are
Buenos Aires papers, and, with the exception of
the two Independent Socialist publications, La
Libertad and Critica y_ Accion , they are avail-
able in Buenos Aires libraries. The Independent
Socialist newspapers are difficult to locate. The
Biblioteca Obrera Juan, B. Justo in Buenos Aires
has some issues of Critica y_ Accion for 1927-
1929, and I was fortunate enough to be accorded
access to a private collection of La Libertad
,
1928-1930. Of the papers listed below, microfilm-
ing has made La Epoca , La Vanguardia , La Prensa ,
and La Nacion available
-
Tn some United States li-
braries.
La Accion , 1922-1930
La Argentina , 1929-1930
Critica v_ Accion , 1927-1929
La Epoca , 1916-1930
La Libertad , 1928-1930
La Nacion, 1916-1923, 1926-1930
La Prensa, 1916-1930
345
La Razon
, 1917, 1919, 1923-1924, 1927-1928
La Vanguardia
, 1916-1930
Periodicals
Boletin de Informaciones Petroliferas ; Yacimientos e
Industrias
, 1924 :r19'65l : ~~
Monthly review initiated by YPF in September 1924.
In 19 34 the title was, shortened to Boletin de
Informaciones Petroliferas and unin terrupted~pub-
lication continued until April 1950 when it was
suspended until April 1958. Provides informa-
tion and statistics on all phases of the oil in-
dustry, particularly in Argentina.
La Ingenieria
, 1907-1930.
Bimonthly publication of the Centro Nacional de
Ingenieros. Most of the articles referring to pe-
troleum are of technical nature, but infrequently
something appears on the political side of the
issue.
El Petroleo Argentine 1923-1924.
This publication and the one which follows present
the views of the private sector of Argentina's oil
industry. Both are difficult to locate in any
quantity, although some issues of both are inclu-
ded in the microfilmed diplomatic reports from
Buenos Aires.
Petroleo y_ Minas, 1921-1922.
Forward f»-om Graduate School
to Library

